Sense of Tamland

There is really nothing new one can say about the massive Modi win except sounding a monotonous bore grinding the same old half-truisms. In any case, I will stick (for the time being) to opinionating on Tamland only because I feel that I have not read any sensible analysis and parsing of the numbers so far. 

1) General trends: The BJP and its partners took part in 38 constituencies (barring the Nilgiris mishap) of which 14 contested on a DMDK ticket, 8 on PMK, 7 on MDMK and 9 on BJP (including the KMDK and IJK candidates). Of these, there were two first place finishes (Kanni and Dharmapuri), six second place finishes, 29 third place finishes, and one fourth place finish. 

The fourth place finish of PMK in Naagai was one of wrong candidate selection -- a non-existent PMK fighting in a reasonably deep South seat which is somewhere close to religious polarization than to caste polarization. The two first place finishes were ones where strategic alignment worked successfully, Pon. Radhakrishnan in Kanni and Anbumani in Dharmapuri. If the Congress and the DMK had aligned, there is a good likelihood that Pon. Radhakrishnan would have finished second (just as in 2004 and 09). Dharmapuri (in North Tamland) presents a more confusing picture. While the caste violence between the numerically vastly dominating Vanniyars and Adi-draavidars (a Dalit sub-caste) and the subsequent action against the PMK partymen and leaders by the ADMK regime had meant that the Dalits were in favor of a ADMK candidate, the ADMK bent down to demographic destiny in picking a Vanniyar candidate. Also, picking a Vanniyar candidate was DMK. With the waters murky, some BJP-MDMK-DMDK vote bank alignment helped Anbumani cross the post by around 75000 votes -- a performance that is not much to crow about given the Vanniyar dominance in the seat. 

The six second place finishes were in Coimbatore, Erode, Pollachi, Tiruppur, Vellore and Virudhunagar. Of these, the first four are in the Kongunaadu-Gounder belt, Vellore in the Vanniyar belt and Virudhunagar in the Naicker/Naidu belt. That said, none of these were close finishes with the ADMK walking a winner comfortably in all the six seats, which just goes to show how caste consolidation behind a rainbow coalition was an ephemeral idea from the very beginning. Of the 29 third place finishes, there were close contests (defined as approx. 10K votes) with the second place candidate only in Aarani (PMK candidate) and Perambalur (IJK). Five seats were complete washouts (defined as < 1 lakh votes): North Madras, Dindigul, Karur, Thanjai, Tiruchi. Of these, four were contested by the DMDK (the other by BJP in Thanjai) showing how much DMDK punched over its weight in the coalition. Of the eight seats contested by the PMK, their candidates got over 2 lakh votes in 5 constituencies. On the other hand, DMDK could get over 2 lakh votes in just 4 of the 14 contested whereas for MDMK, this number was 3 in 7. 

Almost all the constituencies had the classic Chandu Lal Sahu episode in some form or the other. In some seats, it was a clear case of a prop candidate with the same or similar name (Chandrakasi vs. Chandragasan, etc.), in some seats, it was a creative way to introduce confusion (K. Nandagopalakrishnan vs. K. R. Radhakrishnan). Clearly, Tamlanders have some weird unique names that cannot be easily copied and there is the oft-mentioned statement: "vote for the [xyz] symbol." Those two probably explain the nonchalance of the mainstream parties to this menace. 

2) Modi wave: There most definitely was a Modi wave in Bihar and UP (and much of north and west India for that matter), but whether there was one in Tamland requires some serious statistical introspection. In the last elections, none of the BJP candidates except Pon. Radhakrishnan from Kanni and the eternal-party-hopper Su. Thirunaavukkarasar from Ramnad could get anything over 50K votes. Ela Ganesan could get no more than 43K votes in South Madras. In 2014, this scene has changed dramatically with 6 in 9 of BJP contestants securing over 2 lakh votes. Ela Ganesan in fact could win over 2.5 lakh votes, a no mean feat even in South Madras given that it has most likely no more than a few 1000s of upper castes (aka Brahmins). If Ganesan could sew up so many votes, it must have come from the educated, aspiring and climbing middle-class, of which there is plenty in South Madras. Only the total BJP washout in Thanjai is surprising given the temple town's vibes. So yes, there was a Modi wave, but not as big as in UP and Bihar. But big enough to be noticed and recognized. However, whether this is a sustaining wave is a 108$ question.

3) Deep south and religious faultlines: I define the deep south as the four semi-religiously polarized constituencies of Thirunelveli, Thoothukkudi, Kanni and Ramnad. It is remarkably surprising that the BJP contested only Kanni and Ramnad of these four. May be the fact that BJP could not secure anything more than 50K votes in the last elections had something to do with this calculation. But in any case, the story of Kanni has been told before. In addition to the lack of DMK-INC coalition, too many Christian candidates indeed mucked up the broth in a case of reverse polarization chronicled well here: Linky. The same can be said for Ramnad except that Muslims replace the role (to a certain level) of Christians in Kanni.

The strong showing in Aaduthurai of a MMK candidate is most likely because of the DMK vote bank which got transferred to MMK instead of Mani Shankar Aiyar of INC. The only other faultline that is seen is in Vellore with a strong third place finish by the IUML candidate. Again, the DMK vote bank that could have been transferred to the IUML candidate is suspect behind this strong finish.

4) Caste faultlines: The Vanniyar-Dalit fistfight in Dharmapuri spilled over into killing the bonhomie between Ramadoss and Thol. Thirumaavalavan of VCK. It was no wonder that PMK jumped at the opportunity presented by the INC's bumbling (Linky). Even some new-found bonhomie could nt help Thirumaa pull a fast one over the ADMK candidate. To rub salt into the wounds, the PMK candidate finished 30K votes behind Thirumaa, a sharp drop from the 1 lakh margin in the previous election.

The case of PT's K. Krishnasamy in Thenkasi is similar. The Pallar/Devendrakula Vellalar-Thevar faultline is seen even if the constituency is SC-reserved. The MDMK candidate finishes a strong third to rub salt into the wounds festered open by the ADMK whipping.

5) Three idiots: Three members of Idinthakarai/PMANE (Linky) that took part in the protests over the Kudankulam nuclear plant took part in elections as AAP candidates: SP Udhayakumar from Kanni, Pushparayan from Thoothukkudi, and Jesuraj from Thirunelveli. The net votes received by these rabble-rousers were 15K, 26K and 18K, so much for their credibility. More power from the power plant, please.

6) Azhagiri: With DMK suspending MK Azhagiri from the party, he was on a one-man mission to scupper DMK and Stalin's chances anywhere and everywhere. That he saw the complete decimation of DMK is no surprise given Tamland's bipolar disorder in terms of love affair with one party/coalition. Whether Azhagiri was indeed responsible for the decimation is a bit questionable though. In Madurai, he vowed to push the DMK candidate Velusamy to the third or even fourth position. However, Velusamy finished a strong second. Ditto for Theni where the DMK candidate came a strong second. Given that even a swing of a few votes in each ward could push a winner to a losing position, Azhagiri did get away with what he wanted despite their being limits on what Anjaanenjan can do (aka Anjaanenjan can fly, but not do a rope trick!).

7) Happy to see 'em get whipped: Mani Shankar Aiyar from Aaduthurai (my home town of sorts, courtesy my paternal side). Suffice it to say that, Modi's win is important because it takes upward mobility (in politics) in India from the realm of the improbable to the possible, provided one aspires for it unabashedly and with unapologetic determination -- a lesson reinforced in the vaporware circles of academe. Anyone who pisses on the climbers deserves to lose and badly so. MSA ended up fourth with < 60K votes, which just goes to show how much he badly depended on the DMK coalition to win 3.2 lakh votes last time around. Glass house, stones, anyone?! 

The bequest of Sivagangai from papa-jaan ex-Home/Finance minister was not enough to help the one-man destroyer of Indian tennis (Linky), Karti Chidambaram, get a win from there despite Sivagangai being a Nattukottai Chettiyaar bastion of sorts. Despite the Chettiyaars' philanthropy all over Madras and in Chettinaadu in particular, the deference people have for the Azhagappas, the Muthaiahs and the Annamalaiars does not easily translate to the Chidambarams, go figure! Given the high impact that the Kaanaadukathan Annamalaiar had on people in the vicinity, it is indeed a remarkable surprise to see a one-man demolition army three generations ahead. As for me, I am just happy to see that PC at least bowed down without too much mud on his face. Now if only he would have closed shop on his lectures to Modi over the last few days and let his son roil in the muck, it would have been even better. 

The other progeny to bite the dust again was EVKS Elangovan, the grand-relative of Periyar. Swapping Erode from where he finished runner-up last time to Thiruppur only got him the wooden spoon with less than 50K votes. In a land where the catcalls of "Anna naamam vaazhga, Periyaar naamam vaazhga" have been hijacked by a semi-theist outfit, it is indeed a no-brainer that there are so many DKs, let alone *MKs. 

It is indeed a pleasure to see the flopshow of VaiKo in Virudhunagar. Only a glutton for punishment would like to see one more LTTE fanboi shackle India's hands in normalizing relations with Sri Lanka with a carrot and stick approach, a much needed Modi-JJ bandwagon that could set things reasonably ok on the ground in Sri Lanka over the next few years. 

8) Corruption: If the BJP candidate had indeed filed his nomination papers right, Andimuthu Raja of the 2G infamy could have actually won the Neelagiri seat given that the BJP candidate would have split the ADMK votes happily. That around 3.6 lakh voters did not see a problem in electing Raja again shows how corruption is not so much of an issue with which one could whip up sentiments in Tamland anymore. Gone are those Rajnikanth's 1996 avatar days, may be people are just that numb of the sordid reality that is political India. If so, more power to them! Harping endlessly on corruption never got any society cleaner than a completely agnostic one. One point failure models like AAP and their fanbois can keep harping endlessly on how corruption-mukt-India is ah-so-great, but what is needed is not a mukt for corruption, but a mukt for unreasonable corruption. 

9) DMDK and BJP: The no-name brother-in-law of Narasimha aka "Tamland's original transformer-buster" came in third at Salem (and ditto for the DMDK candidate in Madurai) -- a far cry from the days when DMDK was touted as the replacement for DMK and ADMK. That should bring a sobering calm to those who tout the BJP to be a replacement to the *MK parties in Tamland. That reality seems more wishful than real, more fantastically fictituous than fanatically factual, especially given that BJP has repeatedly shown no interest or keenness or alacrity in understanding what drives Tamils. That accusation in the light of a super-strong performance might seem orthogonal, but someone needs to drive home the point that winning one polarized seat, a dynasty does not make. 

Giving a speech in Hindi in Madras may buy a few curious looks and a polite "hmmm", but that does not translate to wins that matter. For that matter, an outfit that goes with the name "aam aadmi" can hardly make any inroads in Tamland, even if Tamland is not necessarily completely agnostic to corruption matters. As far as BJP goes, aligning with casteist outfits like PMK, DMDK and MDMK might have helped an eternal runner up in Ponnar into a first place, but that does nt sync with holding a nationalist chip on the shoulder often enough. But if that was the norm, there could never have been an alliance with an LTTE-ambivalent (at best) DMK or for that matter a Khalistani-ambivalent SAD in the first place. 

The DMK's numbers are not exactly numbered in Tamland. The DMK is a resilient family-first unit that will be around in some form or the other for at least the next decade and more. While Mu Ka and Stalin draw an eerie parallel with Elizabeth II and Prince Charles, there is already a next generation in the form of Udhayanidhi who is all that Mu Ka Muthu could never be. What DMK lacks, just like what the ADMK lacks in a more serious form, is a strong rank and file that is deep in terms of intellect or strategic thinking. DMK leading men such as Naavalar Nedunchezhiyan, NVN Somu, Veerapandi Aarumugam are no more and it is not far from the day when more will pass away. That the idealistic enterprise has transformed into a family business with a hand in every profitable pie is no surprise. Yet, the business-first mentality will make the unit survive in some form. 

Less can be said about ADMK given the absolutely asymmetrical power structure of the organization. Nevertheless, the ADMK's steady vote bank today (the Thevars) is not necessarily available for poaching by the BJP. One look at the ADMK candidate list shows how JJ has been cultivating pockets of deep influence in the Vanniyar and Gounder belts, in addition to the traditional Thevar belt. Some post-Congress feelings in the Naadar community is also seen to lead to some bonhomie with BJP and to a certain extent with ADMK. The broad point being, the lack of a second rung leadership hierarchy NOW does not in any case disabuse or suspend the (magical) formation of such as and when the need arises. The eternal truth is that nature abhors vacuum! 

10) Net winners and losers from the hustings:

Winners: JJ, BJP/Modi, Pon. Radhakrishnan, Anbumani Ramadoss 

Hon. mention: Azhagiri 

Losers: Stalin, the Maarans, A. Raja, Vijayakanth, Vai Ko, Dalit parties 

Hon. mention: Today's Chaanakya with a 7 plus or minus 3 seat prediction which was always laughable in the first place for anyone who has a grasp of what drives Tamland 

Vishwaroopam and aftermath

It is more than a week since I watched Vishwaroopam and I think I have given myself enough time to sit back and ponder at what it is all supposed to mean.

Having made my penchant to dislike Kamal Hassan and his social messaging very clear, nevertheless, I must admit that Vishwaroopam is a brilliant movie with a deep sense of story-telling in multiple layers. Unfortunately it is too brilliant a movie for a vast majority of the Tamil/Indian audience, especially the ones who come to watch the movie. The movie, from the start to the finish, caters primarily to the middle-class and even if that segment has grown in Tamland and India quite rapidly over the last two decades, the messages are too complicated to be grasped in one sitting. After having watched the movie, it appears to be a perfect movie to have been taken DTH as its intended audience (the middle-class) is the one that could have most benefited by seeing it at home rather than at the theaters. 

The topic it handles, terrorism, to be quite honest, is something that a common man hardly, if ever, encounters in real life. Given that I do work on terrorism models and read enough banalities on terrorism matters, the above cannot be but a most severe short-selling on one's own source of paycheck. But, facts are indeed facts. The number of terrorism incidents in India (or for that matter even the most violent country in the world, however one benchmarks it: level of violence, number of fatalities or injuries, economic damage, psychological hold of fear and terror, loss of hold of the State suzerainty, nexus on criminality of society, etc.,) still borders on a few thousands of attacks (I extract them from different databases and impute for missing data, so I do have some confidence on the guesstimates), a few thousands dead/injured/maimed, a few hundreds of crores INR in economic damage, and loss of State suzerainty in a small geographical territory relative to the size of India. Even aberrational examples such as Peru, Colombia or Sri Lanka have shown that when it comes to the war on terror, the State holds a completely asymmetric advantage to kill a terrorist outfit(s) as it emboldens itself (with finances and weaponry, global support or otherwise, and more importantly, the ability and capability to take endless damages) to stage the final battle. And the most successful of terrorist outfits in history are political parties today (ANC, DMK, Akali Dal, Shiv Sena, Communist parties of various stripes that have come to terms with democratic ideals, etc.) which goes to the grain of the idea of what defines a successful terrorist outfit: usurp power, prestige, wealth, control (real and imagined) and sustenance in an as least resistant and least compromised path as possible. 

Of course, a relative comparison with other issues such as accidental deaths, environmental damage, corruption losses, etc., are meaningless and rhetorical point-scoring used by peace-niks and pro-establishmentists to piss wide and far on matters that do not affect them in reality. And while one would love to be in a scenario where terrorism damages are completely wiped out, it must also be pointed that the power of terrorism lies primarily in its power to terrorize people disproportionate to its real connect to day-to-day living. In some sense, the power of terrorism is like a High Voltage transmission line, both are visible gargantuan leviathans, when in reality the ideal response is to not play a mind game that is skewed to one side (the terrorist's). To cut down the moral pontification (aka semantics and rhetorical gymnastics), one suffers the pain of terrorism if one has been a victim or knows a near and dear one who is. For much of middle-class India, the power of terrorism is not immediate and it comes from watching media stories unfolding essentially live, and from reading newspapers and social media. For much of rural and left-behind India, the power of terrorism is more immediate but not commonly attributed to the outfits classified as terrorist by the Government of India. Much of the terror in rural India is systemic terror of various socio-economic and often identity clashes. While Vishwaroopam tries to portray a continuing battle between a rational terrorist and an intelligent and rooted spook, both matched only in their superhuman-ness and endless ability to continue the battle, and in that sense is perhaps a closer portrayal to reality (minus the theatrical liberties) than much else of the Indian fare, it still explores a topic that is too far from reality. 

But more to my sociological interest, Vishwaroopam continues the trend of Tamil cinema evolving into more and more intelligent themes that are primarily targeted at the middle-class than at rural and left-behind India. Note that Tamil cinema has continually evolved from the mythological musical fare of Ellis R. Dungan to pure ideologicals aimed at social change in the 40s to the "Sirippom Sindhippom" fare of ideology seamlessly infused amidst entertainment in the 50s to early middle-class family and social dramas of the 60s and 70s to the angry young man/masala era of the late-70s and 80s to the inward looking 90s followed by the outward looking today. The outward looking-ness that is more or less common today does not shy away from naming Pakistan or China or the white man or terrorism as enemies and in that sense, is a remarkable transformation that TMMK and other ideological neanderthals would best notice. If the protesting TMMK intended to make their point across that terrorism has no religion, their actions are most likely to be perceived by much of middle-class India to be much ado about nothing, of sound and fury that symbolized the sorpozhivus of DMK in the late 50s and 60s. In short, the TMMK have scored an own goal and must be congratulated on that. As must be Kamal Hassan in his ability to indulge in selective hypocrisies and in that sense, he is not in a league of his own. He has the unmatched support of much of India, and the political mainstream, where hypocrisy and "do as I say, not as I do" are the norms. 

Of course, Kamal Hassan could have shortcutted all this drama and just handed over the local TV rights to Jaya TV or whoever that had approached him. Hindsight, as everyone knows, is 400% perfect, but life aint. 

Politically Incorrect: Part Duh

1) Any organization that has not gone extinct over a 100+ year period must be doing something right in terms of organization theory, whether it is retaining the most productive employees, or the biggest contributors/stars/power-brokers, or the best man/woman-managers, or the biggest salesmen/women. While this truism is easily grasped when someone mentions technology companies such as IBM, GE, Ford, etc., that same truism escapes when one talks of the Congress Party or Hinduism. Despite fond wishes of many in the wild world that is out there, neither organization has gone extinct. And neither looks imminent to go extinct anytime soon despite fond hopes/wishes/fears of many. All that remarkable cussing aimed at the Congress Party in one's angst ignores the simple fact that the Congress Party is home to hundreds of years of top-notch management experience that is decentralized so that Barabasi's famous "take a few nodes out and you are safe and dry" result will not kick in.

The Congress Party has not shied away from hitting out at people it has deemed to have crossed a certain limit, whether they be Sheikh Abdullah or the Sikhs or based out of Bhagalpur or out of Nellie. If Narendra Modi is a monster for ruling Gujarat during the Godhra-riots and doing nothing (1169 dead), by the same yardstick, here is a list of major riots under the Congress Party rule:

1969 – Gujarat, Congress Government, Jagan Mohan Reddy Commission, 660 dead.
1983 – Nellie, Congress Government, Tribhuvan Prasad Tiwari Commission, 2191 dead.
1984 – Delhi, Congress Government, Nanavati Commission, 3296 dead.
1989 – Bhagalpur, Congress Government, R. C. Prasad & Shamsul Hasan Commission, 1070 dead.
1992 – Mumbai, Congress Government, Srikrishna Commission, 900 dead.

Clearly, the repeated electoral triumphs in Assam shows that the Congress Party has been "forgiven" if electoral mandate is the modus operandi of legitimacy in a democracy. That trend is true not only in Assam, but also in Punjab and Bombay where we have seen the Congress Party come back to power time and again. It cannot be rationally argued that the Congress Party is an aberrant deviant foisted on the people by all-pervading external powers when it is a fact that it has been repeatedly accepted by the people of the state independent of the fact that whether people had better choices or otherwise. A simple lesson that the political Opposition can learn is to realize that it is not sufficient to fight a battle, but it is necessary to fight a battle sophisticatedly. Whatever the Congress Party lacks (leaders or otherwise), it does not lack cunning. In short, the BJP needs to transform itself from being like the Indian cricket team of the early-90s and do a Dada's Lord's dance, at least for the sake of the health of a still-nascent democracy. If the noisy rank and file and the empathizers/sympathizers club of the Party are any indication, the Party seems to have less brain than bravado, less rationality than cries of victimhood, and less brawn than is needed to become an automatic choice for the ruling party.

2) Corruption has been the number 1 issue that this "cunning" Opposition has tried to tackle the Congress Party on. While that plank displays the bankruptcy of ideas in the Opposition camp, the fact that corruption has become the number 1 issue amongst the Gen. Y shows how remarkably callow and lead-able the new generation is/can be. Let me take a polar plank and claim that corruption is NOT the number 1 problem in India. And fixing corruption is NOT going to fix India. The problem with the current state of India is not corruption because corruption is rife in most places that thrive economically today: whether it is called "lobbying" (the US), or "party politics" (China), or "the price to conduct business" (Singapore and West Asian states) or any other nuanced phrase (much of Europe and the UK) that embellishes a simple fact that overheads is a part of life, academic or otherwise. India (or any other superpower for that matter) cannot rid itself of corruption in a time-bound manner because corruption will exist till the last corrupt man/woman exists and that will be true till the last man/woman exists. While a philosophical viewpoint that everyone is corrupt is a truism, what India needs to focus on is to rid the simpler/least economical aspects of life from corruption in a time-bound manner. While few Indians can see the real impact of 2G or the assorted set of mining-related scams or Commonwealth Games scam, most of the poor can feel the pinch of having to bribe to file a FIR, having to bribe to get a driver/commercial license, having to bribe to get a ration card/passport/UID, etc. "India against corruption" would be wise to rename themselves "India for inflating away corruption from the common-man" even if the acronym would be a nice ii-a-cc which in the classical rendition of Madras Tamil would be uttered as "ai-ai-ah-chee-chee".

3) That brings us to that other successful "organization" in my first point: Hinduism. While many religious folks would find branding of Hinduism as an organization offensive, the very fact that it has survived for hundreds of years of Buddhist/Jaina polity followed by a few hundred years of Sultanate and British rule means that fears of complete annihilation and destruction are a-bit-over-the-top. To cut to the chase, Hinduism has survived because of favorable demographics and when push comes to shove, most Hindus fight a battle to the death (even if they are members of the Congress Party). In that sense, the Hindus are no exceptions to any other set of religious folks: most religions fight to the death when it comes to existential questions, or else they will perish. Even the peace-loving Buddhist/Jainist traditions are no exception to this Darwinian rule. The eternal claims to victimhood of many Gen. X/Y Hindus display more about the person claiming to be a victim than about the idea to which he/she subscribes to. That does not mean that one should sit idle if one sees a blatantly shameful act that exploits the state's obligation to certain rights for everyone, but one should learn to educate themselves in terms of cunning, whether it is legal or otherwise.

Politically Incorrect: Comments on recent incidents

1) The BJP was given a chance to prove its governance credentials in the South when the people of Karnataka elected the party to power in 2008. While it could be argued that the 2008 win for BJP was a punishment to the JDS for reneging on the power-sharing deal, it was a great opportunity for the BJP to make its case in the entire South by means of proof by action, rather than via the standard rhetoric of proof by words. Four years into the BJP rule, we see that the BJP is not very different from the other national party -- the INC. Intrigues and factionalism, divisiveness and ineptitude, endless corruption -- you name it, BJP == INC. Latest in the exhibit list of inept behavior by the BJP is the exodus of Indians from the Northeast from Bangalore. On why this is ineptitude on the part of the State government and not the Central government, here is some civics 101: Law and order is a state subject with the administrative hierarchy going the way of Home Secretary --> Home Minister --> Chief Minister. May be the parties involved are busy soothing the egos of the Vokkaligas and Lingayats frayed in the succession battle of a few weeks back? Or may be everyone involved is counting the moneys tithed by the mining mafia?

2) That said, there are fears that the Indians from the Northeast will be divorced from "mainstream" India because of this one incident. Nothing could be farther from the truth and this one incident will have little say in the matters. The truth on the ground is that we "mainstream" Indians have a deep fear in accommodating people who do not look like us, who do not speak like us, who do not live like us, who do not [fill in the blank]. That fear is not patented by "mainstream" Indians, it is a classic sociological divide that comes naturally. Why, we even sub-divide ourselves and hunt down affinities to belong to, an entirely different story. Modulo all that, we really have a problem that we are unwilling to accede to and which the "mainstream" Indians are guilty of -- we have divorced our fellow Indians from the Northeast from us and us from them, because they look slightly differently from us, and that too only because of microscopic mitochondrial mutations. No amount of ostrich-like hiding under the bench will change facts on the ground. In that sense, this one incident will have no bearing on how people behave with each other and treat each other. "Mainstream" middle-class Indians in their vanity have essentially ignored much of India, why we hardly have a clue about rural India and what goes for educational facilities in rural India.

3) Let us look at this exodus of Indians from the Northeast from major "mainstream" Indian cities a bit more objectively. If it appears that the source of all this fear and paranoia is indeed provocative social media messages from the Islamist segment of India, this act will have indeed set forth a circle of reactive acts. In one swift act, the Muslims (from West Bengal, Bihar, Bangladesh, Assam and Manipur) will have created bucketloads of enemies at the drop of a hat. Manipuri Pangals have had a long history of co-existing with the Mizo, Naga and Hindu/Sanamahi Meitei affinities, but then as we saw in the blockades and counter-blockades of not-so-long-back, it is dried wood that needs no big sparks to set fire to. It is indeed the valiant who will blasely assume that only one party is the eternal victim and the other the eternal victimizer. Even a casual reading of history shows that both the Muslims and other "tribal" affinities have hit back and forth with violence and vengeance that is all so human. If there is a truce on the ground as witnessed by less of Muslim-tribal fistfights, it is because of a stalemate enforced by lack of demographic opportunities to see a battle to the finish. However, such a game at its supposed Nash equilibrium can change in the solution contours by a small change in the assumptions, such as more determination to seek vengeance. So, in short, the Muslims (if indeed they are the agent provocateurs) have by choice pitted themselves in a losing demographic battle in "mainstream" India and bucketloads of enemies with potentially more determination in the Northeast. If that is indeed a trajectory chosen by strategic foresights rather than by pure chance, such insights richly deserve the Darwin award!

4) Continuing on the path of continually questioning assumptions, here is one more. The recent Bangladeshi Muslim and Assamese Muslim vs. Bodo fistfight in Kokrajhar and elsewhere have really nothing to do with the "Muslim" factor. Even if Bangladesh were overwhelmingly Hindu, we would have had a similar problem, just less violent. To make such profound conclusions, one needs to fit some known theories to human behavior. In this direction, here is my (not-so-lame) attempt at using thermodynamic principles for violence and chaos.

First Law: The amount of violence in an essentially isolated society (dU) is given by T dS - P dV, where T is a measure of misgovernance in the territory, S is a measure of distinction between identities, P is a measure of the combativeness of peoples, and V is the amount of foraging space for the various contestants.

So you see, the only thing that will change is P (hopefully the level of combativeness between Hindu Bengalis and Bodos may not be as high as that between Muslim Bengalis/Bangladeshis and Bodos with an overwhelming religious slant).

In the same vein, here is an equivalent form of the Second Law (just to complete things): People continue to self-divide themselves into sub-identities. And if there is none, there will be a need to invent one.

I could come up with a Third Law that connects the God phenomenon with identities and sub-identities, and thus close the circle, but lets just say enough political bullshit for the day!

Making Sense of the Manipuri Verdict 2012 -- Part II

We continue from the previous post (Linky) on interpreting the Manipur mandate 2012.

Manipur has nine administrative districts and 60 Assembly constituencies (see Footnote 1). The Imphal Valley has approx 60% of the state's population whereas the Hill districts have approx 40% of the population. Due to delimitation exercises done as late as 2011, the Valley has been divided into 40 Assembly constituencies and the Hill districts have 19 reserved (for ST candidates -- read as Kuki/Chin/Mizo and Naga tribal affinities -- only) constituencies and 1 general constituency (in Senapati district). The main candidate parties for the Assembly elections were: i) INC, ii) Manipur People's Party (MPP), iii) Naga People's Front (NPF), iv) Manipur State Congress Party (MSCP), v) All India Trinamool Congress (AITC), vi) CPI, vii) CPM, viii) Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), ix) Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), x) BJP, xi) BSP, xii) Janata Dal (United), xiii) Janata Dal (Secular), etc. Of these, the first five are/were serious contenders to be meaningful participants in the Assembly debates with enough members to change the course of certain policy decisions, while the rear end had/has their pockets of influence in Manipur but not severe enough to dent the course of the main contenders.

First, some useful statistics from the elections and comparable data from the 9th Assembly elections of 2007. Most of the data have been sourced from:
1) Linky 1
2) Linky 2
3) Linky 3
4) Linky 4
5) Linky 5
6) Linky 6.

Voting percentage: 79.8% of the electorate (86.73% in 2007)
Overall seat wins: INC 42, AITC 7, MSCP 5, NPF 4, LJP 1, NCP 1 (In 2007, it was INC 30, MPP 5, NCP 5, CPI 4, RJD 3, NPP 3, Independent 10)
No. of women winners: 3 (Akoijam Mirabai, Okram Landhoni Devi (wife of Okram Ibobi Singh), Nemcha Kipgen)
In 2007, it was one when Okram Landhoni Devi won the Khangabok seat vacated by the resignation of CM Okram Ibobi Singh who had also won from Thoubal.
Big-time losers:
1) Radhobinod Koijam (former CM and NCP state unit President),
2) L. Jayantakumar Singh and 3) D. D. Thaisii (both Ministers in the previous Cabinet)
4) O. Joy Singh (veteran MPP leader)
5) Th. Chaoba Singh (another veteran MPP leader)

Lessons from the elections:
1) Toothless Opposition: The MPP, CPM, NCP, JD(U) and RJD had initially come under the People's Democratic Front umbrella to fight the incumbent INC regime and this combine soon became the People's Democratic Alliance of eleven non-Congress parties (with the inclusion of AITC, CPI, BJP, MSCP, NPP and NPF). While it may remain questionable (in the minds of a few) that the eventual outcome was whether a massive mandate for the Congress, it certainly was a mandate against an ineffective, toothless Opposition with nothing much in common except a visceral hatred towards INC rule. Very often have we seen such maha-parivars fail to usurp the sitting party and the Opposition has yet again made a big mistake in sensing people's moods and sentiments. The facts that the INC government was hobbled by many a scandal and handled the economic blockade (see Footnote 2) by the Nagas and the tit-for-tat from the Kukis rather poorly did not seem to have had any impact on the voters. In fact, from 30 seats in 2007, INC has increased its tally to 42 in 2012. More specifically,

For the first time in over a quarter century or more, a single party has won an absolute majority in the 60-member state assembly.

This is just a direct reflection of the quality of Opposition in the elections.

2) Congress' Performance: As for the INC, it stood in all the 60 constituencies. Of the 40 Valley constituencies, it won in 28 seats, came a strong second in 9, came a strong third in 2 and got washed out in Langthabal where its candidate Waikhom Shyama Devi was no match for other contestants. In the Hill constituencies, INC won in 14 of the 19 reserved seats and came a strong second in 5. In the Kangpokpi (Gen) seat in Senapati district, INC came third behind MSCP and AITC. Thus, INC could claim to have had an across-the-state presence amongst all the three sets of peoples -- Meiteis, Kukis and Nagas. The Meiteis of the Valley seem to have polarized strongly in favor of INC as witnessed by the strong showing of INC in the Valley. Or have they?

3) Kuki vs. Naga votes in the Hill constituencies: The NPF took to the hustings in 12 of the 19 reserved seats. Its performance was first in 4 seats (Chandel (ST), Karong (ST), Mao (ST) and Ukhrul (ST)), a second in 3 seats and a third in 5 seats. As noted above, INC came first in 14 of the 19 reserved seats and came a strong second in 5. The remaining seat was won by MSCP (which had come first in Tamenglong (ST)) ahead of the INC and NPF candidates. The Kangpokpi (general) seat was won by MSCP ahead of AITF and INC. Of the 9 Kuki dominated seats including Kangpokpi, INC has won in 8 and MSCP in 1, while in the 11 Naga dominated seats, INC has won 6, NPF in 4, and MSCP in 1.

4) More on the NPF flop-show: In the 12 seats where the INC and NPF had directly contested, the scorecard was INC 7-5-0, NPF 4-3-5. In terms of district-wise divisions, of the three seats in Tangkhul Naga dominated Ukhrul district (Chingai (ST), Phungyar (ST), Ukhrul (ST)), NPF could win only in one seat (Ukhrul (ST)) and that too by a slim margin of 70 votes over the INC candidate with the BJP candidate (Danny Shaiza who was an independent MLA in the 2007 Assembly) coming a strong third. Further, in Chingai (ST), an independent candidate (Khashim Vashum who was embroiled in a recent controversy Linky) had come second ahead of the NPF candidate.

In the three seats of the Kabui-Kacha Naga dominated Tamenglong district (Nungba (ST), Tamei (ST), Tamenglong (ST)), NPF had failed to win a single seat. In fact, in Nungba (ST) and Tamei (ST), the MSCP and AITC candidates had come second ahead of the NPF candidate, respectively. In Tamenglong, both MSCP and INC candidates had come ahead of NPF candidate. In the six seats of Senapati district, the NPF contested three and came 1-1-2 (Mao (ST)-Karong (ST)-Tadubi (ST)). However, in Mao (ST), the AITC candidate was a strong third behind NPF and INC. In the six seats of Churachandpur district, NPF contested one and came third (Heinglep (ST)) behind the INC and AITC candidates. In the two seats of Chandel district, NPF came 1-2 (Chandel (ST)-Tengnoupal (ST)) with the win in Chandel (ST) coming by a margin of 60 votes.

Thus, the NPF had provided a knockout win in only 2 of the 12 constituencies it had contested in. The numbers also indicate that the NPF seems to have had the backing of Mao-Maram-Anal-Maring-Paomei affinities, but not the Kabui-Kacha Naga-Tangkhul Naga affinities. For a party that had put its credibility at stake in terms of being the united Naga voice and the grand spearhead of the Nagalim campaign within the Manipur Assembly, such a show was a massively poor outcome. This intra-Naga dynamic should not be completely surprising. NPF which is also a part of the DAN government in Nagaland is dominated by Angami Nagas (Nagaland CM Dr. Neiphiu Rio and NPF founder Shurhozelie Liezietsu are Angamis), whereas NSCN (IM) is dominated by Tangkhul (Muivah) and Sema (Swu) Nagas and NSCN (K) based primarily out of Arunachal and Burma is dominated by Konyak (Khaplang) Nagas. Kacha Nagas have been at the forefront of the massive Kuki genocide of 1992-93 (see Footnote 3) in Tamenglong district and elsewhere and have migrated more towards Tangkhul Nagas and NSCN (IM) in this interregnum. Thus, even though the NPF was promised NSCN (IM) support in the pre-election setting, assuming that this support was forthcoming on the ground seems like a mirage.

5) Grand-Nagalim Project: The role played by Nagaland CM Dr. Neiphiu Rio in inflaming emotions in the Naga-dominated regions of Manipur when he was campaigning for NPF needs attention. In fact, Rio had stated the following at an election rally in Tamenglong district on January 19 (Linky):

Last year, Ibobi Singh and his cabinet decided that they will not allow the Naga Chief Minister to enter the State, but now that the elections have been announced, he no longer has the power to prevent me from coming here and meeting you. But if you let him win again I will not be able to come to Manipur to meet all of you.

Needless to say, that remark was in rather poor taste and the poor show of NPF was richly deserved.
Overall, the impression one gets from the NPF campaign is that the whole of Nagaland (DAN, INC as well as NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NNC, Naga Hoho, etc.) is firmly behind the grand-Nagalim project. Only the methods adopted by the different actors change from time to time, some adopt democratic means, some use coercive means; some use legal means, some use extra-legal means, and so on. Nevertheless, despite all overall impressions of union, when it comes to tit for tat, things breakdown along tribal sub-affinities.

6) Comparison with 2007: Note that in the 2007 Assembly elections, the INC which had won a total of 30 seats took 25 from the Valley and only 5 from the reserved Hill seats (3 in Churachandpur district -- Churachandpur (ST), Hinglep (ST), Saikot (ST), one in Senapati district -- Karong (ST) and one in Tamenglong district -- Nungba (ST)). The Hill seats breakdown for 2007 was 5 in favor of INC, 3 (including Kangpokpi) for the NPP, 2 for the RJD, 1 for the NCP and 9 for independents supported by the NPF, ANSAM and the Naga combine. Here is a theory to explain the reversal in fortunes for MPP, NPP, NPF, RJD, INC, etc.

In contrast to the NPF's woes, INC has won 6 out of 6 seats in Churachandpur district, 3 of 6 in Senapati district, 2 of 3 in Ukhrul and Tamenglong districts, and 1 of 2 in Chandel district. While almost all of these wins do not appear to be massive/overwhelming and appear to be steals in a tri-cornered fight with a spoiler candidate, the endorsement of INC can only be logically explained as the Kuki side's tilt to INC (the only possible perceptible winner) as a backlash to the ANSAM enforced Naga blockade (see Footnote 2).

7) Rise of the Trinamool Congress: In contrast to what Nitin Gokhale states (Linky):

Mamata Banerjee's Trinamool Congress, never before a force to reckon with in Manipur, has won seven seats in the recent assembly elections, overtaking established political forces like the Manipur People's Party.

the rise of AITC should be seen in the light of: i) how a strong dynamic in West Bengal will always have (and has always had!) an influence in all the Northeastern states (not just Manipur), ii) the brand of minority politics wielded by the likes of AITC and CPM -- both of which are constrained by realpolitik of a rising and enlightening Muslim votebank and who are never shy of showing off their secular credentials, iii) how the AITC had become popular amidst the also-running Opposition parties as witnessed by its success in the bye-elections of 2011 (Linky).

8) Looking at the Trinamool performance more closely: The Trinamool Congress won in the following constituencies (winners in 2007 elections are given in parentheses):
a) Thounaojam Shyamkumar -- Andro by 10432 votes (T. Shyamkumar on MPP ticket)
b) Maibam Kunjo -- Hiyanglam by 17 votes (Elangbam Dwijamani Singh of INC)
c) Konthoujam Sharat Singh -- Konthoujam by 514 votes (Late Dr. Sapam Budhichandra Singh of INC)
d) Irengbam Ibohalbi Singh -- Oinam by 956 votes (I. I. Singh on MPP ticket)
e) Khumukcham Joykishan Singh -- Thangmeiband by 984 votes (Radhabinod Koijam of NCP)
f) Thongam Biswajit Singh -- Thongju by 603 votes (Bijoy Koijam of INC)
g) Oinam Lukhoi Singh -- Wangoi by 182 votes (Salam Joy Singh of NCP)
Thus, of the seven seats Trinamool won in 2012, three were sitting MLAs -- two won the elections in 2007 on a MPP ticket and one had won the bye-elections of 2011. Thus, Trinamool Congress has gained significantly due to defections from MPP. Further, three of the winning seats are in Imphal west district, two in Imphal east and one each in Thoubal and Bishnupur, all in the Valley area. This makes a case that Trinamool had a backing only in the Meitei areas and not much in the Kuki-Naga areas. Such a coarse analysis misses the big picture.

The Trinamool finished a strong second (several thousand votes) in 16 constituencies of which 6 were reserved constituencies (Churachandpur (ST), Henglep (ST), Saikot (ST), Saikul (ST), Singhat (ST), Tipaimukh (ST)), a strong third in 11 constituencies of which 4 were reserved constituencies (Mao (ST), Saitu (ST), Tadubi (ST), Tengnoupal (ST)), and a strong fourth in 4 constituencies of which one was reserved (Ukhrul (ST)). In other words, the Trinamool has been a strong candidate in 37 of the 48 seats it contested, making it the number 2 party in the state by any metric and the biggest riser from 2007. Of these 11 reserved constituencies, 5 are in Senapati district, 5 in Churachandpur district and one in Chandel district. In Ukhrul and Tamenglong districts (both Naga dominated), the Trinamool took to the polls in only 2 of the 6 constituencies getting washed out in both. Thus, a strong case can be made that the Trinamool is becoming the no. 2 party of choice of both Meiteis and Kukis.

9) Trinamool Trend: It may appear that the rise of Trinamool Congress is perhaps a temporary aberration of people putting more hope in the Trinamool than in the Opposition combine of Manipur. The moment there is a sense of de javu and hopelessness that Trinamool Congress is just another party is the moment it shall lose its rising stars -- the ball for which is in the court of the Trinamool, of course. On the other hand, if the AITC does snatch this ball (so-to-speak), it could be the alternate pole sorely needed in the Indian Northeast to the INC given that the BJP has seemed to have fallen off from its high of 1998-2004. More so, the rise of the Indian Northeast cannot be ensured without the co-option of West Bengal and AITC's rise augurs well for this prospect (also bringing with it all the pitfalls that already constrain West Bengal's polity today). In addition, AITC could be seen more hopefully by people in the Northeast to solve regional problems than the likes of BJP given the image manufactured by AITC so far. For example, prior to the elections, AITC had given support to withdrawal of AFSPA from Manipur. Further, a good showing in a few more states could give a fillip to AITC's seeking of National Party status, which will bring in its own added momentum (Linky) and the consequence of the bold standing up to the INC in coalition politics will have its own unintended consequences.

Overall,
1) In response to the Naga blockade crisis, the Meiteis of the Valley seem to have chosen to stick with the INC -- more or less the only credible choice -- and put AITC over the rest of the established parties such as NCP, MPP, MSCP, etc.
2) In contrast to an ambivalent 2007, the Kukis seem to have sided with the INC and partly with AITC.
3) The Nagas seem to have been vertically divided along tribal sub-affinities in terms of support to NPF (Nagalim issue and territorial sovereignty of Manipur).
4) This dynamic means that INC has been able to land a whitewash despite massively poor economic upliftment of the people of Manipur, enormous increase in extortion activities and the business of terrorism, and complete stalling of bureaucracy/officialdom over the previous five years. The fact that INC has not had any major success in any of the other four state elections except for a marginal performance in Uttarakhand means that this win stands out for its complete surprise.
5) If any of the Opposition parties have to make a dent into this quickly transforming INC bastion (along with Assam where the illegal votebank has become a de facto powerbroker), they have to see past the fractiousness of the tribal divisions and present a credible solution to Manipur's economic woes. The only seeming prospect as of now appears to be AITC, but it is a hope banked on hope rather than on performance. If such an alternative is not coming soon, it is advantage INC to maintain status quo in spite of poor performance. The INC should feel like the ball is in the Opposition court for they have to manufacture a win out of nothing in 2017 (or earlier).
6) Despite all the whitewashes, the bluster of NPF and the Opposition combine shall continue as the blame for the whitewash will fall on imaginary conspiracies.

Other Minor Facts:
1) The biggest margin of victory was achieved by the incumbent CM Okram Ibobi Singh from the Thoubal constituency. Other 10K+ margin winners include Thounaojam Shyamkumar of AITC from
Andro and Ginsuanhau of INC from Singhat (ST).
2) Out of the 60 newly elected MLAs of the Manipur Assembly, no MLA has declared criminal cases against him/her. 57 of the 60 are men and 3 are women. In terms of educational qualification, 49 out of 60 are graduates with only 4 being 10th Pass and below.
3) Out of all 60 MLAs analyzed from Manipur 2012 Assembly Elections, 16 are crorepatis. In 2007 Assembly Election for the whole of Manipur only 1 MLA was crorepati.
4) The MLA with maximum assets in Manipur is T.N. Haokip of INC from Saikot (ST) constituency with assets worth Rs. 10.07 crores followed by Ksh. Biren Singh of INC from Lamlai with assets worth Rs. 5.22 crores and R.K. IMO Singh of MSCP from Sagoiband constituency with assets worth Rs. 2.72 crores. Among major parties, the average asset per candidate for INC is Rs. 1.05 crores, for AITC is Rs. 69.8 lakhs, for MSCP is Rs. 97.43 lakhs, and for NPF is Rs. 68.5 lakhs.
5) The number of re-elected MLAs from 2007 is 35. Of these 35, the average asset value in 2007 was Rs. 20.02 lakhs. The average asset value of this set in 2012 is Rs. 1.18 crore. Of these,
a) T.N. Haokip of INC's asset worth increased from Rs. 29.73 lakhs in 2007 to Rs. 10.07 crores in 2012.
b) Ksh. Biren Singh of INC's asset worth increased from Rs. 14.23 lakhs in 2007 to Rs. 5.22 crores in 2012.
c) Kh. Govindas of INC's asset worth increased from Rs. 38.25 lakhs in 2007 to Rs. 2.49 crores in 2012.
Other notable increases include:
d) K. Meghachandra of INC's assets rose from Rs. 2.90 lakhs in 2007 to Rs. 2.06 crores in 2012.
e) Akoijam Mirabai Devi of INC's assets rose from Rs. 30.5 thousand in 2007 to Rs. 14.40 lakhs in 2012.
f) K. Ranjit Singh of INC's assets rose from Rs. 3.82 lakhs in 2007 to Rs. 1.70 crores in 2012.

Footnotes:
1) The smallest number that can be had for a Legislative Assembly is 60, unless there is a Constitutional exception by an Act of the Parliament (as is the case with Sikkim, Mizoram and Goa). See Linky for details.

2) When the Centre decided to hold ADC elections in Manipur, the All Naga Students Association of Manipur (ANSAM) and the Naga Students Federation (NSF) began a blockade of NH-39 in April 2010 to protest the decision. In May 2010, the crisis took a bitter turn when the State government disallowed NSCN (IM) general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah from visiting his village Somdal in Ukhrul. During the four-month long blockade, Manipur was strapped for severely needed resources like petrol, LPG and basic food commodities. As Kuki-Naga tensions worsened, the NSCN (IM) was accused of trying to stall the democratic process in Manipur where nearly 200,000 voters would vote. A year later, in 2011, Kuki groups from Manipur started a 122-day blockade to draw attention to their demand — declare Sarda in Senapati district an autonomous district for Kukis. Both blockades crippled the State economically and losses ran to the tune of Rs. 250 crore.

In fact, there is a precedent from 2002 and 2007 to the claim that economic blockades matter zilch in Manipur.

3) Within the Hill districts, Kuki and Naga militia have been at loggerheads since the 1990s, with Kuki groups asking for the establishment of an Autonomous District Council (ADC) in Senapati, and Naga groups, backed by the NPF and NSCN (IM), demanding that large chunks of the four Hill districts be part of Greater Nagalim since these areas were inhabited by Tangkhul Nagas.

Understanding the Manipuri Verdict -- Part I

Elections to the 10th Legislative Assembly of Manipur has just now been completed with the people's mandate counted and declared. It makes sense to understand the subtle and not-so-subtle meanings of this democratic mandate as Manipur is not only a frontier and fractured state, but also because this could have serious import on the business of counterterrorism in the Indian Northeast for a significant period.

But before this task can be undertaken, the numbers that make Manipur need to be understood. For this, we follow-up from Linky in our goal of understanding Manipur and its peoples.

1) There are nine administrative districts in Manipur: i) Bishnupur, ii) Imphal East, iii) Imphal West, iv) Thoubal, v) Churachandpur, vi) Chandel (formerly known as Tengnoupal), vii) Senapati, viii) Tamenglong, and ix) Ukhrul. A picture of the district map of Manipur is available at: (Linky).

2) Of these, the four districts of Bishnupur, Imphal East, Imphal West and Thoubal form the Valley or plateau region while the rest form the Hilly area. The area of Manipur is 22,327 sq km, of which 20,736 sq km is the surrounding Hills and the remaining area is the Valley. Clearly, the population density in the Valley is much much more than the density in the Hilly districts.

3) From the 2011 census, the population of the various districts of Manipur is as below (Linky). Also provided is the district's population percentage relative to the state's population in the 2001 census

Manipur total population: 2,721,756 = 100%

Valley population: 1,628,224 = 59.79% (2011) 61.54% (2001)
Bishnupur - 240,363 = 8.83% 9.08%
Thoubal - 420,517 = 15.45% 15.87%
Imphal West - 514,683 = 18.91% 19.37%
Imphal East - 452,661 = 16.63% 17.21%

Hills population: 1,093,532 = 40.18% (2011) 38.46% (2001)
Senapati - 354,972 = 13.04% 12.36%
Tamenglong - 140,143 = 5.15% 4.86%
Churachandpur - 271,274 = 9.97% 9.94%
Ukhrul - 183,115 = 6.73% 6.14%
Chandel - 144,028 = 5.29% 5.16%

Conclusion 1: Thus the population of the Valley districts has decreased slightly over the 2001-2011 census relative to the population of the Hill districts. But in terms of general trends, both the 2011 census as well as the 2001 census show similar behavior. This is in contrast to the 1991 census where dramatic changes were witnessed due to ethnic cleansing of Kukis from Naga-dominated territories by NSCN(IM), ANSAM and affiliated bodies so that a stake for Nagalim could be put.

4) As we know from Linky, Manipur is a four-way contest between the Meiteis, the Meitei Pangals, the Kuki/Chin/Mizo tribal affinities and the Naga tribal affinities. The precise contest as from the 2001 census is as follows:

Hill districts
a) Senapati district:
Population - 283,621 (- 100%)

Population excluding Mao-Maram, Purul and Paomata subdivisions - 156,513
Christians: 122,724
Hindus: 30,441
Muslims: 1,281

ST Population - 122,791
Thadou (Kuki): 72,535
Tangkhul (Naga): 8,329
Vaiphei (Kuki): 7,357
Rest: 34,570

Missing data on Mao-Maram, Paomei (Naga): 127,108

Estimate of Naga percentage in the district population: 47.75%
Estimate of Kuki percentage in the district population: 28.17%
Estimate of rest: 12.19%
Estimate of Meitei population: 10.73%

Assembly constituencies (6): Karong (ST), Mao (ST), Saikul (ST), Saitu (ST), Tadubi (ST), Kangpokpi (General)
----------------------------------------------
b) Churachandpur district:
Population - 227,905 (= 100%)
Christians: 213,186 (93.5%)
Hindus: 10,538 (4.6%)
Muslims: 2,573 (1.13%)

ST Population of district - 212,482 (= 93.23% of district population)
Thadous (Kuki group): 54,929 (25.9% of ST population)
Paite (Kuki): 45,549 (21.4%)
Hmar (Kuki): 37,998 (17.9%)
Rest: 74,006 (34.8%)

Assembly constituencies (6): Churachandpur (ST), Hinglep (ST), Saikot (ST), Singhat (ST), Thanlon (ST), Tipaimukh (ST)
----------------------------------------------
c) Ukhrul district:
Population - 140,778 (= 100%)
Christians: 133,966 (95.2%)
Hindus: 5,687 (4.04%)
Muslims: 881 (0.6%)

ST Population of district - 134,493 (= 95.54% of district population)
Tangkhul (Naga group): 127,035 (94.5% of ST population)
Thadou (Kuki): 5,268 (3.92%)
Simte (Naga): 718 (0.5%)
Rest: 1,472 (1.09%)

Assembly constituencies (3): Chingai (ST), Phungyar (ST), Ukhrul (ST)
----------------------------------------------
d) Tamenglong district:
Population - 111,499 (= 100%)
Christians: 105,791 (94.88%)
Hindus: 3,187 (2.86%)
Muslims: 1,431 (1.28%)

ST Population of district - 106,349 (= 95.38% of district population)
Kabui (Naga group): 60,893 (57.26 % of ST population)
Kacha Naga (Naga): 34,368 (32.32 %)
Thadou (Kuki) - 6,888 (6.47%)
Rest: 4,200 (3.95%)

Assembly constituencies (3): Nungba (ST), Tamei (ST), Tamenglong (ST)
----------------------------------------------
e) Chandel district:
Population - 118,327 (= 100%)
Christians: 109,128 (92.2%)
Hindus: 5,701 (4.8%)
Muslims: 2,318 (1.96%)

ST Population of district - 108,779 (= 91.93% of district population)
Thadou (Kuki group): 35,086 (32.3% of ST population)
Anal (Naga): 20,851 (19.2%)
Maring (Naga): 19,828 (18.2%)
Rest: 33,014 (30.3%)

Assembly constituencies (2): Chandel (ST), Tengnoupal (ST)
----------------------------------------------

Conclusion 2: Thus, Churachandpur district is two-thirds Kuki majority, Ukhrul is Tangkhul Naga (same affinity as Thuingaleng Muivah who was prevented from entering Ukhrul district in 2011)-dominated, and Tamenglong is Kabui-Kacha Naga dominated. On the other hand, Chandel is evenly split between Kukis and Nagas. For Senapati district, the figures are controversial because no census was taken for Mao-Maram, Purul and Paomata subdivisions and the numbers for other subdivisions is believed to be inflated at the edges (see Linky, for example). But it is also widely believed that these three subdivisions are (at least historically) dominated by Naga affinities, specifically Mao-Maram and Pangmei tribes. On the other hand, the complete stalling of activity in the Sadar Hills subdivision by Kuki blockades over the last year shows that these regions could be Kuki dominated. Using this intuition and the 2001 census figures, our best guesstimate is that in Senapati district, the Nagas are ~55% in the district, with Kukis around ~30%, and Meiteis around ~15% (give or take 1 or 2% points either side for the three parties). This explains why a general Assembly constituency (Kangpokpi) is delimited in the Senapati district for the Meitei/general population.

Valley districts:
f) Imphal West:
Population - 444,382
Hindus: 330,994 (74.48%)
Others: 73,705 (16.59%)
Muslims: 19,124 (4.3%)

ST Population of district - 21,118 (= 4.75% of district population)
Dominant ST group: Kabui (Naga) - 9,042
---------------------------------------------
g) Imphal East:
Population - 394,876
Hindus: 240,347 (60.87%)
Others: 67,741 (17.16%)
Muslims: 62,932 (15.94%)

ST Population of district - 24,712 (= 6.26% of district population)
Dominant ST group: Tangkhul (Naga) - 5,896
---------------------------------------------
h) Thoubal district:
Population - 364,140
Hindus: 221,096 (60.72%)
Muslims: 86,849 (23.85%)
Others: 50,819 (13.96%)

ST Population of district - 4,274 (= 1.17% of district population)
Dominant ST group: Thadou (Kuki) - 1,154
---------------------------------------------
i) Bishnupur district:
Population - 206,368
Hindus: 148,903 (72.15%)
Others: 38,763 (18.78%)
Muslims: 14,194 (6.88%)

ST Population of district - 6,143 (= 2.95% of district population)
Dominant ST group: Kom (Kuki) - 2,229
---------------------------------------------
Conclusion 3: Thus, except for Thoubal district, Hindus and Others (followers of Sanamahi religion, nature-worshippers, etc.) dominate over the rest of the religious affinities.

To follow next: What does the Manipur verdict really mean?

The meaning of democracy...

From "A Comparative Study of the Indian Constitution" by Sirdar D. K. Sen (Linky):

The question therefore arises: what is the exact meaning of the term "democracy." Most American publicists as well as some English authors begin their discussions on this subject with an extract from the famous speech of President Lincoln at Gettysberg, in which the President described the American Republic as "the government of the people, by the people, and for the people." Does this description contain the essential elements of a democratic Constitution?

In the first place, it describes democracy as the government of the people, but it should be remembered that all Constitutions, whether democratic or otherwise, deal with the government of the people, because without the people, there could be no State, and, therefore, no Constitution. It would, therefore, be clear that this is not an essential feature of democracy.

The second element, according to President's definition, is "the government for the people." Here, again, it is necessary to point out that this is not a distinctive characteristic of democracy, because even under a system of benevolent despotism, the government is carried on for the people and in the interests of the people.

In the third place, the description speaks of "government by the people"; and here indeed lies one of the distinctive elements of democracy, for a democratic Constitution implies three essential attributes: a) the power of the State is vested in the people; b) the power is exercised by the people or their representatives; and c) the people being the ruler as well as the ruled, there is complete identity of interests.

According to Bryce, government by the people is government by the majority of the people, and this means that in a democratic State all citizens must have full political rights so that the vast majority of them constitute the electorate (cited, Modern Democracies, Vol. II, Chap. I). This definition does not appear to be satisfactory. Government by the people or by the majority of the people is perfectly compatible with an authoritarian regime where there exists only one political party. A democratic government is not, therefore, merely a government by the people or a majority of the people. It must have other essential qualities to distinguish it from other forms of government. In a totalitarian form of government certain characteristic elements are to be found. In the first place, all powers of the State are vested in one organ or institution; in other words, there is unity of State authority. Besides, it is the will of those in whom the totality of the powers of the State is vested which prevails against the will of those who do not enjoy or exercise any power. There is thus a legal distinction between those who command and those who obey. On the other hand, in a democratic form of government there is a clear division of power; in other words, there is a plurality of State organs. There is also the important principle of respect for and protection of the minority so that there is every chance of the minority becoming the majority; and this operates through the fundamental principles of equality and liberty. A government where these elements subsist has a democratic Constitution.

This brings us to the question of forms and institutions of democracy. There are two distinct and well-recognized types of democratic government. The first is known as direct democracy, i.e. where the power of the State is directly exercised by the entire body of citizens of the State. Such a type is, however, only practicable in a State with a small compact territory and a small homogenous population as was the case with city-States of ancient Greece and Rome and the village republics of India and China. The same type of government was to be found in some of the Cantons of Switzerland, and even today some of them retain the relics of the system, such as the referendum, popular initiative and plebiscite. The second form of democracy may be described as indirect, i.e. where the power of the State is exercised by the people not directly but through elected representatives. The suffrage under a democratic system has the following essential features: i) it must be universal, i.e. the electorate must be composed of all citizens without any distinction who fulfil certain specified qualifications; ii) the suffrage must be direct; iii) the suffrage must be equal; and iv) the suffrage must be secret. To these must also be added the indispensable condition that every citizen must have the right to stand for election provided he fulfils certain specified qualifications. It is this feature which differentiates democracy properly so-called from the authoritarian system under the Soviet Constitution where one party and one party alone has the monopoly of eligibility and, therefore, of political power.

What is cooking in Arunachal aka the resignation drama of Jarbom Gamlin

To understand what is going on in Arunachal Pradesh, a contextualization is essential.

a) A Historical Background: Arunachal Pradesh is the largest among all the North-East states considering its area of 83,743 sq. kms. The state has a long international border with Bhutan in the west covering 160 kms, Tibet in the north and northeast covering 1030 kms and Myanmar in the east covering 440 kms. The states of Assam in the south and Nagaland in the east and southeast form the other border states. Arunachal Pradesh falls in the outer Himalayas and Patkoi ranges. It is endowed with wide topographical variations, vegetation and wild life. The state is vivisected by innumerable rivers and streams which originate in the higher Himalayas and Arakan ranges. They flow down to form tributaries of Brahmaputra. The major rivers are Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Dibang, Lohit, Diyum and Dihing.

Arunachal Pradesh acquired an identify of its own for the first time in 1914 when some tribal areas were separated from the then Darrang and Lakhimpur district of Assam to form North-East frontier Tract (NEFT). The NEFT was further sub-divided into Balipara Frontier Tract, the Sadiya Frontier tract and Tirap Frontier Tract between 1914-43. At the time of India’s independence in 1947, the present territory of Arunachal Pradesh was under part-B of the Sixth schedule of the Constitution as the tribal areas of Assam. Part-B included NEFT including Balipara Frontier Tract, the Tirap Frontier Tract, the Abor Hills district, the Mishmi Hills district and the Naga tribal areas. All these districts together were renamed as North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in 1951.

The NEFA was reconstituted under North-East Frontier Areas (Administration) Regulation of 1954 into Kameng Frontier Division, Subansiri Frontier Division, Siang Frontier Division, Lohit Frontier Division, Tirap Frontier Division, and Tuensang Frontier Division. The Tuensang Frontier Division was later separated from the NEFA in 1957 and merged with the newly constituted Naga Hills which became the new state of Nagaland. The NEFA was scheduled as part of Assam during the 1950-65 period and its administration was carried out by the Governor of Assam as an agent of the President of India under the Ministry of External Affairs. In the aftermath of the war with China in 1962, the responsibility of the NEFA administration was transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1965 as per the recommendations of the Dying Ering Commission (1965). Consequently, five divisions of the territory (Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Lohit, and Tirap) became five districts. With the passage of time, these five districts have been further sub-divided into 16 districts.

Incorporating the recommendations of the Dying Ering Commission (1965), the North-East Frontier Agency Panchayat Raj Regulation Act was passed by the Parliament and implemented by the Government of India in 1967. As per the provisions of this Act, local self-government was introduced at different levels. For this, the Agency Council was formed at apex level followed by Zilla Parishads at District level, Anchal Samitis at Block level and Gram Panchayat at the village level. The traditional village councils which were already recognized under the North-East Frontier Administration of Justice Regulation, 1945, were accorded the status of Gram Panchayats. The NEFA was upgraded as Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh on January 21, 1972 in accordance with the North-East Frontier Areas (Reorganization) Act of 1971. Finally, the Union Territory was replaced by a Pradesh Council which in turn was converted to a Legislative Assembly in 1975. The first elections to a 30 member Assembly was held in 1978. Finally, the Union Territory was replaced by a full fledged state on February 20, 1978. The present strength of members of the state's Legislative Assembly is 60, which according to the Constitutional stipulations implies that the strength of the Cabinet (including the Chief Minister) cannot exceed 12.

b) The People: The population of Arunachal Pradesh can be roughly divided into Scheduled Tribes and non-Scheduled Tribes. From the 2001 census data, 64.2% are Scheduled Tribes whereas the rest are non-Scheduled Tribes.

Scheduled Tribes: According to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Lists (Modification) Order, 1956 and as inserted by Act 69 of 1986 states, the STs in the state are “All tribes of the State including: Abor, Aka, Apatani, Dafla, Galong, Khampti, Khowa, Mishmi, Monpa, Momba, Any Naga tribes, Sherdukpen, Singpho”. The notification gives only an illustration of a few STs. In the 2001 Census, a total of 100 STs have been enumerated. Of these, 25 tribes have a population of 5000 or more. Relative to the total ST population of the state, these tribes and their relative percentages are: Nissi (Nyishi) 12.4%, Adi Gallong 6.8%, Wancho 6.77%, Dafla (reclassified as Nyishi as Dafla was deemed derogatory) 6.4%, Monpa 5.95%, Tagin 5.54%, Adi Minyong 4.82%, Nocte 4.78%, Adi 4.6%, Apatani 3.9%, Galong 3.86%, Mishmi 3.57%, Nishang 3.11%, Tangsa 2.97%, Abor 2.8%, Mishing/Miri 1.93%, Khampti 1.83%, Adi Padam 1.65%, ... .

Most of the tribes in Arunachal Pradesh are ethnically similar, having derived from an original common stock. But due to geographical isolation certain distinctive characteristics in each tribe in language, dress and customs can be noticed. The ST population form a set of semi-distinct cultural spheres, on the basis of tribal identity, language, religion, and material culture. They occupy distinct regions, specifically,
i) the Tibetic area bordering Bhutan in the west,
ii) the Tani area in the centre of the state,
iii) the Mishmi area to the east of the Tani area,
iv) the Tai/Singpho/Tangsa area bordering Burma, and
v) the "Naga" area to the south, which also borders Burma.
In between there are transition zones, such as the Aka/Hruso/Miji/Sherdukpen area, which provides a "buffer" of sorts between the Tibetic Buddhist tribes and the animist Tani hill tribes. In addition, there are isolated peoples scattered throughout the state, such as the Sulung.

Within each of these cultural spheres, one finds populations of related tribes speaking related languages and sharing similar traditions.
i) In the Tibetic area, one finds large numbers of Monpa tribes-people, with several subtribes speaking closely related but mutually incomprehensible languages, and also large numbers of Tibetan refugees.
ii) Within the Tani area, major tribes include Nissi (Nyishi), which has recently come to be used by many people to encompass Bangni, Tagin and even Hills Miri. Apatani also live among the Nyishi, but are distinct. In the centre, one finds predominantly Galo people, with the major sub-groups of Lare and Pugo among others, extending to the Ramo and Pailibo areas (which are close in many ways to Galo). In the east, one finds the Adi, with many subtribes including Padam, Pasi, Minyong, and Bokar, among others. Milang, while also falling within the general "Adi" sphere, are in many ways quite distinct.
iii) Moving east, the Idu, Miju and Digaru make up the "Mishmi" cultural-linguistic area, which may or may not form a coherent historical grouping.
iv) Moving southeast, the Tai Khamti are linguistically distinct from their neighbours and culturally distinct from the majority of other Arunachali tribes; they are religiously similar to the Chakmas who have migrated from the region that became Bangladesh. They follow the same Theraveda sect of Buddhism. The Chakmas consist of the majority of the tribal population. Districts of Lohit, Changlang, Dibang and Papum Pare have a considerable number of Chakmas. They speak a linguistic variant derived from Assamese and Bengali. Assam also has a large population of Chakmas who reside in the district of Karbi Anglong, Nagaon and Cachar. They also exhibit considerable convergence with the Singpho and Tangsa tribes of the same area, all of which are also found in Burma.
v) Finally, the Nocte and Wancho exhibit cultural and possibly also linguistic affinities to the tribes of Nagaland, which they border.

The 16 districts of Arunachal Pradesh are: i) Tirap, ii) Changlang, iii) Lohit -- Mishmis, Khamties and Singphoes, iv) Anjaw, v) Lower Dibang Valley -- Idu Mishmis, Adis and Mishing, vi) Upper Dibang Valley, vii) East Siang, viii) West Siang, ix) Upper Siang -- center of Adi society, x) Lower Subansiri -- Apatani, Nyishi and Hill Miri, xi) Upper Subansiri, xii) Kurung Kumey, xiii) Papum Pare, xiv) East Kameng, xv) West Kameng -- Monpas, Miji, Sherdukpen, and xvi) Tawang. Of these, the Lower Subansiri, Upper Subansiri, East Kameng, Tirap, and West Siang are predominantly ST districts with the proportion of ST population 80 per cent and above. These districts together share half of the total ST population of the state. Specifically, we have the following % of STs in each district:
i) Lower Subansiri 90.1%,
ii) Upper Subansiri 89.5%
iii) East Kameng 86.7%
iv) Tirap 83.7%
v) West Siang 81.7%
vi) Upper Siang 78.2%
vii) Tawang 75.0%
viii) East Siang 69.1%
ix) Papum Pare 56.6%
x) West Kameng 49.5%
xi) Dibang Valley 46.5%
xii) Lohit 38.2%
xiii) Changlang 36.2%.

From the above data, it can be seen that the combined tribes of the Adis and the Galongs (Abors) is the dominant tribal grouping followed by the Nissi (Nyishi)-Dafla. The Adi peoples are dominant in East Siang, Upper Siang, West Siang and Dibang Valley whereas the Nyishi community is dominant in Papam Pare, East Kameng, Lower Subansiri, Kurung Kumey, parts of Upper Subansiri, as well as the Darrang District and North Lakhimpur district of Assam. So far, no one from the dominant Nyishi community has become the Chief Minister of the state.

Non-Scheduled Tribes: The non-Scheduled Tribes consist of a large numbers of migrants from diverse areas of India and Bangladesh, who, while legally not entitled to settle permanently, in practice stay indefinitely, progressively altering the traditional demographic makeup of the state. Finally, populations of "Nepalis" (in fact, usually Tibeto-Burman tribespeople whose tribes predominate in areas of Nepal, but who do not have tribal status in India) and Chakmas are distributed in different areas of the state (although reliable figures are hard to come by).

c) Religion: In Arunachal Pradesh, unlike Nagaland, Mizoram, and Manipur, considerable ST population still adhere to their original tribal faith. This faith commemorates ancestors, emphasizes a belief in many spirits and folklores, and includes rituals which coincide with lunar phases or agricultural cycles. Sun and moon are worshipped as God and this God is referred to as Donyi-Polo. A law has been enacted to protect the indigenous religions (e.g., Donyi-Polo, Buddhism) in Arunachal Pradesh against the spread of other religions, though no comparable law exists to protect the other religions.

According to the 2001 Indian Census, the religions of Arunachal Pradesh break down as follows: Hindu 34.6%, Others (mostly, Donyi-Polo) 30.7%, Christian 18.7%, Buddhist 13.0%, Muslim 1.9%. Of the total ST population, we have the following breakdown: Others 47.2% (leading to 30.08% of the total state population), Christians 26.5% (leading to 16.96% of the state population), Hindus 13.1% (leading to 8.38%), Buddhists 11.7% (leading to 7.5%). The non-Scheduled Tribes can be broken into 26.3% of the state's share of Hindus, 5.5% of the share of Buddhists, and 1.7% of the share of Christians.

Individual ST wise, Khampti, Monpa, Momba, Sherdukpen, and Singpho are mostly the followers of Buddhism. Adi, Aka, Nishing, Apatani, Mishmi, Tangsa worship Donyi-Polo, whereas the Nocte practice an elementary form of Vaishnavism. Quite sizeable populations among Adi, Nishi (up to 80%), Nocte, and Wancho have been converted to Christianity. The Wancho and Nocte are Naga tribals and some have been influenced by Nagas (predominantly Christians) in Nagaland.

d) Arunachal's Problems:
1) The first problem is to speed up building infrastructure in the state, especially roads criss-crossing deep gorges and swift rivers. While the Border Roads Organisation mostly builds roads in the state, there are areas where connectivity is the state’s responsibility. Besides, the Chinese have, of late, been rapidly building infrastructure along the border that has made the Indian side nervous. While Beijing has geography on its side — the Tibetan plateau lends a distinct advantage — the Indian side neither has geography on its side nor, till recently, had the will to change the difficult terrain to its advantage by building roads.
2) The state also faces challenges in the extreme east as well in the Tirap and Changlang districts. Not only is there pressure from people to open the routes to Myanmar for trade and build roads but also to stem militancy. Both factions of the NSCN, Isak-Muivah and Khaplang, co-exist and exercise considerable influence in Tirap and Changlang. For the new incumbent, there would be pressure from Chidambaram to neutralise the militants with the state’s own police forces who would be allowed to recruit more people. There have been many fruitless efforts in the past to cap the claims of Nagalim: one such stillbirth move was to rechristen the Naga tribes of Arunachal Pradesh (34 tribes and sub-tribes in Changlang and 3 in Tirap) as Tangshangs. These groupings included Muklom, Longchang, Tutsa, Tikhak, Hawoi, Longri, Mungrey, Mushang in Changlang district and Nocte, Wangcho and Tutsa in Tirap district. Another such move was the introduction of the Arunachal Pradesh Control of Organised Crime Act (APCOCA) Bill under the Mukut Mithi government, which was then repealed under Gegong Apang.
3) The third problem is with Assam in terms of contested borders and downstream impact of big dams.
i) The most important position in Arunachal Pradesh after the Chief Minister is the Ministry of Power given the enormous hydel power resources and potential that Arunachal sits on. The state has the potential to generate around 50,000 MW and most of the projects have been commissioned on the Subansiri, the Siang, the Lohit and the Kameng. However, the issue of big dams in Arunachal has generated quite a bit of heat in neighbouring Assam, as there are fears of largescale inundation downstream. Specifically, the Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti (KMSS) and its leader Akhil Gogoi have been preventing vessels carrying machinery for the Lower Subansiri power project to be carried through. In response to this opposition, the Union ministry of environment and forests has been conducting a study on the feasibility and environmental impact of big dams from 2009.
ii) The Nyishis in East Kameng have repeated clashes with Bodos in the Darrang and Sonitpur districts of neighboring Assam due to overlap of territory issues. Similar problems exist elsewhere on the Arunachal-Assam border also.

e) Political State:
Background information on the players:
Gegong Apang is an Adi tribal.
Dorjee Khandu is a Monpa tribal with Buddhist affiliation from Tawang.
Jarbom Gamlin is a Donyi-Polo from the West Siang district.
Mukut Mithi is an Adi tribal (?) from the Lower Dibang Valley.

After a coalition regime (between BJP and Arunachal Congress) under veteran politician Gegong Apang, the eve of the 2004 elections saw Apang shift his allegiance to the Congress yet again. With this weight, Congress stormed back to power in Arunachal Pradesh winning 34 seats in the 60-member assembly with Apang emerging as the frontrunner for the Chief Ministership. Under the Gegong Apang ministry, Dorjee Khandu who was re-elected unopposed in 2004 from Mukto constituency became the minister for Power, NCER, and relief and rehabilitation. Jarbon Gamlin who was elected from Liromoba became the Home Minister. Gamlin was dropped from the Apang ministry in March 2006. While no specific reasons were given for the ouster, the most likely consideration might have been to ensure that all sections of society get proper representation in the ministry given the upper cap of 12 on the ministry (the newly inducted ministers were said to be close to Apang and former CM Mukut Mithi).

Unhappy over the "dictatorial policies and distribution of portfolios in the council of ministers" of the Apang regime, dissidence by a majority of ruling Congress MLAs saw Dorjee Khandu take over as the Chief Minister on April 9, 2007. He continued through 2009 and won a re-election bid in 2009. Of the total 60 seats in the Arunachal State Assembly, 42 was won by the Congress, five by the NCP, five by Trinamul Congress, four by PPA, three by BJP and one is an Independent/rebel candidate from one of the mainstream parties. Meanwhile, Gegong Apang was arrested in August 2010 for alleged corruption relating to a Rs. 1000 crore public distribution system scam. Apang denied the charges and claimed they are politically motivated, though the government stated that the investigation was conducted independently and without political interference. The scam allegedly involved fradulent hill transport subsidy bills that were passed while Apang was Chief Minister without the required financial oversight.

The incumbent Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Dorjee Khandu, died in an unfortunate helicopter crash at Sela Pass on April 30, 2011. Khandu's government from 2007 to his untimely demise had signed scores of MOUs with private players to set up over 100 hydel power projects, the revenue from which would make Arunachal the richest state in the country. In the wake of his demise, four to five (depending on the source) contenders emerged for the Chief Ministership. They were: i) Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee (APCC) president and PWD minister Nabam Tuki, ii) former chief minister Mukut Mithi, iii) Rural Welfare and Development minister Kalikho Pul, iv) Finance minister Setong Sena and v) Power minister and government spokesman Jarbom Gamlin. While Tuki was the frontrunner as a veteran party hand, the scales eventually tipped in Gamlin’s favour as he was backed by the deceased’s family.

The high command (AICC) too gave in to the family’s wish and Jarbom Gamlin was sworn in as the new chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh on May 5, 2011. As payback, Gamlin fielded Dorjee Khandu's son Pema Khandu, 32, in his cabinet with the hope that Pema could contest the Mukto byelection. The rest of the ministers in his cabinet were erstwhile ministers in the Dorjee Khandu-government. They include Kalikho Pul, Setong Sena, Nabam Tuki, Tako Dabi, Chowna Mein, Tanga Byaling, Atum Welly, Takar Marde, Honchun Ngandam and Bosiram Siram. In terms of tribal divisions, the Nyishi community has 14 MLAs in the 60-member state assembly. Two of them are ministers and four others parliamentary secretaries in the Congress government headed by Gamlin.

f) From Crisis to Crisis:
The contentious replacement process for Dorjee Khandu has meant that the Jarbom Gamlin government has been working on a crisis mode from inception. Signs of crisis could be felt during the three-day Assembly session that concluded in late September when non-Congress MLAs demanded a CBI inquiry into the crash that claimed the life of Dorjee Khandu during the obituary references and a Congress legislator raised the issue of the deteriorating law and order situation. In the meanwhile, an explosive news report from Pradeep Thakur of the Times of India which attributed the loss of Nabam Tuki in the Chief Ministerial race to the tense relation Nyishis have with other tribal groupings brought the influential Nyishi Elite Society and the All Nyishi Students’ Union into the picture. They called for an Itanagar chalo campaign (Mega Nyishi Dignity Rally) on October 7 accusing the Gamlin government of divisive politics and collusion by being the news source in the Times of India report.

Other organizations chipped in this effort too. The All Nyishi Youth Organisation has extended support to the Nyishi Elite Society’s demand for Gamlin’s resignation. Also unhappy with the situation are the All Arunachal Youngstar United Federation, the All Arunachal Registered Contractor Association, the Arunachal Citizens’ Right, the NEFA Indigenous Human Rights Organisation and the Women Power Connect (Arunachal chapter). The Arunachal Pradesh Indigenous Tribes Union's charges also included breakdown in law and order situation, unprovoked police firing on protesters and demanded immediate termination of those involved in the police firing, among others. It flayed the state home minister Takar Marde for the breaking down of law and order while Youngstar United has sought the Centre’s intervention for restoration of normalcy.

The governance crisis reached a flashpoint with senior cabinet minister Chowna Mein alleging that he was kidnapped soon after the three-day Assembly session on September 26 and taken to the chief minister’s official residence at Niti Vihar* where other MLAs and ministers were also present and that he had to flee that very evening fearing for his life. Jarbom Gamlin not only dismissed the charges but also said he was the one to drop the minister home. The government spokesperson Setong Sena has refuted accusation of government forces being involved in the kidnapping, dubbing it as an attempt to gain cheap publicity. Mein’s accusation came at a time when several legislators, ministers and party leaders had been camping in Delhi, demanding Gamlin’s ouster. Specifically, Gamlin and Tuki have been camping in Delhi since September 27 hoping for a resolution to their contrasting demands. Gamlin wants Tuki’s wings clipped while Tuki wants Gamlin to be replaced, citing “breakdown” of governance in the state.

Some governmental sources said involvement of NSCN (I-M) rebels in the entire drama, which has derailed governance in the state, was also suspected, as some MLAs were allegedly being threatened to support some faction of the outfit or the other. Their involvement is also suspected in light of their demand for inclusion of Tirap and Changlang districts in the integrated Naga homeland, Nagalim. The Naga rebels, however, have strongly refuted the charge about their involvement in Arunachal Pradesh politics. But the voice of a terrorist group only adds so much credibility to the whole situation.

While the AICC seems to be concerned that there exists a threat by some legislators to form a regional party if there were no change of guard (as has been seen many times in the past), in the words of the BJP organisation secretary (Northeast), P. Chandra Sekhar, administration has come to a total standstill for over a month as two Congress groups lobby for leadership. BJP general secretary Tapir Gao said though the standoff was an internal matter of the Congress, it had caused a crisis for which the party leadership was responsible. As of October 29, 2011, Sonia Gandhi finally decided to remove Arunachal Pradesh chief minister Jarbom Gamlin after the central observers told her of his grave mistakes and the deep sense of disquiet among a majority of the legislators. The process of choosing Gamlin’s successor has begun and the decision will be announced in the next couple of days.

* Gamlin, however, does not stay in his official residence.

No mercy to terrorists

An attack on a former PM of India or the Parliament or the Supreme Court or a broad swathe of the Indian polity is as much an attack on the idea of India. Once a PM, you get into the elite club where what you say matters, what you do matters more, and what others do unto you a lot more.

Hang the planners/killers of Shri. Rajiv Gandhi. No mercy, and no tears for a bunch of folk who claim to do it for the cause of Tamils. Such Tamils need to get out of India, but before that hang and then get out.

India and its near-abroad

The Economists' take on India and what it should have done, not-done yada yada, yet for all its agenda and whatnot it does have some truth to it - of course you need to ensure you blood does not boil at the tone of the article.

NO ONE loves a huge neighbour. For all that, India’s relations with the countries that ring it are abysmal. Of the eight with which it shares a land or maritime boundary, only two can be said to be happy with India: tiny Maldives, where India has the only foreign embassy and dispenses much largesse, and Bhutan, which has a policy of being happy about everything. Among its other South Asian neighbours, the world’s biggest democracy is incredible mainly because of its amazing ability to generate wariness and resentment.

Until recently it operated a shoot-to-kill policy towards migrant workers and cattle rustlers along its long border with Bangladesh. Over the years it has meddled madly in Nepal’s internal affairs. In Myanmar India snuggles up to the country’s thuggish dictators, leaving the beleaguered opposition to wonder what happened to India’s championing of democracy. Relations with Sri Lanka are conflicted. It treats China with more respect, but feuds with it about its border

The following two paragraphs seems to be in indirect ode to MMS and SG.

With the notable exception of India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, who has heroically persisted in dialogue with Pakistan in the face of provocations and domestic resistance, India’s dealings with its neighbours are mostly driven by arrogance and neglect. It has shared shockingly little of its economic dynamism and new-found prosperity with those around it. Just 5% of South Asia’s trade is within the region.

Too little and too late, the neglect is starting to be replaced by engagement (see article). This week Sonia Gandhi, dynastic leader of India’s ruling Congress Party, visited Bangladesh—a first. And on July 27th India’s foreign minister hosted his Pakistani counterpart, the first such meeting in a year. He promised a “comprehensive, serious and sustained” dialogue.

One thing I do agree is the lack of vision. Maybe before the current economic prosperity India did not have the necessary muscle or economic power to create and nurture a vision. What use is a vision if one does not have the capability to implement it, right? With India's attention to South East Asia, hopefully it has now a better vision and clarity of purpose to take its agenda forward.

Second, dynamic India can hardly soar globally while mired in its own backyard. Promoting regional prosperity is surely the best way to persuade neighbours that its own rise is more of an opportunity than a threat. Yet India lacks any kind of vision. A region-wide energy market using northern neighbours’ hydropower would transform South Asian economies. Vision, too, could go a long way to restoring ties that history has cut asunder, such as those between Karachi and Mumbai, once sister commercial cities but now as good as on different planets; and Kolkata and its huge former hinterland in Bangladesh. Without development and deeper integration, other resentments will be hard to soothe. It falls on the huge unloved neighbour to make the running.

Oh well, Karachi and Mumbai becoming sisters again? It is a dream for the select few. For the realists, it is not going to happen unless Pakistan changes and becomes friendly towards India. Not going to happen anytime soon.