Making Sense of the Manipuri Verdict 2012 -- Part II

We continue from the previous post (Linky) on interpreting the Manipur mandate 2012.

Manipur has nine administrative districts and 60 Assembly constituencies (see Footnote 1). The Imphal Valley has approx 60% of the state's population whereas the Hill districts have approx 40% of the population. Due to delimitation exercises done as late as 2011, the Valley has been divided into 40 Assembly constituencies and the Hill districts have 19 reserved (for ST candidates -- read as Kuki/Chin/Mizo and Naga tribal affinities -- only) constituencies and 1 general constituency (in Senapati district). The main candidate parties for the Assembly elections were: i) INC, ii) Manipur People's Party (MPP), iii) Naga People's Front (NPF), iv) Manipur State Congress Party (MSCP), v) All India Trinamool Congress (AITC), vi) CPI, vii) CPM, viii) Nationalist Congress Party (NCP), ix) Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), x) BJP, xi) BSP, xii) Janata Dal (United), xiii) Janata Dal (Secular), etc. Of these, the first five are/were serious contenders to be meaningful participants in the Assembly debates with enough members to change the course of certain policy decisions, while the rear end had/has their pockets of influence in Manipur but not severe enough to dent the course of the main contenders.

First, some useful statistics from the elections and comparable data from the 9th Assembly elections of 2007. Most of the data have been sourced from:
1) Linky 1
2) Linky 2
3) Linky 3
4) Linky 4
5) Linky 5
6) Linky 6.

Voting percentage: 79.8% of the electorate (86.73% in 2007)
Overall seat wins: INC 42, AITC 7, MSCP 5, NPF 4, LJP 1, NCP 1 (In 2007, it was INC 30, MPP 5, NCP 5, CPI 4, RJD 3, NPP 3, Independent 10)
No. of women winners: 3 (Akoijam Mirabai, Okram Landhoni Devi (wife of Okram Ibobi Singh), Nemcha Kipgen)
In 2007, it was one when Okram Landhoni Devi won the Khangabok seat vacated by the resignation of CM Okram Ibobi Singh who had also won from Thoubal.
Big-time losers:
1) Radhobinod Koijam (former CM and NCP state unit President),
2) L. Jayantakumar Singh and 3) D. D. Thaisii (both Ministers in the previous Cabinet)
4) O. Joy Singh (veteran MPP leader)
5) Th. Chaoba Singh (another veteran MPP leader)

Lessons from the elections:
1) Toothless Opposition: The MPP, CPM, NCP, JD(U) and RJD had initially come under the People's Democratic Front umbrella to fight the incumbent INC regime and this combine soon became the People's Democratic Alliance of eleven non-Congress parties (with the inclusion of AITC, CPI, BJP, MSCP, NPP and NPF). While it may remain questionable (in the minds of a few) that the eventual outcome was whether a massive mandate for the Congress, it certainly was a mandate against an ineffective, toothless Opposition with nothing much in common except a visceral hatred towards INC rule. Very often have we seen such maha-parivars fail to usurp the sitting party and the Opposition has yet again made a big mistake in sensing people's moods and sentiments. The facts that the INC government was hobbled by many a scandal and handled the economic blockade (see Footnote 2) by the Nagas and the tit-for-tat from the Kukis rather poorly did not seem to have had any impact on the voters. In fact, from 30 seats in 2007, INC has increased its tally to 42 in 2012. More specifically,

For the first time in over a quarter century or more, a single party has won an absolute majority in the 60-member state assembly.

This is just a direct reflection of the quality of Opposition in the elections.

2) Congress' Performance: As for the INC, it stood in all the 60 constituencies. Of the 40 Valley constituencies, it won in 28 seats, came a strong second in 9, came a strong third in 2 and got washed out in Langthabal where its candidate Waikhom Shyama Devi was no match for other contestants. In the Hill constituencies, INC won in 14 of the 19 reserved seats and came a strong second in 5. In the Kangpokpi (Gen) seat in Senapati district, INC came third behind MSCP and AITC. Thus, INC could claim to have had an across-the-state presence amongst all the three sets of peoples -- Meiteis, Kukis and Nagas. The Meiteis of the Valley seem to have polarized strongly in favor of INC as witnessed by the strong showing of INC in the Valley. Or have they?

3) Kuki vs. Naga votes in the Hill constituencies: The NPF took to the hustings in 12 of the 19 reserved seats. Its performance was first in 4 seats (Chandel (ST), Karong (ST), Mao (ST) and Ukhrul (ST)), a second in 3 seats and a third in 5 seats. As noted above, INC came first in 14 of the 19 reserved seats and came a strong second in 5. The remaining seat was won by MSCP (which had come first in Tamenglong (ST)) ahead of the INC and NPF candidates. The Kangpokpi (general) seat was won by MSCP ahead of AITF and INC. Of the 9 Kuki dominated seats including Kangpokpi, INC has won in 8 and MSCP in 1, while in the 11 Naga dominated seats, INC has won 6, NPF in 4, and MSCP in 1.

4) More on the NPF flop-show: In the 12 seats where the INC and NPF had directly contested, the scorecard was INC 7-5-0, NPF 4-3-5. In terms of district-wise divisions, of the three seats in Tangkhul Naga dominated Ukhrul district (Chingai (ST), Phungyar (ST), Ukhrul (ST)), NPF could win only in one seat (Ukhrul (ST)) and that too by a slim margin of 70 votes over the INC candidate with the BJP candidate (Danny Shaiza who was an independent MLA in the 2007 Assembly) coming a strong third. Further, in Chingai (ST), an independent candidate (Khashim Vashum who was embroiled in a recent controversy Linky) had come second ahead of the NPF candidate.

In the three seats of the Kabui-Kacha Naga dominated Tamenglong district (Nungba (ST), Tamei (ST), Tamenglong (ST)), NPF had failed to win a single seat. In fact, in Nungba (ST) and Tamei (ST), the MSCP and AITC candidates had come second ahead of the NPF candidate, respectively. In Tamenglong, both MSCP and INC candidates had come ahead of NPF candidate. In the six seats of Senapati district, the NPF contested three and came 1-1-2 (Mao (ST)-Karong (ST)-Tadubi (ST)). However, in Mao (ST), the AITC candidate was a strong third behind NPF and INC. In the six seats of Churachandpur district, NPF contested one and came third (Heinglep (ST)) behind the INC and AITC candidates. In the two seats of Chandel district, NPF came 1-2 (Chandel (ST)-Tengnoupal (ST)) with the win in Chandel (ST) coming by a margin of 60 votes.

Thus, the NPF had provided a knockout win in only 2 of the 12 constituencies it had contested in. The numbers also indicate that the NPF seems to have had the backing of Mao-Maram-Anal-Maring-Paomei affinities, but not the Kabui-Kacha Naga-Tangkhul Naga affinities. For a party that had put its credibility at stake in terms of being the united Naga voice and the grand spearhead of the Nagalim campaign within the Manipur Assembly, such a show was a massively poor outcome. This intra-Naga dynamic should not be completely surprising. NPF which is also a part of the DAN government in Nagaland is dominated by Angami Nagas (Nagaland CM Dr. Neiphiu Rio and NPF founder Shurhozelie Liezietsu are Angamis), whereas NSCN (IM) is dominated by Tangkhul (Muivah) and Sema (Swu) Nagas and NSCN (K) based primarily out of Arunachal and Burma is dominated by Konyak (Khaplang) Nagas. Kacha Nagas have been at the forefront of the massive Kuki genocide of 1992-93 (see Footnote 3) in Tamenglong district and elsewhere and have migrated more towards Tangkhul Nagas and NSCN (IM) in this interregnum. Thus, even though the NPF was promised NSCN (IM) support in the pre-election setting, assuming that this support was forthcoming on the ground seems like a mirage.

5) Grand-Nagalim Project: The role played by Nagaland CM Dr. Neiphiu Rio in inflaming emotions in the Naga-dominated regions of Manipur when he was campaigning for NPF needs attention. In fact, Rio had stated the following at an election rally in Tamenglong district on January 19 (Linky):

Last year, Ibobi Singh and his cabinet decided that they will not allow the Naga Chief Minister to enter the State, but now that the elections have been announced, he no longer has the power to prevent me from coming here and meeting you. But if you let him win again I will not be able to come to Manipur to meet all of you.

Needless to say, that remark was in rather poor taste and the poor show of NPF was richly deserved.
Overall, the impression one gets from the NPF campaign is that the whole of Nagaland (DAN, INC as well as NSCN-IM, NSCN-K, NSCN-KK, NNC, Naga Hoho, etc.) is firmly behind the grand-Nagalim project. Only the methods adopted by the different actors change from time to time, some adopt democratic means, some use coercive means; some use legal means, some use extra-legal means, and so on. Nevertheless, despite all overall impressions of union, when it comes to tit for tat, things breakdown along tribal sub-affinities.

6) Comparison with 2007: Note that in the 2007 Assembly elections, the INC which had won a total of 30 seats took 25 from the Valley and only 5 from the reserved Hill seats (3 in Churachandpur district -- Churachandpur (ST), Hinglep (ST), Saikot (ST), one in Senapati district -- Karong (ST) and one in Tamenglong district -- Nungba (ST)). The Hill seats breakdown for 2007 was 5 in favor of INC, 3 (including Kangpokpi) for the NPP, 2 for the RJD, 1 for the NCP and 9 for independents supported by the NPF, ANSAM and the Naga combine. Here is a theory to explain the reversal in fortunes for MPP, NPP, NPF, RJD, INC, etc.

In contrast to the NPF's woes, INC has won 6 out of 6 seats in Churachandpur district, 3 of 6 in Senapati district, 2 of 3 in Ukhrul and Tamenglong districts, and 1 of 2 in Chandel district. While almost all of these wins do not appear to be massive/overwhelming and appear to be steals in a tri-cornered fight with a spoiler candidate, the endorsement of INC can only be logically explained as the Kuki side's tilt to INC (the only possible perceptible winner) as a backlash to the ANSAM enforced Naga blockade (see Footnote 2).

7) Rise of the Trinamool Congress: In contrast to what Nitin Gokhale states (Linky):

Mamata Banerjee's Trinamool Congress, never before a force to reckon with in Manipur, has won seven seats in the recent assembly elections, overtaking established political forces like the Manipur People's Party.

the rise of AITC should be seen in the light of: i) how a strong dynamic in West Bengal will always have (and has always had!) an influence in all the Northeastern states (not just Manipur), ii) the brand of minority politics wielded by the likes of AITC and CPM -- both of which are constrained by realpolitik of a rising and enlightening Muslim votebank and who are never shy of showing off their secular credentials, iii) how the AITC had become popular amidst the also-running Opposition parties as witnessed by its success in the bye-elections of 2011 (Linky).

8) Looking at the Trinamool performance more closely: The Trinamool Congress won in the following constituencies (winners in 2007 elections are given in parentheses):
a) Thounaojam Shyamkumar -- Andro by 10432 votes (T. Shyamkumar on MPP ticket)
b) Maibam Kunjo -- Hiyanglam by 17 votes (Elangbam Dwijamani Singh of INC)
c) Konthoujam Sharat Singh -- Konthoujam by 514 votes (Late Dr. Sapam Budhichandra Singh of INC)
d) Irengbam Ibohalbi Singh -- Oinam by 956 votes (I. I. Singh on MPP ticket)
e) Khumukcham Joykishan Singh -- Thangmeiband by 984 votes (Radhabinod Koijam of NCP)
f) Thongam Biswajit Singh -- Thongju by 603 votes (Bijoy Koijam of INC)
g) Oinam Lukhoi Singh -- Wangoi by 182 votes (Salam Joy Singh of NCP)
Thus, of the seven seats Trinamool won in 2012, three were sitting MLAs -- two won the elections in 2007 on a MPP ticket and one had won the bye-elections of 2011. Thus, Trinamool Congress has gained significantly due to defections from MPP. Further, three of the winning seats are in Imphal west district, two in Imphal east and one each in Thoubal and Bishnupur, all in the Valley area. This makes a case that Trinamool had a backing only in the Meitei areas and not much in the Kuki-Naga areas. Such a coarse analysis misses the big picture.

The Trinamool finished a strong second (several thousand votes) in 16 constituencies of which 6 were reserved constituencies (Churachandpur (ST), Henglep (ST), Saikot (ST), Saikul (ST), Singhat (ST), Tipaimukh (ST)), a strong third in 11 constituencies of which 4 were reserved constituencies (Mao (ST), Saitu (ST), Tadubi (ST), Tengnoupal (ST)), and a strong fourth in 4 constituencies of which one was reserved (Ukhrul (ST)). In other words, the Trinamool has been a strong candidate in 37 of the 48 seats it contested, making it the number 2 party in the state by any metric and the biggest riser from 2007. Of these 11 reserved constituencies, 5 are in Senapati district, 5 in Churachandpur district and one in Chandel district. In Ukhrul and Tamenglong districts (both Naga dominated), the Trinamool took to the polls in only 2 of the 6 constituencies getting washed out in both. Thus, a strong case can be made that the Trinamool is becoming the no. 2 party of choice of both Meiteis and Kukis.

9) Trinamool Trend: It may appear that the rise of Trinamool Congress is perhaps a temporary aberration of people putting more hope in the Trinamool than in the Opposition combine of Manipur. The moment there is a sense of de javu and hopelessness that Trinamool Congress is just another party is the moment it shall lose its rising stars -- the ball for which is in the court of the Trinamool, of course. On the other hand, if the AITC does snatch this ball (so-to-speak), it could be the alternate pole sorely needed in the Indian Northeast to the INC given that the BJP has seemed to have fallen off from its high of 1998-2004. More so, the rise of the Indian Northeast cannot be ensured without the co-option of West Bengal and AITC's rise augurs well for this prospect (also bringing with it all the pitfalls that already constrain West Bengal's polity today). In addition, AITC could be seen more hopefully by people in the Northeast to solve regional problems than the likes of BJP given the image manufactured by AITC so far. For example, prior to the elections, AITC had given support to withdrawal of AFSPA from Manipur. Further, a good showing in a few more states could give a fillip to AITC's seeking of National Party status, which will bring in its own added momentum (Linky) and the consequence of the bold standing up to the INC in coalition politics will have its own unintended consequences.

Overall,
1) In response to the Naga blockade crisis, the Meiteis of the Valley seem to have chosen to stick with the INC -- more or less the only credible choice -- and put AITC over the rest of the established parties such as NCP, MPP, MSCP, etc.
2) In contrast to an ambivalent 2007, the Kukis seem to have sided with the INC and partly with AITC.
3) The Nagas seem to have been vertically divided along tribal sub-affinities in terms of support to NPF (Nagalim issue and territorial sovereignty of Manipur).
4) This dynamic means that INC has been able to land a whitewash despite massively poor economic upliftment of the people of Manipur, enormous increase in extortion activities and the business of terrorism, and complete stalling of bureaucracy/officialdom over the previous five years. The fact that INC has not had any major success in any of the other four state elections except for a marginal performance in Uttarakhand means that this win stands out for its complete surprise.
5) If any of the Opposition parties have to make a dent into this quickly transforming INC bastion (along with Assam where the illegal votebank has become a de facto powerbroker), they have to see past the fractiousness of the tribal divisions and present a credible solution to Manipur's economic woes. The only seeming prospect as of now appears to be AITC, but it is a hope banked on hope rather than on performance. If such an alternative is not coming soon, it is advantage INC to maintain status quo in spite of poor performance. The INC should feel like the ball is in the Opposition court for they have to manufacture a win out of nothing in 2017 (or earlier).
6) Despite all the whitewashes, the bluster of NPF and the Opposition combine shall continue as the blame for the whitewash will fall on imaginary conspiracies.

Other Minor Facts:
1) The biggest margin of victory was achieved by the incumbent CM Okram Ibobi Singh from the Thoubal constituency. Other 10K+ margin winners include Thounaojam Shyamkumar of AITC from
Andro and Ginsuanhau of INC from Singhat (ST).
2) Out of the 60 newly elected MLAs of the Manipur Assembly, no MLA has declared criminal cases against him/her. 57 of the 60 are men and 3 are women. In terms of educational qualification, 49 out of 60 are graduates with only 4 being 10th Pass and below.
3) Out of all 60 MLAs analyzed from Manipur 2012 Assembly Elections, 16 are crorepatis. In 2007 Assembly Election for the whole of Manipur only 1 MLA was crorepati.
4) The MLA with maximum assets in Manipur is T.N. Haokip of INC from Saikot (ST) constituency with assets worth Rs. 10.07 crores followed by Ksh. Biren Singh of INC from Lamlai with assets worth Rs. 5.22 crores and R.K. IMO Singh of MSCP from Sagoiband constituency with assets worth Rs. 2.72 crores. Among major parties, the average asset per candidate for INC is Rs. 1.05 crores, for AITC is Rs. 69.8 lakhs, for MSCP is Rs. 97.43 lakhs, and for NPF is Rs. 68.5 lakhs.
5) The number of re-elected MLAs from 2007 is 35. Of these 35, the average asset value in 2007 was Rs. 20.02 lakhs. The average asset value of this set in 2012 is Rs. 1.18 crore. Of these,
a) T.N. Haokip of INC's asset worth increased from Rs. 29.73 lakhs in 2007 to Rs. 10.07 crores in 2012.
b) Ksh. Biren Singh of INC's asset worth increased from Rs. 14.23 lakhs in 2007 to Rs. 5.22 crores in 2012.
c) Kh. Govindas of INC's asset worth increased from Rs. 38.25 lakhs in 2007 to Rs. 2.49 crores in 2012.
Other notable increases include:
d) K. Meghachandra of INC's assets rose from Rs. 2.90 lakhs in 2007 to Rs. 2.06 crores in 2012.
e) Akoijam Mirabai Devi of INC's assets rose from Rs. 30.5 thousand in 2007 to Rs. 14.40 lakhs in 2012.
f) K. Ranjit Singh of INC's assets rose from Rs. 3.82 lakhs in 2007 to Rs. 1.70 crores in 2012.

Footnotes:
1) The smallest number that can be had for a Legislative Assembly is 60, unless there is a Constitutional exception by an Act of the Parliament (as is the case with Sikkim, Mizoram and Goa). See Linky for details.

2) When the Centre decided to hold ADC elections in Manipur, the All Naga Students Association of Manipur (ANSAM) and the Naga Students Federation (NSF) began a blockade of NH-39 in April 2010 to protest the decision. In May 2010, the crisis took a bitter turn when the State government disallowed NSCN (IM) general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah from visiting his village Somdal in Ukhrul. During the four-month long blockade, Manipur was strapped for severely needed resources like petrol, LPG and basic food commodities. As Kuki-Naga tensions worsened, the NSCN (IM) was accused of trying to stall the democratic process in Manipur where nearly 200,000 voters would vote. A year later, in 2011, Kuki groups from Manipur started a 122-day blockade to draw attention to their demand — declare Sarda in Senapati district an autonomous district for Kukis. Both blockades crippled the State economically and losses ran to the tune of Rs. 250 crore.

In fact, there is a precedent from 2002 and 2007 to the claim that economic blockades matter zilch in Manipur.

3) Within the Hill districts, Kuki and Naga militia have been at loggerheads since the 1990s, with Kuki groups asking for the establishment of an Autonomous District Council (ADC) in Senapati, and Naga groups, backed by the NPF and NSCN (IM), demanding that large chunks of the four Hill districts be part of Greater Nagalim since these areas were inhabited by Tangkhul Nagas.

Understanding the Manipuri Verdict -- Part I

Elections to the 10th Legislative Assembly of Manipur has just now been completed with the people's mandate counted and declared. It makes sense to understand the subtle and not-so-subtle meanings of this democratic mandate as Manipur is not only a frontier and fractured state, but also because this could have serious import on the business of counterterrorism in the Indian Northeast for a significant period.

But before this task can be undertaken, the numbers that make Manipur need to be understood. For this, we follow-up from Linky in our goal of understanding Manipur and its peoples.

1) There are nine administrative districts in Manipur: i) Bishnupur, ii) Imphal East, iii) Imphal West, iv) Thoubal, v) Churachandpur, vi) Chandel (formerly known as Tengnoupal), vii) Senapati, viii) Tamenglong, and ix) Ukhrul. A picture of the district map of Manipur is available at: (Linky).

2) Of these, the four districts of Bishnupur, Imphal East, Imphal West and Thoubal form the Valley or plateau region while the rest form the Hilly area. The area of Manipur is 22,327 sq km, of which 20,736 sq km is the surrounding Hills and the remaining area is the Valley. Clearly, the population density in the Valley is much much more than the density in the Hilly districts.

3) From the 2011 census, the population of the various districts of Manipur is as below (Linky). Also provided is the district's population percentage relative to the state's population in the 2001 census

Manipur total population: 2,721,756 = 100%

Valley population: 1,628,224 = 59.79% (2011) 61.54% (2001)
Bishnupur - 240,363 = 8.83% 9.08%
Thoubal - 420,517 = 15.45% 15.87%
Imphal West - 514,683 = 18.91% 19.37%
Imphal East - 452,661 = 16.63% 17.21%

Hills population: 1,093,532 = 40.18% (2011) 38.46% (2001)
Senapati - 354,972 = 13.04% 12.36%
Tamenglong - 140,143 = 5.15% 4.86%
Churachandpur - 271,274 = 9.97% 9.94%
Ukhrul - 183,115 = 6.73% 6.14%
Chandel - 144,028 = 5.29% 5.16%

Conclusion 1: Thus the population of the Valley districts has decreased slightly over the 2001-2011 census relative to the population of the Hill districts. But in terms of general trends, both the 2011 census as well as the 2001 census show similar behavior. This is in contrast to the 1991 census where dramatic changes were witnessed due to ethnic cleansing of Kukis from Naga-dominated territories by NSCN(IM), ANSAM and affiliated bodies so that a stake for Nagalim could be put.

4) As we know from Linky, Manipur is a four-way contest between the Meiteis, the Meitei Pangals, the Kuki/Chin/Mizo tribal affinities and the Naga tribal affinities. The precise contest as from the 2001 census is as follows:

Hill districts
a) Senapati district:
Population - 283,621 (- 100%)

Population excluding Mao-Maram, Purul and Paomata subdivisions - 156,513
Christians: 122,724
Hindus: 30,441
Muslims: 1,281

ST Population - 122,791
Thadou (Kuki): 72,535
Tangkhul (Naga): 8,329
Vaiphei (Kuki): 7,357
Rest: 34,570

Missing data on Mao-Maram, Paomei (Naga): 127,108

Estimate of Naga percentage in the district population: 47.75%
Estimate of Kuki percentage in the district population: 28.17%
Estimate of rest: 12.19%
Estimate of Meitei population: 10.73%

Assembly constituencies (6): Karong (ST), Mao (ST), Saikul (ST), Saitu (ST), Tadubi (ST), Kangpokpi (General)
----------------------------------------------
b) Churachandpur district:
Population - 227,905 (= 100%)
Christians: 213,186 (93.5%)
Hindus: 10,538 (4.6%)
Muslims: 2,573 (1.13%)

ST Population of district - 212,482 (= 93.23% of district population)
Thadous (Kuki group): 54,929 (25.9% of ST population)
Paite (Kuki): 45,549 (21.4%)
Hmar (Kuki): 37,998 (17.9%)
Rest: 74,006 (34.8%)

Assembly constituencies (6): Churachandpur (ST), Hinglep (ST), Saikot (ST), Singhat (ST), Thanlon (ST), Tipaimukh (ST)
----------------------------------------------
c) Ukhrul district:
Population - 140,778 (= 100%)
Christians: 133,966 (95.2%)
Hindus: 5,687 (4.04%)
Muslims: 881 (0.6%)

ST Population of district - 134,493 (= 95.54% of district population)
Tangkhul (Naga group): 127,035 (94.5% of ST population)
Thadou (Kuki): 5,268 (3.92%)
Simte (Naga): 718 (0.5%)
Rest: 1,472 (1.09%)

Assembly constituencies (3): Chingai (ST), Phungyar (ST), Ukhrul (ST)
----------------------------------------------
d) Tamenglong district:
Population - 111,499 (= 100%)
Christians: 105,791 (94.88%)
Hindus: 3,187 (2.86%)
Muslims: 1,431 (1.28%)

ST Population of district - 106,349 (= 95.38% of district population)
Kabui (Naga group): 60,893 (57.26 % of ST population)
Kacha Naga (Naga): 34,368 (32.32 %)
Thadou (Kuki) - 6,888 (6.47%)
Rest: 4,200 (3.95%)

Assembly constituencies (3): Nungba (ST), Tamei (ST), Tamenglong (ST)
----------------------------------------------
e) Chandel district:
Population - 118,327 (= 100%)
Christians: 109,128 (92.2%)
Hindus: 5,701 (4.8%)
Muslims: 2,318 (1.96%)

ST Population of district - 108,779 (= 91.93% of district population)
Thadou (Kuki group): 35,086 (32.3% of ST population)
Anal (Naga): 20,851 (19.2%)
Maring (Naga): 19,828 (18.2%)
Rest: 33,014 (30.3%)

Assembly constituencies (2): Chandel (ST), Tengnoupal (ST)
----------------------------------------------

Conclusion 2: Thus, Churachandpur district is two-thirds Kuki majority, Ukhrul is Tangkhul Naga (same affinity as Thuingaleng Muivah who was prevented from entering Ukhrul district in 2011)-dominated, and Tamenglong is Kabui-Kacha Naga dominated. On the other hand, Chandel is evenly split between Kukis and Nagas. For Senapati district, the figures are controversial because no census was taken for Mao-Maram, Purul and Paomata subdivisions and the numbers for other subdivisions is believed to be inflated at the edges (see Linky, for example). But it is also widely believed that these three subdivisions are (at least historically) dominated by Naga affinities, specifically Mao-Maram and Pangmei tribes. On the other hand, the complete stalling of activity in the Sadar Hills subdivision by Kuki blockades over the last year shows that these regions could be Kuki dominated. Using this intuition and the 2001 census figures, our best guesstimate is that in Senapati district, the Nagas are ~55% in the district, with Kukis around ~30%, and Meiteis around ~15% (give or take 1 or 2% points either side for the three parties). This explains why a general Assembly constituency (Kangpokpi) is delimited in the Senapati district for the Meitei/general population.

Valley districts:
f) Imphal West:
Population - 444,382
Hindus: 330,994 (74.48%)
Others: 73,705 (16.59%)
Muslims: 19,124 (4.3%)

ST Population of district - 21,118 (= 4.75% of district population)
Dominant ST group: Kabui (Naga) - 9,042
---------------------------------------------
g) Imphal East:
Population - 394,876
Hindus: 240,347 (60.87%)
Others: 67,741 (17.16%)
Muslims: 62,932 (15.94%)

ST Population of district - 24,712 (= 6.26% of district population)
Dominant ST group: Tangkhul (Naga) - 5,896
---------------------------------------------
h) Thoubal district:
Population - 364,140
Hindus: 221,096 (60.72%)
Muslims: 86,849 (23.85%)
Others: 50,819 (13.96%)

ST Population of district - 4,274 (= 1.17% of district population)
Dominant ST group: Thadou (Kuki) - 1,154
---------------------------------------------
i) Bishnupur district:
Population - 206,368
Hindus: 148,903 (72.15%)
Others: 38,763 (18.78%)
Muslims: 14,194 (6.88%)

ST Population of district - 6,143 (= 2.95% of district population)
Dominant ST group: Kom (Kuki) - 2,229
---------------------------------------------
Conclusion 3: Thus, except for Thoubal district, Hindus and Others (followers of Sanamahi religion, nature-worshippers, etc.) dominate over the rest of the religious affinities.

To follow next: What does the Manipur verdict really mean?

Updating the Maoists' top layer profile and my biggest questions on maoism

Organization: The Central Committee is at the apex. It oversees both political and military maters, as well as publicity. The Central Military Commission (CMC) is responsible for all military related matters, such as logistics, training, devising battle tactics. To provide for specialized guidance on military affairs, a Sub Committee on Military Affairs (SCOMA) was formed in 1995 but was disbanded in favour of the CMC. Further, the Sub Committee on Political Education (SCOPE) was formed in 1996 and has been tasked with indoctrinating party cadres. The publishing bureau oversees propaganda and preparation, distribution of party literature and circulars. Regional Bureaus, Zonal/State Committees, District Committees, Squad Area Committees and Village People's Committees are connected with political work.

At the parallel level, there runs the military machine. Armed cadres are organized in the form of the People's Liberation Guerrilla Army (PLGA). The people's militia is at the bottom and is organized as Village Defence Squads. This constitutes the base force. Military platoons constitute the main striking force, while Local Guerrilla Squads and Special Guerrilla Squads form the secondary force.

At the end of the Unity Congress-9th Congress of the CPI(Maoist) in January-February 2007, there were 38 Central Committee (CC) members and 14 Politbureau members. Of these, around 21-22 CC members and 7 Politbureau members remain at large today. Fourteen of the CC members are residents of different villages in Andhra Pradesh, five hail from West Bengal, two from Jharkhand, and one each from Bihar and Karnataka.

A picture of the top guns: Linky

At-large Central Committee members:
1) Mupalla Laxman Rao alias Ganapathi -- General Secretary and Gen Sec of PWG
2) Prasanta Bose alias Kishanda -- second in command and Gen Sec of MCC, heads the outfit’s operations in Orissa, Jharkhand, Bihar, West Bengal and Assam (Eastern Regional Bureau)
3) Nambala Keshav Rao alias V(B)asavraj alias Basab Raj alias Gangana -- chief of the armed wing (Military Commission in-charge)
4) Mallojula Venugopal Rao alias Vivek alias Sonu alias Abhay -- Kishenji's brother, secretary of its Central Regional Bureau of Dandkaranya, appointed official spokesperson in place of Azad on July 7, 2010. Likely to take over Azad’s job of supervising the Maoist publications Vanguard, People’s March and Kranti. Linky

5) Katakam Sudershan alias Anand alias Mohan alias Birenderji -- Vasavaraj's deputy -- As secretary of the outfit’s “central regional bureau”, he is also in charge of operations in the Dandakaranya forests, north Telangana and the Andhra-Orissa border — a belt where the rebels are perhaps most active. The brain behind the Dantewada massacre.
6) Malla Raji Reddi -- arrested in Kerala’s Angamally, 20 km from Kochi, in December 2007, recently obtained bail from a Kerala court and reportedly went underground. Linky, sharp military capability
7) Misir Besra alias Sunirmal -- member of Maoist Central Military Commission (CMC), was arrested in Jharkhand’s Giridih, 200 km north-east of Ranchi, in September 2007, escaped when taken out of court on June 23, 2009
8) Rajesh da alias Majoj

9) Tippiri Tirupati alias Devuji -- sharp military capability
10) Katta (Kadari) Ramachandra Reddy alias Kosa alias Gudsa Usendi -- Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee official spokesman
11) Jingnu Narasimha Reddy alias Jampanna -- sharp military capability
12) Akkiraju Haragopal alias Ramakrishna alias RK
13) Pulluri Prasada Rao alias Chandranna

14) Ramachandra Reddy Pratap Reddy alias Chalapathi
15) Modem Balakrishna
16) Gajanand Bhaskar alias Parush
17) Mohan alias Mahesh
18) Dev Kumar Singh alias Nishanth
19) Vivek Chenderi Yadav alias Payag
20) Kuppuswamy Devaraj alias Ramesh alias Balaji
21) Rayanna
22) Ranjith Bose alias Kanchan
23) Kadari Satyanarayana Reddy
24) Pratap

Politbureau members:
1) Mupalla Laxman Rao
2) Prashanta Bose
3) Nambala Keshava Rao
4) Mallojula Venugopal Rao
5) Katakam Sudarshan
6) Misir Besra
7) Malla Raji Reddy

Other prominent leaders:
1) Asim Mindal alias Aakash, secretary of the party’s West Midnapore state unit
2) Mansaram Hembram alias Bikash, the only tribal in Bengal’s Maoist leadership
3) Arnab Dam alias Bikram -- from Purulia
4) Ranjit Pal -- from Purulia

Reward:
Mupalla Laxman Rao (reward of INR 24 lakhs),
Nambala Keshav Rao (Rs 19 lakh),
Katakam Sudarshan (Rs 19 lakh),
Mallojula Venugopala Rao (Rs 19 lakh),
Prashanta Bose (Rs 7 lakh),
Malla Raji Reddy (Rs 7 lakh).

Big catches from the list eliminated in the (\approx) last two years:

a) Central Committee Members
Killed:
1) Wadkapur Chandramouli/Chandra Mohan alias Devanna (Dec 2006)
2) Sande Rajamouli alias Prasad (June 2007)
3) Patel Sudhakar Reddy -- Alias Suryam alias Vikas alias Srikanth -- killed May 24, 2009
4) Shakhamuri Appa Rao -- killed Mar 11, 2010 with Kondal Reddy
5) Cherukuri Rajakumar -- Alias Uday alias Azad alias Parimal alias Prasanth alias Madhu alias Gangadhar -- Vasavaraj's other deputy and spokesperson of CPI(M) -- killed in encounter July 2, 2010
6) Mallojula Koteshwar Rao -- Alias Kishenji alias Pradip alias Prahlad -- Eastern India "commander", killed in encounter November 25, 2011

Arrested:
7) Sheela Marandi (July 2006)
8) Amitabha Bagchi -- see below
9) Kobad Gandhy -- see below
10) Tusharkant Bhattacharya -- Alias Srikant, released from jail on Nov 19, 2009 due to lack of evidence, re-arrested Jan 8, 2010
11) Balraj -- Alias Arvind alias B. Prasad Singh, arrested Feb 8, 2010
12) Chintan -- Alias Banshidhar alias Chintan Da alias Banshidhar Singh, arrested Feb 8, 2010
13) Aditya Bora -- arrested in Sundergarh district of Orissa, February 13, 2011
14) Pulendu Sekhar Mukherji -- Alias Saheb alias Gagan alias Akash alias Jhantu alias Jhantu Mukherjee alias Joyda -- arrested from Barsoi village in Katihar district of Bihar April 29, 2011 Linky
15) Varanasi Subrahmanyam -- Alias Vimal alias Srikanth alias Sukant -- as above
16) Vijay Kumar Arya -- Alias Jaspalji alias Amar -- as above

Surrendered:
17) Lanka Venkata Papi Reddy alias Lachchanna

Old/unclassified: Shyam, Mahesh, Murali, Moti Lal Soren, Vishnu, Shobha, Pankaj

Politbureau Members Neutralized:
1) Sushil Roy (May 2005), arrested from Hooghly
2) Narayan Sanyal (Jan 2006)
3) Pramod Mishra (May 2008) arrested from Dhanbad: Alias Bibiji or Banbihariji alias Janardhanji alias Madanji -- arrested on May 11, 2008 Linky
4) Amitabha Bagchi (August 2009) arrested from Ranchi -- Alias Anil, founder of the erstwhile CPI(ML)-Party Unity -- arrested on Aug 19, 2009 (Former Politburo member and secretary of the central military commission of the outfit)
5) Kobad Gandhy (Sept 2009) arrested from Delhi -- Sept 22, 2009, obtained bail on June 16, 2010. Linky
6) Baccha Prasad Singh (Feb 2010) arrested from Kanpur -- Alias Arvind alias Bachha Prasad Singh
7) Cherukuri Rajakumar -- killed July 2, 2010 -- see above
8) Akhilesh Yadav (June 2011) arrested from Gaya -- Alias Jagdish Master alias Jagdish Yadav alias Bhupesh, Politbureau member arrested from Gurar area of Gaya district in Bihar on June 11, 2011
9) Mallojula Koteshwar Rao -- November 25, 2011 -- see above

Others:
1) Satyendra Kushwaha alias Naresh alias Dadan -- arrested Feb 25, 2009
2) Ashutosh Tudu -- arrested in Rourkela, Orissa, in March 2009
3) Tauhild Mula alias Kartik -- arrested Aug 19, 2009
4) Saswati Panda alias Subhashree alias Mili -- arrested Jan 15, 2010
5) Lalmohan Tudu -- killed Feb 23, 2010
6) Venkateshwar Reddy alias Telugu Deepak -- arrested Mar 2, 2010
7) Kondal Reddy alias Tech Ramanna --- killed Mar 11, 2010
8) Marshal Topno -- arrested Mar 16, 2010
9) Bapi Mahato -- arrested June 21, 2010

Caste/Biodata information:
1) Mupalla Laxman Rao -- Born in Beerpur village in Sarangapur mandal in Karimnagar district of AP. He worked as teacher in Karimnagar district and deserted his job for higher education in Warangal. There, he met Nalla Adi Reddy and Kondapalli Seetharamaiah and he joined the naxalite movement. He was one of the early members of Communist Party of India (ML) People's War and grew as General Secretary of the party that is now called as Communist Party of India (Maoist). He is married to Muppalla Vijaya, has two brothers and two sisters.
2) Mallojula Koteshwar Rao -- Born in a poor Brahmin family in Pedapalli in Karimnagar district, which eked out a living on priesthood in nearby temples. His father was a freedom fighter and vice-president of the state branch of the Congress Socialist Party. Kishenji completed school in 1969 and graduated from Adarsha College in Jammikunta. In 1973, after a BSc mathematics degree from Government Degree College, Peddapalli, he moved to Hyderabad to pursue law (LLB degree), but gave up after the first year. He married Maniakka, alias Sujatha, who is a member of the Dandakaranya special zonal committee in Chhattisgarh. She was earlier secretary of the South Bastar divisonal committee.
3) Prashanta Bose -- Comes from Jadavpur in West Bengal. Bose’s wife Sheela Marandi, another central committee member of CPI (Maoist) was arrested in 2006.
4) Nambala Keshav Rao -- Comes from a family of government officials in Srikakulam district. Rao's brothers are Vigilance and CMD level officers in Andhra Pradesh.
5) Mallojula Venugopala Rao -- Brother of Kishenji (one of three sons), Brahmin, A graduate and a resident of Peddapalli in Karimnagar district.
6) Malla Raji Reddy -- hails from Karimnagar district.
7) Katakam Sudarshan -- Born to the weaver community in Bellampally, Adilabad district, studied at a polytechnic in Warangal before joining the People’s War Group of Kondapalli Seetharamaiah in the 1980s. A few years ago he lost his life partner Sadhana, who was secretary of the Maoists’ Adilabad district unit in north Telangana. Linky
8) Kobad Gandhy -- Born into an affluent Parsi family that had a house famed for its antique furniture in Worli Sea Face in Mumbai, an ice-cream factory and a resort in Mahabaleswar. The young Ghandy went to public school and later to Elphinstone College in Mumbai. He married Anuradha who hailed from a Konkan family that owned a coffee plantation. Anuradha died in 2009 of cerebral malaria.
9) Misir Besra -- Hails from Jharkhand

Some questions for which I dont have a clear answer as yet:
1) Why has Karimnagar district produced 15 of the 38 central committee members of the maoists?
A take is provided at Linky

15 Central Committee Members are from Karimnagar district. Karimnagar, named after a Nizam’s son, is on the edge of the Dandakaranya forests in the Deccan plateau and is dotted with forests and hilly tracts that lead to Chhattisgarh, the bloodiest theatre of the rebels. Complementing the lay of the land was a man-made environment of exploitation that drove bonded farm labourers to rebellion in 1973. Several landlords died in the violence that accompanied the demand for more wages. Then a familiar cycle followed. The landlords, belonging to the upper-caste Velama, unleashed the police who cracked down with mindless brutality that was met with retaliations modelled on guerrilla tactics. The brutalities found expression in the film Dasi, where Jagityal, a town in Karimnagar, provides the backdrop.

During the days of the Emergency, the Congress government supported the landlords and tried to crush the peasant movement with military force. Nearly 600 activists were killed in the Dandakaranya jungles of Karimnagar and Warangal. But the seeds had been sown long before. In the early sixties, Maoist top gun Chandra Pulla Reddy led a group on a 20km march in the forests of Karimnagar and Warangal to motivate tribals and farm labourers. The symbolic protest received wide publicity. Kishan’s hometown Peddapalli was the nerve centre of the movement by bonded farm labourers. As the movement took root and the threat from Maoists spread, most landlords migrated to the district headquarters. The Naxalites were seen as liberators from police zulum at the behest of the feudal landlords, said social scientist N. Venugopal.

2) What is the strength of the Maoists now?
A take is provided at Linky

The CPI (Maoist) has around 20,000 firearms and nearly 10,000 cadres, enough to withstand a state-backed onslaught for six months, but it faces a problem of ammunition mismatch, a study by intelligence agencies has found. The estimate is the first of its kind on the Maoists done by central and state intellegince. Twelve states — Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Karnataka, Bihar, Bengal, Madhya Pradesh, Uttarakhand, Tamil Nadu and Kerala — were included in the study. It said the rebels’ weapon stocks include AK-47s, AK-52s, .303 rifles, assault pistols, Israeli-make sniper rifles and light machine guns.

The gun-manpower ratio stands at 1:2 with the number of personnel in the rebel ranks estimated at 10,000. The study said the Maoists acquired weapons in four ways: i) By snatching them from police stations and dead security forces after blasts and ambushes, ii) Snatching from security guards of industries in Maoist-infested zones, iii) Manufacturing weapons such as pistols, country-made mines and explosives in collusion with local mafia and gangs, iv) Procuring foreign weapons, ammunition and explosives from militant and criminal groups operating within and outside India.

3) Is the Maoist menace defeatable?
My answer: The basic feeding attribute to the Maoist movement is the relative disparity in the growth of people. If the Government of India tries to address this problem, it allocates invaluable resources to equalize growth at the cost of self-entrenched prosperity dictated by the "law of the few." And further, such a redressal mechanism bows down to the superiority of the Maoist revolutionary logic that growth should perforce be equalized. On the other hand, if the Government of India ignores this disparity, the Maoist menace self-feeds itself. Alas, a balance needs to be achieved between these two extremes.

Such a balance should recognize the fact that the Government of India cannot kill the Maoist menace. Nor should it try to. The goal should focus on making the Maoist menace an irritant that is toleratable in a gross strategic calculation of territory controlled, peoples ruled and power emanated rather than to invest diminishing returns at trying to vanquish a beast that has more than just nine lives.

4) So where does the stable equilibrium in this pursuit of the balance lie? What measures could be taken toward this stable equilibrium?
i) Neutralizing the Politbureau and Central Committee Members, Zonal and Divisional Commanders of the outfit,
ii) de-legitimizing the overground workers and propagandists of the Party in various overt and covert forms,
iii) effective measures to de-corrupt administration at all levels,
iv) regulating PUCL via an act of law,
v) strengthening NHRC and other States' Human Rights Commissions in both mandate as well as in terms of administrative sanction to hear cases of abuse,
vi) strengthening the Fourth Estate by appointments of Central and States Ombudsman that are semi-independent of legislative oversights,
vii) law and order reform with a view to humanizing the attitudes and actions of Police forces in the Maoist belt (as well as the rest of India) by including continuing education courses to that effect,
viii) promotion of women's self-employment, rights' awareness and poverty alleviation schemes,
ix) providing a fair share of the resources divested from the Maoist belt to the local populations, and
x) overall uni-directional growth of the Indian economy and standards of living
are some of the points that have been suggested by different think-tanks and informed people.

5) Why are the AP-based maoists more violent than the WB-based maoists? Why do AP-based maoists dominate the military wing whereas the WB-based maoists dominate the policy, propaganda and ideology wings of the party? Why is the Spokesperson job reserved for AP-based maoists?

6) What is the share of women and tribals in the maoists movement? Are the women less violent than the men, are the Brahmins less violent than the tribals, and other stereotyping?
A take is provided at: Linky

7) The Communist dialectic and literature is rich enough that different attributions can be made to explain the maoist menace. Some claim that India is in the middle of an agrarian crisis, others claim it to be a class war, yet another set of people claim it to be a war between the revolutionaries (Proletariat) and the reactionaries (Bourgeois). So which of the three is it? Which part dominates the other two? What part does caste oppression play a role in feeding the maoist menace? What part does exploitation of forest and mining resources feed into this mess?

8) Why do the maoists have a dire need to use pen-names at random? Who are Abhay, Akash and Gudsa Usendi? Why was Mallojula Koteshwara Rao fond of the Kishen moniker?

9) Why are there more Sorens and Mahatos in the rank and file of the maoists than Xalcos or Mundas?

10) Why did MCCI and CPI(ML)-PW merge? Who were responsible for this merger?
What is the movement from PLGA to PLA supposed to mean?

11) What did the Purulia arms drop have to do with the maoists' increased fire-power?

What is cooking in Arunachal aka the resignation drama of Jarbom Gamlin

To understand what is going on in Arunachal Pradesh, a contextualization is essential.

a) A Historical Background: Arunachal Pradesh is the largest among all the North-East states considering its area of 83,743 sq. kms. The state has a long international border with Bhutan in the west covering 160 kms, Tibet in the north and northeast covering 1030 kms and Myanmar in the east covering 440 kms. The states of Assam in the south and Nagaland in the east and southeast form the other border states. Arunachal Pradesh falls in the outer Himalayas and Patkoi ranges. It is endowed with wide topographical variations, vegetation and wild life. The state is vivisected by innumerable rivers and streams which originate in the higher Himalayas and Arakan ranges. They flow down to form tributaries of Brahmaputra. The major rivers are Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Dibang, Lohit, Diyum and Dihing.

Arunachal Pradesh acquired an identify of its own for the first time in 1914 when some tribal areas were separated from the then Darrang and Lakhimpur district of Assam to form North-East frontier Tract (NEFT). The NEFT was further sub-divided into Balipara Frontier Tract, the Sadiya Frontier tract and Tirap Frontier Tract between 1914-43. At the time of India’s independence in 1947, the present territory of Arunachal Pradesh was under part-B of the Sixth schedule of the Constitution as the tribal areas of Assam. Part-B included NEFT including Balipara Frontier Tract, the Tirap Frontier Tract, the Abor Hills district, the Mishmi Hills district and the Naga tribal areas. All these districts together were renamed as North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) in 1951.

The NEFA was reconstituted under North-East Frontier Areas (Administration) Regulation of 1954 into Kameng Frontier Division, Subansiri Frontier Division, Siang Frontier Division, Lohit Frontier Division, Tirap Frontier Division, and Tuensang Frontier Division. The Tuensang Frontier Division was later separated from the NEFA in 1957 and merged with the newly constituted Naga Hills which became the new state of Nagaland. The NEFA was scheduled as part of Assam during the 1950-65 period and its administration was carried out by the Governor of Assam as an agent of the President of India under the Ministry of External Affairs. In the aftermath of the war with China in 1962, the responsibility of the NEFA administration was transferred to the Ministry of Home Affairs in 1965 as per the recommendations of the Dying Ering Commission (1965). Consequently, five divisions of the territory (Kameng, Subansiri, Siang, Lohit, and Tirap) became five districts. With the passage of time, these five districts have been further sub-divided into 16 districts.

Incorporating the recommendations of the Dying Ering Commission (1965), the North-East Frontier Agency Panchayat Raj Regulation Act was passed by the Parliament and implemented by the Government of India in 1967. As per the provisions of this Act, local self-government was introduced at different levels. For this, the Agency Council was formed at apex level followed by Zilla Parishads at District level, Anchal Samitis at Block level and Gram Panchayat at the village level. The traditional village councils which were already recognized under the North-East Frontier Administration of Justice Regulation, 1945, were accorded the status of Gram Panchayats. The NEFA was upgraded as Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh on January 21, 1972 in accordance with the North-East Frontier Areas (Reorganization) Act of 1971. Finally, the Union Territory was replaced by a Pradesh Council which in turn was converted to a Legislative Assembly in 1975. The first elections to a 30 member Assembly was held in 1978. Finally, the Union Territory was replaced by a full fledged state on February 20, 1978. The present strength of members of the state's Legislative Assembly is 60, which according to the Constitutional stipulations implies that the strength of the Cabinet (including the Chief Minister) cannot exceed 12.

b) The People: The population of Arunachal Pradesh can be roughly divided into Scheduled Tribes and non-Scheduled Tribes. From the 2001 census data, 64.2% are Scheduled Tribes whereas the rest are non-Scheduled Tribes.

Scheduled Tribes: According to the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Lists (Modification) Order, 1956 and as inserted by Act 69 of 1986 states, the STs in the state are “All tribes of the State including: Abor, Aka, Apatani, Dafla, Galong, Khampti, Khowa, Mishmi, Monpa, Momba, Any Naga tribes, Sherdukpen, Singpho”. The notification gives only an illustration of a few STs. In the 2001 Census, a total of 100 STs have been enumerated. Of these, 25 tribes have a population of 5000 or more. Relative to the total ST population of the state, these tribes and their relative percentages are: Nissi (Nyishi) 12.4%, Adi Gallong 6.8%, Wancho 6.77%, Dafla (reclassified as Nyishi as Dafla was deemed derogatory) 6.4%, Monpa 5.95%, Tagin 5.54%, Adi Minyong 4.82%, Nocte 4.78%, Adi 4.6%, Apatani 3.9%, Galong 3.86%, Mishmi 3.57%, Nishang 3.11%, Tangsa 2.97%, Abor 2.8%, Mishing/Miri 1.93%, Khampti 1.83%, Adi Padam 1.65%, ... .

Most of the tribes in Arunachal Pradesh are ethnically similar, having derived from an original common stock. But due to geographical isolation certain distinctive characteristics in each tribe in language, dress and customs can be noticed. The ST population form a set of semi-distinct cultural spheres, on the basis of tribal identity, language, religion, and material culture. They occupy distinct regions, specifically,
i) the Tibetic area bordering Bhutan in the west,
ii) the Tani area in the centre of the state,
iii) the Mishmi area to the east of the Tani area,
iv) the Tai/Singpho/Tangsa area bordering Burma, and
v) the "Naga" area to the south, which also borders Burma.
In between there are transition zones, such as the Aka/Hruso/Miji/Sherdukpen area, which provides a "buffer" of sorts between the Tibetic Buddhist tribes and the animist Tani hill tribes. In addition, there are isolated peoples scattered throughout the state, such as the Sulung.

Within each of these cultural spheres, one finds populations of related tribes speaking related languages and sharing similar traditions.
i) In the Tibetic area, one finds large numbers of Monpa tribes-people, with several subtribes speaking closely related but mutually incomprehensible languages, and also large numbers of Tibetan refugees.
ii) Within the Tani area, major tribes include Nissi (Nyishi), which has recently come to be used by many people to encompass Bangni, Tagin and even Hills Miri. Apatani also live among the Nyishi, but are distinct. In the centre, one finds predominantly Galo people, with the major sub-groups of Lare and Pugo among others, extending to the Ramo and Pailibo areas (which are close in many ways to Galo). In the east, one finds the Adi, with many subtribes including Padam, Pasi, Minyong, and Bokar, among others. Milang, while also falling within the general "Adi" sphere, are in many ways quite distinct.
iii) Moving east, the Idu, Miju and Digaru make up the "Mishmi" cultural-linguistic area, which may or may not form a coherent historical grouping.
iv) Moving southeast, the Tai Khamti are linguistically distinct from their neighbours and culturally distinct from the majority of other Arunachali tribes; they are religiously similar to the Chakmas who have migrated from the region that became Bangladesh. They follow the same Theraveda sect of Buddhism. The Chakmas consist of the majority of the tribal population. Districts of Lohit, Changlang, Dibang and Papum Pare have a considerable number of Chakmas. They speak a linguistic variant derived from Assamese and Bengali. Assam also has a large population of Chakmas who reside in the district of Karbi Anglong, Nagaon and Cachar. They also exhibit considerable convergence with the Singpho and Tangsa tribes of the same area, all of which are also found in Burma.
v) Finally, the Nocte and Wancho exhibit cultural and possibly also linguistic affinities to the tribes of Nagaland, which they border.

The 16 districts of Arunachal Pradesh are: i) Tirap, ii) Changlang, iii) Lohit -- Mishmis, Khamties and Singphoes, iv) Anjaw, v) Lower Dibang Valley -- Idu Mishmis, Adis and Mishing, vi) Upper Dibang Valley, vii) East Siang, viii) West Siang, ix) Upper Siang -- center of Adi society, x) Lower Subansiri -- Apatani, Nyishi and Hill Miri, xi) Upper Subansiri, xii) Kurung Kumey, xiii) Papum Pare, xiv) East Kameng, xv) West Kameng -- Monpas, Miji, Sherdukpen, and xvi) Tawang. Of these, the Lower Subansiri, Upper Subansiri, East Kameng, Tirap, and West Siang are predominantly ST districts with the proportion of ST population 80 per cent and above. These districts together share half of the total ST population of the state. Specifically, we have the following % of STs in each district:
i) Lower Subansiri 90.1%,
ii) Upper Subansiri 89.5%
iii) East Kameng 86.7%
iv) Tirap 83.7%
v) West Siang 81.7%
vi) Upper Siang 78.2%
vii) Tawang 75.0%
viii) East Siang 69.1%
ix) Papum Pare 56.6%
x) West Kameng 49.5%
xi) Dibang Valley 46.5%
xii) Lohit 38.2%
xiii) Changlang 36.2%.

From the above data, it can be seen that the combined tribes of the Adis and the Galongs (Abors) is the dominant tribal grouping followed by the Nissi (Nyishi)-Dafla. The Adi peoples are dominant in East Siang, Upper Siang, West Siang and Dibang Valley whereas the Nyishi community is dominant in Papam Pare, East Kameng, Lower Subansiri, Kurung Kumey, parts of Upper Subansiri, as well as the Darrang District and North Lakhimpur district of Assam. So far, no one from the dominant Nyishi community has become the Chief Minister of the state.

Non-Scheduled Tribes: The non-Scheduled Tribes consist of a large numbers of migrants from diverse areas of India and Bangladesh, who, while legally not entitled to settle permanently, in practice stay indefinitely, progressively altering the traditional demographic makeup of the state. Finally, populations of "Nepalis" (in fact, usually Tibeto-Burman tribespeople whose tribes predominate in areas of Nepal, but who do not have tribal status in India) and Chakmas are distributed in different areas of the state (although reliable figures are hard to come by).

c) Religion: In Arunachal Pradesh, unlike Nagaland, Mizoram, and Manipur, considerable ST population still adhere to their original tribal faith. This faith commemorates ancestors, emphasizes a belief in many spirits and folklores, and includes rituals which coincide with lunar phases or agricultural cycles. Sun and moon are worshipped as God and this God is referred to as Donyi-Polo. A law has been enacted to protect the indigenous religions (e.g., Donyi-Polo, Buddhism) in Arunachal Pradesh against the spread of other religions, though no comparable law exists to protect the other religions.

According to the 2001 Indian Census, the religions of Arunachal Pradesh break down as follows: Hindu 34.6%, Others (mostly, Donyi-Polo) 30.7%, Christian 18.7%, Buddhist 13.0%, Muslim 1.9%. Of the total ST population, we have the following breakdown: Others 47.2% (leading to 30.08% of the total state population), Christians 26.5% (leading to 16.96% of the state population), Hindus 13.1% (leading to 8.38%), Buddhists 11.7% (leading to 7.5%). The non-Scheduled Tribes can be broken into 26.3% of the state's share of Hindus, 5.5% of the share of Buddhists, and 1.7% of the share of Christians.

Individual ST wise, Khampti, Monpa, Momba, Sherdukpen, and Singpho are mostly the followers of Buddhism. Adi, Aka, Nishing, Apatani, Mishmi, Tangsa worship Donyi-Polo, whereas the Nocte practice an elementary form of Vaishnavism. Quite sizeable populations among Adi, Nishi (up to 80%), Nocte, and Wancho have been converted to Christianity. The Wancho and Nocte are Naga tribals and some have been influenced by Nagas (predominantly Christians) in Nagaland.

d) Arunachal's Problems:
1) The first problem is to speed up building infrastructure in the state, especially roads criss-crossing deep gorges and swift rivers. While the Border Roads Organisation mostly builds roads in the state, there are areas where connectivity is the state’s responsibility. Besides, the Chinese have, of late, been rapidly building infrastructure along the border that has made the Indian side nervous. While Beijing has geography on its side — the Tibetan plateau lends a distinct advantage — the Indian side neither has geography on its side nor, till recently, had the will to change the difficult terrain to its advantage by building roads.
2) The state also faces challenges in the extreme east as well in the Tirap and Changlang districts. Not only is there pressure from people to open the routes to Myanmar for trade and build roads but also to stem militancy. Both factions of the NSCN, Isak-Muivah and Khaplang, co-exist and exercise considerable influence in Tirap and Changlang. For the new incumbent, there would be pressure from Chidambaram to neutralise the militants with the state’s own police forces who would be allowed to recruit more people. There have been many fruitless efforts in the past to cap the claims of Nagalim: one such stillbirth move was to rechristen the Naga tribes of Arunachal Pradesh (34 tribes and sub-tribes in Changlang and 3 in Tirap) as Tangshangs. These groupings included Muklom, Longchang, Tutsa, Tikhak, Hawoi, Longri, Mungrey, Mushang in Changlang district and Nocte, Wangcho and Tutsa in Tirap district. Another such move was the introduction of the Arunachal Pradesh Control of Organised Crime Act (APCOCA) Bill under the Mukut Mithi government, which was then repealed under Gegong Apang.
3) The third problem is with Assam in terms of contested borders and downstream impact of big dams.
i) The most important position in Arunachal Pradesh after the Chief Minister is the Ministry of Power given the enormous hydel power resources and potential that Arunachal sits on. The state has the potential to generate around 50,000 MW and most of the projects have been commissioned on the Subansiri, the Siang, the Lohit and the Kameng. However, the issue of big dams in Arunachal has generated quite a bit of heat in neighbouring Assam, as there are fears of largescale inundation downstream. Specifically, the Krishak Mukti Sangram Samiti (KMSS) and its leader Akhil Gogoi have been preventing vessels carrying machinery for the Lower Subansiri power project to be carried through. In response to this opposition, the Union ministry of environment and forests has been conducting a study on the feasibility and environmental impact of big dams from 2009.
ii) The Nyishis in East Kameng have repeated clashes with Bodos in the Darrang and Sonitpur districts of neighboring Assam due to overlap of territory issues. Similar problems exist elsewhere on the Arunachal-Assam border also.

e) Political State:
Background information on the players:
Gegong Apang is an Adi tribal.
Dorjee Khandu is a Monpa tribal with Buddhist affiliation from Tawang.
Jarbom Gamlin is a Donyi-Polo from the West Siang district.
Mukut Mithi is an Adi tribal (?) from the Lower Dibang Valley.

After a coalition regime (between BJP and Arunachal Congress) under veteran politician Gegong Apang, the eve of the 2004 elections saw Apang shift his allegiance to the Congress yet again. With this weight, Congress stormed back to power in Arunachal Pradesh winning 34 seats in the 60-member assembly with Apang emerging as the frontrunner for the Chief Ministership. Under the Gegong Apang ministry, Dorjee Khandu who was re-elected unopposed in 2004 from Mukto constituency became the minister for Power, NCER, and relief and rehabilitation. Jarbon Gamlin who was elected from Liromoba became the Home Minister. Gamlin was dropped from the Apang ministry in March 2006. While no specific reasons were given for the ouster, the most likely consideration might have been to ensure that all sections of society get proper representation in the ministry given the upper cap of 12 on the ministry (the newly inducted ministers were said to be close to Apang and former CM Mukut Mithi).

Unhappy over the "dictatorial policies and distribution of portfolios in the council of ministers" of the Apang regime, dissidence by a majority of ruling Congress MLAs saw Dorjee Khandu take over as the Chief Minister on April 9, 2007. He continued through 2009 and won a re-election bid in 2009. Of the total 60 seats in the Arunachal State Assembly, 42 was won by the Congress, five by the NCP, five by Trinamul Congress, four by PPA, three by BJP and one is an Independent/rebel candidate from one of the mainstream parties. Meanwhile, Gegong Apang was arrested in August 2010 for alleged corruption relating to a Rs. 1000 crore public distribution system scam. Apang denied the charges and claimed they are politically motivated, though the government stated that the investigation was conducted independently and without political interference. The scam allegedly involved fradulent hill transport subsidy bills that were passed while Apang was Chief Minister without the required financial oversight.

The incumbent Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh, Dorjee Khandu, died in an unfortunate helicopter crash at Sela Pass on April 30, 2011. Khandu's government from 2007 to his untimely demise had signed scores of MOUs with private players to set up over 100 hydel power projects, the revenue from which would make Arunachal the richest state in the country. In the wake of his demise, four to five (depending on the source) contenders emerged for the Chief Ministership. They were: i) Arunachal Pradesh Congress Committee (APCC) president and PWD minister Nabam Tuki, ii) former chief minister Mukut Mithi, iii) Rural Welfare and Development minister Kalikho Pul, iv) Finance minister Setong Sena and v) Power minister and government spokesman Jarbom Gamlin. While Tuki was the frontrunner as a veteran party hand, the scales eventually tipped in Gamlin’s favour as he was backed by the deceased’s family.

The high command (AICC) too gave in to the family’s wish and Jarbom Gamlin was sworn in as the new chief minister of Arunachal Pradesh on May 5, 2011. As payback, Gamlin fielded Dorjee Khandu's son Pema Khandu, 32, in his cabinet with the hope that Pema could contest the Mukto byelection. The rest of the ministers in his cabinet were erstwhile ministers in the Dorjee Khandu-government. They include Kalikho Pul, Setong Sena, Nabam Tuki, Tako Dabi, Chowna Mein, Tanga Byaling, Atum Welly, Takar Marde, Honchun Ngandam and Bosiram Siram. In terms of tribal divisions, the Nyishi community has 14 MLAs in the 60-member state assembly. Two of them are ministers and four others parliamentary secretaries in the Congress government headed by Gamlin.

f) From Crisis to Crisis:
The contentious replacement process for Dorjee Khandu has meant that the Jarbom Gamlin government has been working on a crisis mode from inception. Signs of crisis could be felt during the three-day Assembly session that concluded in late September when non-Congress MLAs demanded a CBI inquiry into the crash that claimed the life of Dorjee Khandu during the obituary references and a Congress legislator raised the issue of the deteriorating law and order situation. In the meanwhile, an explosive news report from Pradeep Thakur of the Times of India which attributed the loss of Nabam Tuki in the Chief Ministerial race to the tense relation Nyishis have with other tribal groupings brought the influential Nyishi Elite Society and the All Nyishi Students’ Union into the picture. They called for an Itanagar chalo campaign (Mega Nyishi Dignity Rally) on October 7 accusing the Gamlin government of divisive politics and collusion by being the news source in the Times of India report.

Other organizations chipped in this effort too. The All Nyishi Youth Organisation has extended support to the Nyishi Elite Society’s demand for Gamlin’s resignation. Also unhappy with the situation are the All Arunachal Youngstar United Federation, the All Arunachal Registered Contractor Association, the Arunachal Citizens’ Right, the NEFA Indigenous Human Rights Organisation and the Women Power Connect (Arunachal chapter). The Arunachal Pradesh Indigenous Tribes Union's charges also included breakdown in law and order situation, unprovoked police firing on protesters and demanded immediate termination of those involved in the police firing, among others. It flayed the state home minister Takar Marde for the breaking down of law and order while Youngstar United has sought the Centre’s intervention for restoration of normalcy.

The governance crisis reached a flashpoint with senior cabinet minister Chowna Mein alleging that he was kidnapped soon after the three-day Assembly session on September 26 and taken to the chief minister’s official residence at Niti Vihar* where other MLAs and ministers were also present and that he had to flee that very evening fearing for his life. Jarbom Gamlin not only dismissed the charges but also said he was the one to drop the minister home. The government spokesperson Setong Sena has refuted accusation of government forces being involved in the kidnapping, dubbing it as an attempt to gain cheap publicity. Mein’s accusation came at a time when several legislators, ministers and party leaders had been camping in Delhi, demanding Gamlin’s ouster. Specifically, Gamlin and Tuki have been camping in Delhi since September 27 hoping for a resolution to their contrasting demands. Gamlin wants Tuki’s wings clipped while Tuki wants Gamlin to be replaced, citing “breakdown” of governance in the state.

Some governmental sources said involvement of NSCN (I-M) rebels in the entire drama, which has derailed governance in the state, was also suspected, as some MLAs were allegedly being threatened to support some faction of the outfit or the other. Their involvement is also suspected in light of their demand for inclusion of Tirap and Changlang districts in the integrated Naga homeland, Nagalim. The Naga rebels, however, have strongly refuted the charge about their involvement in Arunachal Pradesh politics. But the voice of a terrorist group only adds so much credibility to the whole situation.

While the AICC seems to be concerned that there exists a threat by some legislators to form a regional party if there were no change of guard (as has been seen many times in the past), in the words of the BJP organisation secretary (Northeast), P. Chandra Sekhar, administration has come to a total standstill for over a month as two Congress groups lobby for leadership. BJP general secretary Tapir Gao said though the standoff was an internal matter of the Congress, it had caused a crisis for which the party leadership was responsible. As of October 29, 2011, Sonia Gandhi finally decided to remove Arunachal Pradesh chief minister Jarbom Gamlin after the central observers told her of his grave mistakes and the deep sense of disquiet among a majority of the legislators. The process of choosing Gamlin’s successor has begun and the decision will be announced in the next couple of days.

* Gamlin, however, does not stay in his official residence.

Northeast Frontier Railway

The above pic is a recent railway map of Assam. From a recent news report:

At present, there is a network of only 2,447-km rail line in the entire north-eastern region, which accounts for 4 per cent of the national network. Of the total railway network, about 97 per cent is in Assam and 2 per cent in Tripura. Therefore, a very accelerated programme of rail connectivity is required to provide the basic infrastructure capacity for the NE to realize its economic potential. At present, there is a plan to connect Itanagar and Agartala during the 11th Plan whereas Aizawl, Imphal and Kohima would be connected during the 12th Plan, the sources said, and added that Shillong and Gangtok were expected to be connected in the 13th Plan. According to the sources, India is going to construct the Agartala-Akhaura (Bangladesh) line to connect Tripura to the Bangladesh railway network. It has been decided that the projects of the Railways designated as national projects will be supported by the Government of India in the ratio of 75-25. It has also been decided to create a fund for development of rail infrastructure in the north-eastern region.

So here is a Know Your Northeast Frontier Railway Primer.

1) Headquarters: Maligaon in Guwahati,
2) Established: The railway zones of the Indian Railways were reorganized in the year 1953. During this time, Avadh - Tirhut Railway and Assam Railway were coalesced to create North Eastern Railway. Later in 1958 (Jan 15), Northeast Frontier Railway was created out of the North Eastern Railway.
3) Divisional headquarters: Alipurduar, Katihar, Lumding, Rangiya and Tinsukia
4) Issues: Pre-partition Indian Railways had linked the North-East and the present-day Bangladesh as an organic whole. Partition resulted in complete severance of this logical link. The truncated network of the North-East stood woefully incomplete and unconnected. See more of the Pre-partition history at Linky 1 and Linky 2.

The Indian Railways addressed this problem immediately and in right earnest. The Assam Rail Link project was completed in 1950 providing a meter gauge (MG) rail link to Assam. But the journey involved transhipment and ferry crossing both for passengers and for freight. The broad gauge (BG) link was extended in phases to Guwahati between 1965 and 1985. Two massive bridges on the mighty Branhmaputra at Kamakhya and Jogighopa and later extension of a BG link up to Dibrugarh and Lekhapani finally made it possible to travel to the North-East.

5) Past achievements:
a) Track linking project in Agartala-Jogendranagar-Jirania-Brigudaspara
b) Katihar-Jogbani GC Project
c) Senchoa-Silghat GC project
d) Siliguri Diesel Shed
e) Sick line shed and freight examination facilities at New Bongaigaon

6) Freight traffic composition (from Linky):
Three broad categories — coal, petroleum products and other cargoes — each having almost equal share
In 2008-09 and 2007-08 (in million tons):
a) Coal - 4mt 4.8mt
b) Petroleum - 3.5mt 3.8mt
c) Foodgrains - 0.876mt
d) Bamboo - 0.503mt
e) Dolomites - 0.306mt
f) Cement - 0.176mt
g) Fertilizers - 0.133mt

7) Heritage projects:
a) 120km long Mahur–Harangajao hill section in North Cachar Hill district (now called Dima Hasao district) of Assam
b) 10km long Siliguri—Bagdogra section in West Bengal
c) Heritage park called the Rail Heritage Park-cum-Museum at New Tinsukia station in eastern Assam at the confluence of two historic railway systems — Dibru Sadiya Railway (DSR) and Assam Bengal Railway (ABR), which were linked at Tinsukia on March 1, 2003. The museum showcases DSR and ABR along with a gallery on the unique Darjeeling Himalayan Railway (DHR). The DHR is the famous 610 mm-wide narrow gauge railway that snakes up the Himalayas from Siliguri to Darjeeling for 88 km and is a World Heritage Site, as recognised by UNESCO since November 2, 1999. The still-operational DHR was made operational in 1881 across one of the most scenic mountainous terrains of the world by virtue of ingenuous engineering solutions.
d) Century-old Cooch Behar railway station in West Bengal is a heritage structure

8) Ongoing major projects (from Linky):
In Assam:
a) Gauge conversion Lumding-Silchar (201.03km), Arunachal-Jiribam (50.39km), Badarpur-Kumarghat (117.82km) segments, Hill section of 151km and Plain section of 217km, sanctioned in 1996-97, declared National Project in 2004 (meaning 75% funding will be met by the Ministry of Finance, GoI and remaining 25% by Ministry of Railways), Hill section is confronted with the constraints of short working season (November-April), militancy (NC Hills area has been under the spell of DHD and KLNLF), difficult terrain, limited contractors, non-availability of raw material and skilled labour, bad condition of roads and bridges resulting into frequent interruptions in man and material movement and land acquisition resulting into interruptions by several departments and interest groups
b) Rail cum road Bridge over river Brahmaputra at Bogibeel with linking lines on North and South Bank - 74km, National Project, sanctioned in 1997-98, expected to be completed by 2014 (around 90% of work done in earthwork, minor as well as major bridges, no tunnels needed), need to complete Dibrugarh Guide-I in one working season otherwise it will be washed away in the monsoon season, project delayed due to extortion attempts and security threats by militants and meagre allotment of funds through 2005-06
c) Completion of 142km Jogighopa-Guwahati and the Bridge at Jogighopa

In Tripura:
a) New broad gauge line Agartala-Sabroom (110km), Sabroom is 75km from Chittagong International Airport in Bangladesh, a small bridge over river Feni can connect Sabroom and Khagrachari (in BD) -- the second such link after the Kolkota-Dhaka rail line, sanctioned in 2008, delay by State Government to hand over land and resistance by villagers
b) New line connecting Agartala with Akhaurah (in BD) - 5km
c) Kumarghat-Agartala meter gauge line project - 109km, foundation stone laid in 1996, project complete and line commissioned by October 2008, three big tunnels through the Longtharai Valley, Baramura and Atharamura Hills in Dhalai and West Tripura districts, 1,962-metre Longtharai tunnel is the longest railway tunnel in eastern India

In Manipur:
a) Jiribam-Tupul-Imphal - 84km in place of the Diphu-Karong project (123 km) connecting Brahmaputra valley with Manipur valley which was frozen for strategic reasons, National Project, sanctioned in 2003-04, Jiribam-Tupul expected to be completed in 2014 and Tupul-Imphal in 2016, survey took five years to complete due to insurgency, frequent bandhs, hilly terrain, economic blockades in NH39 and NH53, poor/non-existent feeder roads to reach interior project sites, weak bridges and poor road conditions to transport heavy machinery and material not possible from Silchar side, and NH39 not available due to blockades.

In Arunachal-Upper Assam:
a) New broad gauge line from Harmuti-Naharlagun-Itanagar - 22km, project sanctioned in 1996-97, detailed estimate sanctioned in January 2008 for the Harmuti-Naharlagun segment, the other segment's estimate sent to the Railway Board, approx 10% of work on major bridges done, no tunnels required, delay in land acquisition by Government of Assam, dispute of ownership of land at State boundary between Arunachal and Assam

In Sikkim-North Bengal:
a) New broad gauge line from Siliguri-Sevok-Rangpo-Ranipool near Gangtok, 52.70km, National Project, sanctioned in 2008-09, expected to be completed in 2016, detailed estimate under process with the Railway Board
b) Gauge conversion New Jalpaiguri-Siliguri-New Bongaigaon (417km)

9) Other major/minor projects in the works:
a) New line from Dimapur to Kohima (Zubza)
b) New BG line from Bhairabi to Sairang
c) New BG line from New Maynaguri to Jogighopa - 265.7km
d) New BG line from Azara to Byrnihat
e) New BG line from Eklakhi to Balurghat (113km) and Gazole to Itahar
f) Dudhnoi to Depa (Mendipathar) - 18km
g) New BG line from Araria to Galgalia (Thakurganj)
h) New BG line from Kishanganj to Jalalgarh
i) Gauge conversion Katihar-Jogabani (200km)
j) Gauge conversion Lumding-Dibrugarh including branch lines (628km)
k) Gauge conversion Katakhat-Bhairabi (84km)

In short:
1) Tripura's trade future seems to lie in close-knit cross-border ties with Bangladesh. This writing on the wall + rapproachment from the Bangladeshi side means that the Manik Sarkar government has not been found wanting in moving towards a status quo ante in terms of trade with Bangladesh.
2) Assam as usual is the connector for Arunachal and Nagaland (Upper Assam) and Meghalaya (Lower Assam). Some speedy movement in Arunachal is perhaps mooted by the Chinese claim, while the various insurgencies in Nagaland and Meghalaya means that they stand to see the gains of connectivity last. Darwin's award for self de-selection deserves no better exhibit than the case of Nagaland.
3) Sikkim's future is tied to the Dooars-Siliguri corridor (Darjeeling/North Bengal). This may provide a stepping stone to pull East Nepal and Bhutan into a tight trade-based embrace with a cross-border rail and HV transmission network. The day is not far off when hydroelectric power is traded for perishable and non-perishable commodities.
4) Vested by the disadvantage of geography, Mizoram might see connectivity towards the fag end of the process. Cross-border ties with Mizo tribes in Burma is the way to go. The process bulldozed by the Manik Sarkar government may catalyze such a revolutionary thinking sometime soon. While Moreh-Tamu is a significant boost in this direction, the viability of Mizoram-Burma trade is still light years away.
5) An alternate to the NSCN(IM)/Nagalim pressure point vis-a-vis Manipur is being envisaged, but given the state of affairs with respect to project completion in India (in general) and the Northeast (in particular), NSCN (both the factions) will remain a pressure point for a long time to come. Diversifying trade with Burma and developing the British era highway system to Assam (North Cachar Hills) is the way to go for Manipur.

Understanding Manipur (Part I)

The data here has been collated from
1) Linky 1
2) Linky 2
3) Linky 3
4) Tribes of North East India: An Ethnographic Profile, by Chaturbhuj Sahu
5) Linky 4

Manipur became a Union Territory in 1956 and later, in 1972, a full-fledged state of India. The area of Manipur is 22,327 sq km, of which 20,736 sq km is the surrounding hills (with ~41% of the population) and the remaining area is the Imphal Valley or plateau (with ~59% of the population). There are nine administrative districts in Manipur: i) Bishnupur, ii) Churachandpur, iii) Chandel (formerly known as Tengnoupal), iv) Imphal East, v) Imphal West, vi) Senapati, vii) Tamenglong, viii) Thoubal and ix) Ukhrul. Of these the four districts of Bishnupur, Imphal West, Imphal East and Thoubal form the Valley region while the rest form the Hilly area.

The Hilly area is the predominant home of the tribal people with Ukhrul, Tamenglong, Churachandpur, and Chandel having more than 90 per cent of the district’s population as ST. Senapati district has recorded 78.5 per cent of its population as ST. These five districts together hold 92.4 per cent of the state’s total ST population. The rest of the four districts (Imphal West, Imphal East, Bishnupur, Thoubal) have negligible percentage of ST population.

There are 29 tribal communities notified as per the census records: Aimal, Anal, Angami, Chiru, Chote, Gangte, Hmar, Kabui, Kachanaga (Liangmei), Kairao, Koirang, Kom, Lamgang, Mao, Maram, Maring, Mizo (Lushai), Monsang, Moyon, Paite, Purum, Ralte, Sema, Simte, Sabte, Tangkhul, Thadou, Vaipha and Zou. These tribes are broadly categorized into two groups: i) the Naga group (which includes Anal, Angami, Kabui, Kachanaga, Kairao, Koirang, Lamgang, Mao, Maram, Maring, Mizo, Monsang, Moyon, Ralte, Sema, Sabte, and Tangkhul), and ii) the non-Naga or the Kuki group. Apart from these two tribal groups, there is a primary chord of ethnic Manipuri (or Meitei) groupings. There is yet another chord of Meiteis who subscribe to Islam and go by the name Meitei Pangals. Thus, Manipur is a four-way toss-up between Meitei, Pangal, Naga and Kuki whinefests modulo the intra-Kuki (and very rarely intra-Naga) whinefests.

In terms of ethnography, the Naga group lead a settled life and have a great affinity with the Naga groups in Nagaland whereas the Kuki group exhibits a migratory habit and have affinity with the Chins and Mizos. The Naga group holds a communal system of control and management of resources whereas the Kukis often have a strong, authoritative and hereditary chiefship for this purpose. Sociologically and anthropologically these non-Naga tribes believe that their customs and social organizations are akin to each other among themselves and that these are different from the ones found among the Nagas. Geographically, the non-Naga tribes occupy contiguous areas and have closer contacts with the Chins of Burma's Chin Hills. Linguistically, languages of the non-Naga tribes are mutually intelligible to a great extent, whereas Naga languages are totally unintelligible to these communities. Politically, the non-Naga tribes had an upper hand in Manipur before independence and had enjoyed official patronage more than the Naga tribes did. In addition to these, many non-Naga villages have mixed population of non-Naga tribes.

The population of Manipur in 2001 Census has been 2,166,788. Of this 741,141 are Scheduled Tribes (STs), which constitutes 34.2 per cent of the total population of the state. Of these 741,141, almost 717,604 are Christians constituting 96.8 per cent of the ST population. The state has registered 17.2 per cent decadal growth of its Scheduled Tribe population in 1991-2001. The total population of the state in the 1981 and 1991 censuses was 1,420,953 and 1,937,149 while the same for the ST population was 387,977 and 632,173 (27.30% and 31.78%). According to the 1961-2001 census, the different tribal numbers is as follows (with % inter-decadal change in brackets):

1961 1971 1981 1991 2001
1 Aimol 108 836(674.07) 1,862(122.73) 2,108(13.21) 2529(19.97)
2 Anal 4,868 6,670(37.02) 9,349(40.16) 10,642(13.83) 21,242(99.61)
3 Angami 632 70(-88.92) 566(708.57) 308(-45.58) 132(-57.14)
4 Chiru 1809 2,785(53.95) 3744(34.43) 6032(61.11) 5622(-6.80)
5 Chothe 1,035 1,905(84.06) 1,687(-11.44) 2,571(52.40) 2,762(7.43)
6 Gangte 4,856 6,307(29.88) 7,891(25.11) 12,793(62.12) 9,442(-26.19)
7 Hmar 15,365 23,312(51.72) 29,216(25.33) 35,767(22.42) 42,933(20.04)
8 Kabui 29,218 40,257(37.78) 26,006(-35.40) 62,487(140.28) 82,386(31.85)
9 Kacha Naga 9,734 13,026(33.82) 12,754(-2.09) 33,640(163.76) 42,013(24.89)
10 Koirao 406 1,620(299.01) 919(-43.27) 1716(86.72) 2348(36.83)
11 Koireng 531 458(-13.75) 948(106.99) 873(-7.91) 1,410(61.51)
12 Kom 5,477 6,550(19.59) 9,830(50.08) 13,004(32.29) 14,600(12.29)
13 Lamgang 1,866 2,622(40.51) 3,452(31.66) 4,031(16.77) 5,894(46.22)
14 Mao 28,810 33,379(15.86) 50,715(51.94) 76,972(51.77) 4,736(-93.85)
15 Maram 4,928 4,539(-7.89) 6,544(44.17) 9,592(46.58) 1,225(-87.23)
16 Maring 7,745 9,825(26.86) 11,910(21.22) 15,698(31.81) 23,238(48.03)
17 Any Lushai tribe(Mizo) 2,746 7,483(172.51) 6,126(-18.13) 8,240(34.51) 15,164(84.03)
18 Monsang 1,342 930(-30.70) 1,139(22.47) 1,803(58.30) 2,130(18.14)
19 Moyon 647 1,360(110.20) 1,642(20.74) 2,081(26.74) 2,970(42.72)
20 Paite 17,029 24,755(45.39) 30,959(1152.11) 40,792(31.76) 49,271(20.79)
21 Purum 82 - 447 388(-13.20) 571(47.16)
22 Ralte 80 154(92.50) 109(29.22) 250(129.36) 5(-98.00)
23 Sema 4 3(-25.00) 24(700.00) 111(362.50) 13(-88.29)
24 Simte 2,818 4,177(48.23) 5,034(20.52) 8,833(75.47) 11,065(25.27)
25 Suhte - 3 282(9300.00) 746(164.54) 1905(155.36)
26 Tangkhul 43,943 57,851(31.65) 79,029(36.61) 107,244(35.70) 146,075(36.21)
27 Thadou 47,994 59,955(24.92) 56,467(-5.82) 121,994(116.04) 182,594(49.67)
28 Vaiphei 8,215 12,347(50.30) 15,463(25.24) 26,877(73.81) 38,267(42.38)
29 Zou 6,761 10,060(48.79) 12,576(25.01) 16,803(33.61) 20,567(22.40

As can be seen from the above data, some tribal numbers such as for Mao, Maram, Gangte etc. have been decreasing. This flux is due to conversion and re-orientation of tribal affinities of the Kuki vs. Naga, intra-Naga and intra-Kuki kinds. The seven most dominant tribes in the 2001 census are Thadou, Tangkhul, Kabui, Paite, Hmar, Kachanaga and Vaiphui (that is, four Kuki sub-tribes and three Naga sub-tribes). Together, they occupied 78.7% of the ST population as the following table shows:

1 All STs 741,141 100%
2 Thadou 182,594 24.6
3 Tangkhul 146,075 19.7
4 Kabui 82,386 11.1
5 Paite 49,271 6.6
6 Hmar 42,933 5.8
7 Kacha Naga 42,013 5.7
8 Vaiphui 38,267 5.2
9 Maring 23,238 3.1
10 Anal 21,242 2.9
11 Zou 20,567 2.8
12 Any Mizo (Lushai) tribes 15,164 2.0
13 Kom 14,602 2.0
14 Simte 11,065 1.5

Of these, many Kuki sub-tribes have refused to be clubbed together with Thadous and there has been a demand for calling their mutually intelligble dialects as Kuki-Thadou or Thadou Kuki or Kuki or Thadou (depending on who you hear). This explains the great preponderance for intra-Kuki hostility. In terms of terrorism in Manipur, there are four types of outfits: i) Meitei outfits, ii) Kuki outfits, iii) Naga outfits, iv) Meitei Pangal (Muslim) outfits. We now briefly describe the main outfits, with a follow-up take soon.

Meitei outfits:
1) UNLF: The United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the oldest Meitei insurgent group in the State was formed under the leadership of Areambam Samrendra Singh on November 24, 1964 to achieve independence and a socialist society. A pan-Manipuri Youth League was formed in December 1968, which functioned as an overground body for the UNLF. Later, differences within the outfit surfaced over the issue of strategies to be adopted. While Samrendra Singh sought to spread ideological consciousness before launching an armed struggle, the more radical leader Oinam Sudhir Kumar established a Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM). Samarendra Singh was killed by unidentified terrorists in Imphal on June 10, 2001. In the seventies and eighties, the UNLF concentrated mainly on mobilisation and recruitment. In 1990, it decided to launch an armed struggle for the ‘liberation’ of Manipur from India. In the same year, it formed an armed wing called Manipur People’s Army (MPA).
Whine Profile: The UNLF aims to establish an independent socialist Manipur.
2) PREPAK: The People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) was formed under the leadership of R.K. Tulachandra on October 9, 1977.
Whine Profile: Claiming to be the "most genuine revolutionary groups" in Manipur, the PREPAK’s main demand is the expulsion of ‘outsiders’ from the State.
3) KCP: Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP) was formed on April 13, 1980, under the leadership of Y. Ibohanbi.
Whine Profile: The main objective of KCP is to restore the independence of the erstwhile Manipur kingdom and to bring about an egalitarian society, which is to be achieved by uniting all ethnic-Mongoloid groups belonging to South-East of Himalayan region, liberating Manipur from the Indian rule, building up the strength of the working class and reviving the indigenous culture.
4) KYKL: Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), meaning "the Organisation to save the revolutionary movement in Manipur" is a Meitei terrorist group formed in January 1994 following merger of the Oken faction of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the Meiraba faction of People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and the Ibo Pishak faction of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP).
Whine Profile: The purported objective of the KYKL is to ‘rebuild’ the Manipuri society by clearing it of all vices like immoral activities, drug trade and corruption. According to the KYKL ‘Public Relations Officer’ S.K. Loya, the group stands for ‘nationalism’ of the entire Northeastern region to be based on the principle of "all for one and one for all". Towards the end of 2001, the outfit launched ‘Operation New Kangleipak’ (ONK), an ‘anti-corruption’ campaign to ‘clean up’ the educational system in Manipur. While the outfit continues its activities under the ONK, it has also pledged open support to other terrorist groups who reportedly work against the narcotics trade, drug addiction, immoral activities and corruption in the society.
5) PLA: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was established under the leadership of N. Bisheswar Singh on September 25, 1978.
Whine Profile: The PLA aims to organise a revolutionary front covering the entire Northeast and unite all ethnic groups, including the Meiteis, Nagas and Kukis, to liberate Manipur. PLA, though a Meiti outfit, claims itself to be a trans-tribal organisation seeking to lead the non-Meiteis as well.

Naga outfits:
1) NSCN(IM) runs its reign of terror across the Nagaland, Arunachal and Manipur belts via proxy outfits such as ANSAM (All Naga Students Association of Manipur).

Kuki outfits:
1) KNA: The Kuki National Organisation (KNO) and its armed Wing, Kuki National Army (KNA), were formed in 1988. The first batch of the cadres, under the command of Thangkholun Haokip, was trained by the Kachin Independent Army (KIA) in Myanmar.
Whine Profile: The main objectives of the KNA is to bring together all the Kuki-inhabited areas separated by artificial boundary created in 1935, specifically in the Kabaw valley of Myanmar and the Kuki inhabited areas in the hill districts of Manipur under one administrative unit called ‘Zalengam’ (Land of freedom). In case of the eventuality of such integration not materializing, the KNA aims at the creation of two Kuki states: one within Burma i.e. ‘Eastern Zalengam’ and the other within India, ‘Western Zalengam’.
2) KNF: Kuki National Front (KNF) was formed under the leadership of Ranco Thangboi Kuki on May 18, 1988 primarily to counter the NSCN-IM hegemony in the Kuki-inhabited areas.The KNF split in 1995, with one unit identifying itself as the "presidential faction" and the other as the "military council". The former again split into KNF (Samuel faction) and KNF (Zougam faction).
Whine Profile: The primary objective is to secure a separate State or Union Territory for the Kuki community and the unification of all scattered Kukis in the new homeland, 'Kukiland'.
3) KLA: The Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) was formed under the leadership of Paozangam Letkholun sometime in 1992. He was shot dead by the security forces in an encounter at Chaningpokpi village in the Imphal East district on June 4, 2003.
Whine Profile: The Kuki Liberation Army (KLA) claims to be fighting for an independent Kukiland or a separate Kuki state.
4) KRA: The Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) was formed in December 1999, allegedly with the support of the Isak-Muivah faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-IM). In August 2007, the KRA underwent a split with the formation of the KRA-Unification in the Karbi Anglong district of Assam.
Whine Profile: The primary objective of the KRA is to secure a “separate State” for the Kuki tribe within the Indian union and the unification of all scattered Kukis in the new homeland. In Assam, its declared objective is the creation of the “Kuki National Council”, an autonomous administrative council for the Kukis in the Karbi Anglong district. The KRA-Unification, on the other hand, aims at unifying the Kuki tribals.
5) UKLF: The United Kuki Liberation Front (UKLF) is one of the several small militant groups fighting for an ethnic Kuki state, Kukiland. The outfit was formed on March 29, 2000.
Whine Profile: The purported objective of the UKLF is to uphold the interests of the Kuki community and form a separate Kuki state called 'Kukiland'.
6) ZRO/ZRA: The Zomi Revolutionary Organization (ZRO) was formed in 1993 and its armed wing, the Zomi Revolutionary Army (ZRA), was formed in 1997 following an escalation of ethnic violence between the Kukis and Paites in the Churachandpur district of Manipur.
Whine Profile: The purported objective of the ZRO/ZRA is to protect the interests of the Paite community from the ‘onslaught of any community or group’. It further attempts to bring all the Zomi people, divided by artificial State boundaries in various countries, specifically in Myanmar (Chin State), India (Manipur and Mizoram) and Bangladesh (Chittagong Hills Tracts), together under one administrative unit, a ‘Zogam’, which means ‘land of the Zomi’ under the Indian Union.
7) HPC(D): Hmar People's Convention - Democracy (HPC-D) is an offshoot of the Hmar People's Convention (HPC), which came into existence in 1986, as a political party spearheading a movement for self-government in the north and northeast of Mizoram.
Whine Profile: The Hmars, who according to the 1991 census, were 12,535 in number in Mizoram, were disappointed with the contents of the Mizo Peace Accord of 1986, which failed to address their demand of a 'Greater Mizoram' integrating all areas inhabited by Hmars in Mizoram, Assam and Manipur under a single administrative unit. Since April 1987, the HPC waged an armed struggle for autonomy, which touched extreme levels of violence towards 1991. Hmar cadres abducted tea executives and triggered off a spate of extortions in the Hmar inhabited areas of the States of Mizoram, Assam and Manipur. The purported objective of the outfit over the years has changed from an autonomous district covering the north and northeast Mizoram to an independent Hmar State (Hmar ram) consisting of the Hmar inhabited areas of Mizoram, Manipur and Assam.

Pangal outfits:
1) PULF: A communal clash between the dominant Meiteis and the Pangals (Muslims) on May 3, 1993 over monetary transaction in the Lilong Bazaar area of Thoubal district led to approximately 150 deaths in the Thoubal and Imphal districts. Subsequently, discontented members of the minority Muslim community formed a number of Islamist militant outfits. People’s United Liberation Front (PULF), founded in 1993, was one of them.
Whine Profile: Besides seeking to safeguard the interests of the minority Muslim community in Manipur, PULF’s purported objective is to secure an Islamic country in India’s northeast through an armed struggle in collaboration with other Islamist fundamentalist groups. The outfit also envisions a society based on ‘Islamist values’ and to this end, has ‘acted’ against the prevalence of substance abuse and alcoholism among Muslims in the State. It has also passed diktats on the dress code for Muslim girls in the State.