Republic Day Diplomacy

The choice of chief guest in the Republic Day celebrations is dictated by a number of reasons — strategic and diplomatic, business interest and international geo-politics. There is an interesting sub-text for the visit of every head of state who is invited as the chief guest. Though the reasons differ from year to year, the choice — either for Republic Day chief guests or for recipients of prestigious awards — is based on some general principles. Most often, the choice is dictated by the usefulness of the person to India, either in the past or in future. (Linky)

2012: Prime Minister Yingluck Shinawatra of Thailand — The invitation to Yingluck is part of New Delhi's effort to boost its' 'look East' policy. Yingluck is expected to hold talks on ways to increase trade and investment opportunities between the two countries, particularly in energy, petroleum and food industries. From the Thai perspective, "... once the Asean economic community takes affect in 2015, Thailand could become a trade and investment gateway to the community for India, while India would be a distribution centre of Thai products to countries in the South Asia region."

2011: President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono of Indonesia — From Linky

From an Indian perspective, there were two objectives underlying President Yudhoyono’s selection as chief guest for this year’s Republic Day celebrations. First, closer alignment with Indonesia is expected to strengthen India’s hand in the East Asian Summit, an ASEAN-led grouping of 17 countries that also includes Russia, China, Japan, Australia, and the US trade is an important component of the summit process, along with strategic issues ranging from energy security to climate change. India has been a part of the summit since its first meeting in Kuala Lumpur in 2005. Among other advantages, strengthening India’s relationship with Indonesia, which currently chairs ASEAN, is seen as a way of counterbalancing Chinese influence in the summit.

Second, the trip was about business, pure and simple. Like British Prime Minister David Cameron last July, U.S. President Barack Obama in November, and Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao in December, President Yudhoyono arrived in New Delhi accompanied by a planeload of business leaders. Economic engagement between India and Indonesia is growing fast, bolstered by the signing of the India-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement last year under which India committed to reduce import tariffs on goods from ASEAN countries. Bilateral trade between India and Indonesia topped $12 billion in 2010. Among other goods, India sells military hardware to Indonesia under a defense cooperation agreement signed in 2001.

President Yudhoyono and his delegation met with around 500 business leaders at a forum hosted by national business associations where they signed billions of dollars worth of cooperative agreements for ventures ranging from infrastructure to mining and manufacturing. The Steel Authority of India (SAIL) signed an agreement to set up a $3.3 billion steal plant in Indonesia’s Central Kalimantan. Hyderabad-based GVK Power and Infrastructure Ltd. signed memoranda to build airports in North Bali and Yogyakarta. In addition to trade agreements, the two countries signed an extradition treaty and a ‘mutual legal assistance’ treaty.

President Yudhoyono’s visit has been viewed within Delhi’s policy and business communities as having been very successful. The visit highlighted the importance that India attaches to its ‘Look East’ policy of increased engagement and economic integration with Southeast Asia. It also showcased India and Indonesia’s growing profile on the world stage as part of a strong and resurgent Asia.

More from: Linky

Apart from signing trade deals/MoUs worth US$15 billion with his Indonesian counterpart (and thus making India one of Indonesia’s top investors), the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, also announced the commencement of negotiations for an India-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA). The trade agreements signed will give India access to key Indonesian resources including coal. Indian companies, like GVK Power, have also inked deals to build infrastructure, like airports, in Indonesia. These deals aim to double bilateral trade by 2015. Indeed, bilateral trade has already been growing steadily, from US$5 billion in 2005 to US$11 billion in 2010. Additionally, India and Indonesia signed a mutual legal assistance treaty and an extradition treaty. These treaties signal a mutual interest in countering terrorism and ensuring the security of key sea lanes of communication, like the Straits of Malacca. The increased cooperation also reflects a mutual concern vis-à-vis a rising and increasingly active China, which has territorial disputes with both countries. Yudhoyono had earlier visited India in November 2005 when India and Indonesia had signed the India-Indonesia strategic partnership agreement.

2010: President Lee Myung-bak of South Korea — South Korea is an influential player in the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum where India has a growing stake, because of which New Delhi feels the need for a greater engagement with APEC member countries. India also signed a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA) with South Korea recently to bolster economic ties. CEPA is much more than just a free trade agreement as it includes services in its scope as well. The visit by President Myung-bak came in the wake of the final environmental clearance to Posco which was to set up a $12-billion steel plant in Orissa — the single biggest foreign investment in India.

2010: President Nursultan Nazarbayev of Kazakhstan — Kazakhstan is one of the largest producers of uranium which India was seeking desperately to secure fuel supplies for its nuclear reactors. India signed a civil nuclear deal with Kazakhstan during Nazarbayev’s visit and the first uranium consignment was delivered soon after.

2008: President Nicolas Sarkozy of France — The two countries finalized their bilateral civil nuclear cooperation agreement even as India awaited the conclusion of the Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA.

2007: President Vladimir Putin of Russia — During this visit, Russia formally acknowledged India as a nuclear weapons power and offered to set up four more nuclear reactors at Kudankulam in Tamil Nadu and additional ones elsewhere. Russia also promised support for special waiver from the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group.

2006: King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz al-Saud — At a time when engaging with the Muslim world was being seen as necessary from a strategic angle, India chose Saudi Arabia to begin the process of strengthening its presence in that region. Aware that hardly any Arab money was being invested in its markets, New Delhi wanted to correct that.

2005: King Jingme Singye Wangchuk of Bhutan — Bhutan had cracked down on ULFA militants in December 2003, becoming the only country to have demonstrated by action that it would not tolerate any anti-India activity on its soil. This was a thank-you invitation by India.

2004: President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of Brazil — This visit was indicative of the growing ties between the major emerging economies of the world. The IBSA (India-Brazil-South Africa) grouping had already taken off and trade with Brazil had crossed $1 billion for the first time. The two countries have been coordinating even more closely ever since, the most recent example of which was on display at the Copenhagen climate change summit.

2003: President Mohammad Khatami of Iran: India and Iran, at that time, were working on the common objective of bringing stability in Afghanistan. Both countries were supporting groups that were fighting the Taliban. India was helping the Northern Alliance led by Ahmad Shah Masood while Iran had been backing the Hazaras. Iran was the one that had offered India access to Afghanistan after Pakistan refused to let Indian foodgrains and other materials to be taken through its territory.

2002: President Cassam Uteem of Mauritius — This was in line with New Delhi’s plans to reach out to the African countries. Mauritius has a large number of people of Indian origin, including Cassam Uteem himself. Uteem had been President of the island nation for the previous ten years and India wanted to honour his achievement.

2001: President Abdelaziz Bouteflika of Algeria — This visit had more to do with NAM legacy. Bouteflika was a friendly face for India in Africa and the NDA government under Vajpayee also wanted to use him to convey that it did not discriminate against Muslims.

2000: President Olusengun Obasanjo of Nigeria — As a young military officer, Obasanjo had come, rather reluctantly, to India for training. Once here, he fell in love with India. He became a military dictator in 1976 but just three years later transferred power to an elected President. He was imprisoned in the early nineties by another military dictatorship. During this time, India honoured him with the Indira Gandhi Peace Prize which his wife received on his behalf. Obasanjo was released only in 1998 and went on to win the Presidency in elections a year later. India wasted no time in inviting him for the Republic Day the following year.

1999: King Birendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev of Nepal — This was in line with New Delhi’s policy of a continued engagement with its neighbours. The Gujral doctrine of promoting friendly relations with neighbouring countries was very much still in practice even though the government had changed.

1998: President Jacques Chirac of France — This was a period when India was wooing Western powers for technological and military supplies in the wake of the fall of the Soviet Union. The US was not warming up enough and the UK was seen to be toeing the Washington line on major issues. France had a more independent thought process and was more willing to do business quietly. France was the only major power not to have criticised the Indian nuclear tests carried out less than six months later.

1997: Prime Minister Basdeo Panday of Trinidad and Tobago — A PIO, Panday was the Foreign Minister when India’s then External Affairs Minister N D Tiwari made a trip to Trinidad and Tobago. They decided to open an Indian cultural centre in Trinidad. But it did not go down well with the local population which accused Panday of letting India colonise their country. The cultural centre was put on hold. Panday himself lost the ministership because of other reasons. But when he returned as Prime Minister in 1995, one of the first things that Panday did was to open the Indian cultural centre.

1996: President Fernando Henrique Cardoso of Brazil — This was when the idea of closer cooperation between the emerging economies was still taking shape. Till then India had negligible trade with Latin America. Cardoso was also in favour of greater economic cooperation between the two countries. Trade picked up and India also opened a consul in Sao Paulo.

1995: President Nelson Mandela of South Africa — After 27 years in prison, Mandela had just been elected President of South Africa in its first ever multi-racial elections in 1994. And it was only fitting that India invited him to grace the Republic Day next January.

1994: Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong of Singapore — India had recently become a dialogue partner of ASEAN. So important was Singapore’s role in India’s engagement with ASEAN that Manmohan Singh, then the Finance Minister, used to often say that New Delhi must never forget the contribution of Singapore which had held India’s hand when no one else did.

1993: Prime Minister John Major of United Kingdom — In the wake of the break-up of Soviet Union, India was trying to warm up to the Western powers for its military and technology supplies and Britain was one of the first ones New Delhi had reached out to.

1992: President Mario Soares of Portugal — In 1992, Portugal was celebrating the 500 years of Vasco da Gama’s victory over French pirate ships near its coasts and had invited India to become a part of it. New Delhi had initially agreed but later realised that it could be seen as eulogizing the man who laid the ground for Portuguese rule in India. New Delhi, therefore, politely declined and instead invited the Portuguese President as chief guest.

1991: President Moumoon Abdul Gayoom of Maldives — This invite was to honour a long-time friend of the country in a neighbouring country which is strategically extremely important for India.

1990: Prime Minister Anerood Jugnauth of Mauritius — Jugnauth was a PIO, originally from Bihar and spoke fluent Bhojpuri. The invitation was a reflection of changing politics.

A complete list of the invitees during the Republic Day celebrations is available at: Linky.
Some more understanding of this diplomacy is at: Linky

Turn the other cheek diplomacy

The recently concluded 17th summit meeting of SAARC leaders at Addu city has come in for criticism on the "appeasement" policy followed by the Indian PM, Shri. Manmohan Singh. Specifically, one commentator states that: Linky 1

However, the Addu Declaration has failed to address India's concern on terrorism.
...
Given the fact that India has been a victim of cross-border terrorism for more than three decades now, and by the admission of Pakistan's Interior Minister Rehman Malik that "incidents like 26/11 happen every day in Pakistan," the Addu Declaration has clubbed terrorism, transnational organised crimes, illegal trafficking in narcotics and psychotropic substances, illegal human trafficking, piracy and smuggling of small arms together, albeit briefly.

One certainly cannot be in an eternal state of aggressive diplomacy (aka) jingoistic fervor to make a point. Given the enormity of challenges in ensuring connectivity to the Northeast of India, and securing energy resources from Nepal and Bhutan in a grid that spans India and Bangladesh, it would have been suicidal to score an own goal of further persisting with an India-Pakistan equal-equal. India needs to handle Pakistan and vice versa, but these are bilateral issues that need not stalemate a multilateral initiative such as SAARC. In fact, given the Indian reluctance to make J&K, crossborder terrorism as de jure multilateral initiatives, it has been a big surprise that a forum such as SAARC has been hijacked by the India-Pakistan status quo. Divorcing Indian problems with cross-border terror emanating from Pakistan in a multilateral setting that allows the leeway to speak broadly and widely and cutting across many boundaries can at best be termed "Turn the other cheek" diplomacy, at worst as sell-out. I would rather have it the former than the latter. At the very least, it behooves to understand the Prime Minister's logic before mounting noisy protestations at his supposed "sell-outs."

1) From his inaugural address at the summit: Linky 2
On cutting down the sensitive list:

I am happy to announce that, in a major trade liberalization effort, the Government of India has issued a notification to reduce the Sensitive List for the Least Developed Countries under the South Asian Free Trade Area Agreement from 480 tariff lines to 25 tariff lines. Zero basic customs duty access will be given for all items removed with immediate effect. I recognize that non-tariff barriers are an area of concern. India is committed to the idea of free and balanced growth of trade in South Asia. Competition begins at home. Our industries have to learn to compete if our economies are to have a future in this globalised world that we live in. We can all benefit from our respective comparative advantages. These include our hydropower and natural resource endowments, possibilities of earnings from transit, marine resources, our scientific and technological base and above all our young population which will drive consumption and investment in the years ahead.

On connectivity issues:

The theme of this year’s Summit is “Building Bridges”. This eloquently summarizes the imperative of greater regional integration, and is an objective to which India is fully committed. One such initiative taken last year was the launch of the South Asia Forum that has brought eminent South Asians from different walks of life together. In our Summit in Dhaka in 2005, I had suggested a reciprocal initiative to provide unrestricted access to airlines from SAARC States to our four metropolitan cities, and to 18 other destinations in India. Connectivity has partially improved since then. We must take this further. We should aim to conclude a regional Air Services Agreement, for which India would be happy to host a meeting of officials next year.

We have been talking of a Regional Railway Agreement and a Motor Vehicle Agreement for a long time. Let us agree to conclude these agreements as a matter of priority. India, Maldives and Sri Lanka are in the process of developing regional ferry services. We should replicate many more such connectivity arrangements in other parts of our sub-continent.

I commend the Postal Administrations of SAARC for agreeing to establish a South Asian Postal Union. India is happy to host the ad hoc Secretariat for the Union, and to sponsor training courses at our Postal Staff College to train upto ten SAARC officials per year, belonging to interested Member States. We should follow up this agreement by improving our telecommunication linkages to reduce call rates and telecommunication tariffs and interconnection termination charges. India will be ready to facilitate the development of a regional telecommunications infrastructure to improve the quality of connectivity. We should encourage greater broadcasting, television and film exchanges among our countries. It is time that we overcome the information deficit among the SAARC countries. We should encourage our people to know more about each other.

In this spirit, I wish to announce the following initiatives that India will take.

We will host a conclave of the top dozen tour operators from the SAARC region to boost tourism exchanges. We will take the initiative to establish a travelling exhibition on the ancient history of South Asia. This could comprise of a hundred archeologically-significant pieces per country to be selected by member States. The exhibition can be hosted in each of our national museums in turn for three months. Post-graduate courses in the South Asian University have started in July 2010. India will increase the number of SAARC Silver Jubilee Scholarships for the South Asian University from 50 to 100. 75 of these will be at the Masters level and 25 at the doctoral level.

On environmental matters:

Protecting our environment even as we pursue rapid growth is essential. The India Endowment for Climate Change which I had announced last year has been established. We look forward to receiving project proposals from our SAARC partners. We will provide a total of ten scholarships per year to SAARC Member States for post-graduate and doctoral studies in forestry courses at the Forestry Research Institute of India, Dehradun.

2) As a consequence of the push: Linky 3

In his address during the inauguration of the summit on Thursday, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh had called for full implementation of his six-year-old proposal for unrestricted access to airlines from SAARC states. He had also suggested giving priority to a Regional Railway Agreement and a Motor Vehicle Agreement. The declaration made no mention of an air services agreement but met Dr. Singh's desire for SAARC-wide ferry and rail services. In the absence of seamless air, rail and sea connections among SAARC member-countries due to traditional animosities, unsettled conditions and apprehension about the other country's designs, the common man travelling between some SAARC countries is forced to take circuitous routes. In this respect, the eight leaders at the summit decided to finalise a Regional Railways Agreement and complete the preparatory work on an Indian Ocean Cargo and Passenger Ferry Service by the end of this year.

3) From the Addu declaration, some points that need highlighting: Linky 4

7. To direct the conclusion of the Inter-governmental Framework Agreement for Energy Cooperation and the Study on the Regional Power Exchange Concept as also the work related to SAARC Market for Electricity.
...
11. To initiate work towards combating maritime piracy in the region.
...
19. To undertake a comprehensive review of all matters relating to SAARC’s engagement with Observers, including the question of dialogue partnership, before the next Session of the Council of Ministers in 2012.

4) More on the observer issue: Linky

India today persuaded other Saarc member-countries to undertake a comprehensive review of the association’s guidelines for granting observer status to other nations.
...
A three-year moratorium on admitting new observers ended this year. New Delhi believes the existing nine observers is one too many for the eight-member Saarc. The observers are the US, Australia, China, Iran, Japan, South Korea, Mauritius, Myanmar and the European Union. India’s concerns stem from member-countries, particularly Pakistan, pushing for China to become a more involved partner. New Delhi does not want Saarc to become Beijing’s playground. It also has reservations about Pakistan support for Turkey’s bid to become an observer.

5) Four agreements were signed at Addu city:

a) SAARC Agreement on Rapid Response to Natural Disasters
b) SAARC Agreement on Multilateral Arrangement on Recognition of Conformity Assessment
c) SAARC Agreement on Implementation of Regional Standards
d) SAARC Seed Bank Agreement

As I point out elsewhere, the primacy of an Indian-centred electricity grid that is shared with Bangladesh and Sri Lanka and that is supplied by the massive hydro potential of Bhutan, Nepal and surplus power states of the Indian Northeast such as Arunachal Pradesh can go a long way to address the burgeoning demand for electricity in India and its neighborhood. Nuclear power can only go so far, and there is a need to diversify the sources of cheap and sustainable power. That does not make renewable power an alternative model for electricity generation discourse in India. Nor does it condone the criminality of transmission, distribution and pilferage losses.

Peace dividend vs. Democratic dividend vs. Oligarchic dividend

There have been quite a few moves by the South Block in the last few weeks/months: Nepal, Burma, Viet Nam, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, ..., that one opinionator found the deafening silence so perplexing (LInky)

All of this is good news both for India and for the region as a whole. So why does the story not get better play in the media, in the region and globally? Perhaps because no one is making the point.

So let me try undoing this silence on a not-so-grand-scale.

1) First, some opinions on BIPPA's aftermath in Nepal:

Maoist Spokesperson Dina Nath Sharma went on to claim that the BIPPA was approved by the Standing Committee meeting of the party prior to Bhattarai’s India visit and the deal has been reached abiding by the international norms and values. On October 18, the Standing Committee meeting of the Maoists had directed PM Bhattarai not to sign any controversial deals during his India trip.

By this one move, BIPPA will ensure guaranteed security for Indian investments in Nepal which the Indian embassy can invoke as and when needed. It will allow encircled companies such as Dabur, Tata, etc., to breathe free from bashing by different factions of maoists. The fact that this deal was signed with the maoists speaks more on why it could nt have passed muster under the JHK regime or worse, with MKN. That does nt mean that we are home now.

Meanwhile, the faction led by Maoist Vice Chairman Mohan Baidya has strongly objected to the deal reached between India and Nepal. Maoist Secretary CP Gajurel, who is considered close to Baidya, tagged the BIPPA as “anti-national.”

Sooner than later, even the NC and CPN(ML) will find a need to oppose BIPPA as an "imposed" treaty which should be re-bargained to maintain the honor and dignity of Nepal.
2) In Burma, an opinionator describes the happenings as follows: Linky

The Tatmadaw, i.e. the military, has agreed to try out a different method of governance (in which a ‘ civilian' government bears day-to-day responsibility for the country's affairs), but red markers are in place. Political forces are expected to behave responsibly, ensuring that public order and territorial integrity are not jeopardised and no one asks for a full-fledged democracy in a hurry.

So it may not be the Burmans' hedging of the bets against the chinese for all one knows. It could be that, and it could in part be a realization that democratic credentials surely are important in a long-term context of the internal health of Burma itself. Which is precisely where India fits in far better than the chinese will, given that our democratic dividend (in contrast to the classical demographic dividend, I know this word will become popular very soon, so you know who to attribute it to :)) is far better. Is India mediating on behalf of Burma to let the west go slow and see reason? You bet it.
3) India's biggest problem with Burma is not its pro-chinese moves, but

Delving deeper, two key gains of the visit should be highlighted. The first relates to border security management. A whole mix of negative activities is a constant on the India-Myanmar border. Although Myanmar extends cooperation to India, it is episodic, not sustained, in nature and it is given to a suboptimal degree. This explains the two governments' agreement on “enhancing effective cooperation and coordination” between their security forces in tackling “the deadly menace of insurgency and terrorism.” It is hoped that President Thein Sein carried home a clear message and that he would deliver on this score satisfactorily.
...
For the first time, a figure was put out, showing the monetary value of the assistance extended by India through various projects in recent years; it is $300 million. What is of the greatest importance — and what also constitutes evidence that South Block is listening to Track II deliberations — is the decision to offer a generous Line of Credit (LoC) amounting to $500 million for new projects.

There you go in terms of comparison: Bangladesh (1 billion US$) > Burma (500 million US$) > Nepal (250 million US$). All these are still peanuts w.r.t. 2 billion US$ to Afghanistan projects.
4) Soft loan of 250 million US$ for Nepal while 1 billion US$ reserved for Bangladesh. Much of foreign policy happens via the classical "carrots and sticks" paradigm and India is no exception to this game. Bangladesh delivered on some of the NE terrorist outfits and received a giant carrot. The Nepalese delivered on regime change and brought a moderate faction of the maoists to power. The Indians worked backroom to cool down the NC and the desperate Jhalnath Khanal faction of the CPN(ML), brokered some power for the Madhesi parties, and stitched an alliance that is as much as chalk is to cheese. Ok, curd rice to jam if you are as much sdre as you usually are. India did deliver some goodies, but it has held back quite a bit because we want results before goodies get unloaded.
5) So that sets the tongues wagging on why why Indo-BD relations are a model for the rest of the Indian subcontinent.
6) As someone wisely pointed out that real life is a zero-sum game. Rajiv Bhatia says this:

Myanmar's decision to suspend the Myitsone dam project with China as the main beneficiary, has introduced new tensions, but the two governments are likely to craft a modus vivendi soon. The India-related factor is that South Block, facing criticism, has begun to strive hard to expedite implementation of previous projects and to choose new projects that are susceptible to execution within a shorter time frame.

So the chinese will try to fix the mess on their side, and things will settle back in. But that does not take away from the South Block's gains over the last month or so.
7) As Paul Keating says in a different context (Linky),

On America, Keating is dismayed by the pivotal change in its outlook after the end of the Cold War. "When the Berlin Wall came down the Americans cried victory and walked off the field," he says. "Yet the end of the Cold War offered the chance for America to develop a new world order. It didn't know what to do with its victory. ... "
...
"Well, frankly, the US didn't have the wisdom. It just wanted to celebrate its peace dividend. The two Clinton terms and the two George W. Bush terms, that's four presidential terms, have cost US mightily."

fear is that the South Block will rest on its much hard-earned laurels. There is no time for that kinda sitting back and self-kudo-ing.
8) However, with the IDSA pointing out the direction, which I interpret hopefully, as a one-way street (Linky),

India needs to increase its footprints in Afghanistan. Towards this end the recent agreements signed during the visit of President Karzai are insufficient to leave lasting imprints post 2014. India needs to increase its stakes in Afghanistan in the energy, minerals and power sectors, which have a longer presence and resultantly require construction of ancillaries like transportation, railways and housing besides the need to guard assets. Further, India must build on the training of the Afghan National Army and Police by enlarging the scope to include the provision and supply of arms and munitions, vehicles and stores as also training the Afghan Air Force. All these must be guaranteed by the US through trilateral agreements before its withdrawal from Afghanistan.

I am not losing much sleep on my worries.
9) Elsewhere, as Edward Luttwak writes in the Infinity Journal on "Why China will not become the next global power ... But it could," a detente calls for a deconstruction of the aggressive military posturing and stances on perceived territorial disputes. As another wiseman Billy Joel said, we did nt unfortunately start the fire and hence, we cannot be party to a transformation from oligarchic dividend to democratic dividend. Therefore, I am loving this battle already. Bring it on! Peace!

0) As an aside, one commentator had this deep question with my comments in parantheses (Linky):

Sheikh Hasina’s visit to Dahagram-Angarpota had been on the cards for several weeks. Until three days before her visit, the Bangladeshis were told that India’s Home Minister P Chidambaram would be there to receive her. Sore and humiliated by the PM’s refusal to call Mamata Banerjee’s bluff over the Teesta (as if West Bengal's share of waters flowing through its state are to be bestowed by the Union Government to a foreign entity for their benefit), they agreed that Chidambaram’s presence would be a big gesture from Delhi.

Then it was said that Rural Development Minister Jairam Ramesh – said to be close to the Gandhi family, and even Rahul – would be going, along with the junior minister for home affairs, Jitendra Singh. In the end, Health Minister Ghulam Nabi Azad, along with Singh, ended up doing the honours. No offence meant to Mr Azad, but how relevant is his presence to a meeting with a Bangladeshi leader? Where was Foreign Minister S M Krishna? What was Mr Chidambaram doing that he couldn’t drop everything and go?

Well, if Jyoti Malhotra had googled up, she would have noted that Linky

Union home minister P. Chidambaram, who was to receive her and hold a 20-minute discussion literally by the roadside when Hasina crosses the corridor, had to call off the visit because of his mother Lakshmi Ammal’s ill health. Chidambaram is in Tamil Nadu. (So Chidambaram had something urgent to attend to unless if the order of priority is Bangladesh >> Mother, not to mention that that happens too at times.)

“I will be going but I do not know if there would be discussions. I have been told only a short while back,” Ramesh told The Telegraph. (So a Minister asked to stand in for someone else may not have anything else on his plate given that he is a Cabinet Minister?!)

In Chidambaram’s absence, Hasina was received by Indian Health Minister Golam Nabi Azad and Minister of State for Home Affairs Jitendra Prasad. Indian officials worked overnight to build a helipad in the Teen Bigha corridor near the BSF outpost for the Prime Minister’s helicopter’s landing and take-off. She was given a guard of honour by the BSF.
...
Can Congress President Sonia Gandhi urgently please set aside a few hours, even on a weekly basis, and ask for the files dealing with the most important foreign policy issues? In Dhaka last month, when the Teesta agreement was falling apart, everyone talked about the amazing trip Sonia Gandhi had had to Dhaka just days before. If only Sonia Gandhi were here, they said, this wouldn’t have happened; she would have phoned Mamata Banerjee and persuaded her to see reason.
...
The point of this column is that there is such a terrible absence of political leadership in South Block that “chalta hai” (anything goes) has begun to take the place of creative imagination.
...
Imagine if Hasina had been greeted by a galaxy of leaders from Delhi and Bengal, all lined up on the Teen Bigha. Imagine if the Indian government – the president, the prime minister, whoever – gave the young and newly married King of Bhutan, Jigme Khesar Wangchuk, who comes to India in a few days to spend his honeymoon in Rajasthan, a public reception at the Red Fort or the Mughal Gardens at the Rashtrapati Bhavan.

Yes, we can imagine all these things, but then the government officeholders have to run a government instead of being the chaperones to the newly married King of Bhutan and being around when Sh. Hasina makes a point to visit the enclaves in India. Jyoti Malhotra's penchant for symbolism devoid of cool and rational logic which should ideally be what foreign policy moves are, of acts that matter more to building image than to acts that build credentials, focus on propaganda and a deep worry on what others might think of us instead of worrying about what they do think of us, etc., is what makes commentariat in India so irritating, painful and yet a big pleasure to endure. A crying call for Sonia Gandhi and pleas for "creative imagination" when full-time Foreign Service personnel work double hard to square circles without displeasing the manifold internal stakeholders is what makes this episode even sadder than it is. But then these commentators are the news-makers of India, they literally make the news, not like their job ends with reporting on events that make the news.

Breaking News: Dr. Bhattarai as PM

More at: Linky

Nepal's legislature-parliament on Sunday elected Baburam Bhattarai, Vice-Chairman of the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), new Prime Minister. The Maoists were supported by the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), an alliance of five Madhesi parties. In the House of 594 MPs, 575 members participated in the election and around 340 voted for Dr. Bhattarai, helping him secure a simple majority.

The other candidate, Nepali Congress Parliamentary Party leader Ram Chandra Poudel, got 235 votes. The NC was supported by the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist). NC and UML leaders said they had no reason to trust the Maoists. Mr. Poudel told the House: “The NC is totally committed to democracy and democratic principles. The Maoists have constantly breached past agreements and continue to retain their military apparatus.” The UML said it had not received a credible and acceptable peace process proposal from the Maoists.

Read more »

Nepal updates (August 27, 2011)

1) Prashant Jha writes this: Linky

A day after he presented his credentials, the new Indian ambassador to Nepal, Jayant Prasad, faces his first major challenge of formulating and implementing a unified Indian position with regard to the government formation process underway in Nepal. The decision will bring to the fore all of New Delhi’s dilemmas regarding domestic Nepali politics.

Efforts at forging a consensus government have failed. The Nepali Congress asked the Unified Communist Party of Nepal (Maoists) to give in their weapons immediately and make ‘irreversible progress’ on the peace process, primarily the integration and rehabilitation of combatants, first before they could be supported to lead a government. The Maoists asked for government leadership first, and promised to move on the peace process subsequently. There will now be elections through a majority vote in parliament. The Maoists have now projected vice chairman Dr. Baburam Bhattarai as their candidate, while the Nepali Congress has put forward its parliamentary party leader Ram Chandra Poudel to be PM.

For the Maoists to win, they need the support of the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), which consists of five Madhesi parties, or the Communist Party of Nepal (Unified Marxist Leninist). For Mr. Poudel to win, he will need the support of both the UDMF and the UML. Neither UML nor the Madhesi parties have made their positions clear yet, but the overwhelming mood among Madhesi MPs is to support the Maoists. Madhesi parties feel that the radical left is a natural ally in terms of issues of ‘state restructuring and federalism’, and calculate they can extract a better power sharing deal by supporting the Maoists. Senior leaders of the UML, such as former PM Madhav Kumar Nepal, K.P. Oli, and general secretary Ishwor Pokharel, are understood to be veering towards NC though the younger MPs in the party want to give time-bound support to the Maoists making it conditional on progress in the peace process.

Some comments are in order at this stage:
a) The Madhesi feeling of support for Dr. Bhattarai's candidacy is not a unilateral move that has not been blessed by the South Block.
b) The feeling of disenchantment in the UML cadre is understandable given the factionalism that has ridden the UML, its Khanal vs. Nepal vs. Oli. The fact that Oli and Nepal are on one side does not mean that they are friends and comrades, except in grandiose posturing. Both are out to get their pound of flesh vis-a-vis Khanal.

NC leaders have told India that the CA will get dissolved without a new statute, and in that scenario, it is in Delhi’s interest to have an NC PM leading the government. If the Maoists are allowed to return to power, ‘democracy would be in danger’. For their part, the Maoists have argued that progress in the peace and constitutional process is possible only under their leadership. ‘Isolating and encircling’ them, as was tried when Madhav Kumar Nepal led an anti Maoist coalition between 2009 and 10, was doomed to fail, both Maoist chairman Pushpa Kamal Dahal ‘Prachanda’ and Dr. Bhattarai have assured Delhi that they will implement past commitments if voted to power.

The whole problem with the Maoists is that they do not understand a single thing about upholding the honor of committing to a task. So what exactly do they mean by "implementing past commitments?" Write that in red ink (if need be) on the running Sarda river. Whatever that is, Jha is a bit too optimistic to opine that:

If India still wants to see the framework succeed, it should not try to block the Maoists from forming a government by influencing the Madhesi parties against them. The Maoists have said they would move forward on the regrouping of combatants immediately and hand over the weapons as soon as their government is formed. They can be held accountable for these commitments, and the threat of allies withdrawing support would generate additional pressure on them.
...
The dishonesty and overwhelming ambition of the Maoists collides with the fear and insecurity of the status quoist older parties. The internal rifts within each party make inter-party compromises even more difficult.

How does the latter square with the former? Let me read this: Maoists are ambitious, their ambition is in capturing the State with power or without, as the need may be. The other parties are a bumbling mass of idiocy. The Maoists have not adhered to their past commitments. Yet, India should let it go and not be suspicious because Dr. Bhattarai is now the contender. Thank you, sir.
2) Meanwhile, Jayant Prasad meets Sushil Koirala and Ram Chandra Poudel and any number of meanings can be attached to these meetings. That said,

At present Prasad is secretary at the public diplomacy section of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs, serving for the last 1 1/2 years. He is a career diplomat who started in career in 1976. Prior to his current role in the EAM, he has served as the Indian Ambassador to Afghanistan and Algeria. Moreover, he has also served in different sectors of the strategic departments of Geneva, Paris and Brussels. Prasad is the son of former Indian ambassador to Nepal Bimal Prasad (1991-1995) who was appointed by then prime minister Chandrashekhar. He replaces Rakesh Sood in the Ambassadorial role.

Meanwhile,

Departing Ambassador Rakesh Sood will now be posted in Paris as the Indian ambassador there. The delay by the French government in forwarding its agreemo, thanks to public holidays in France, contributed to his delayed departure and Prasad’s delayed arrival.

3) Elsewhere in Darjeeling: Linky

Social and religious issues so long overshadowed by the larger cause of statehood has starting resurfacing in the hills, now that a political settlement has been reached on Darjeeling with the signing of the agreement to set up the Gorkhaland Territorial Administration. Hundreds of Buddhists today took to the streets in Darjeeling to revive some of their longstanding demands, one of them being a paid holiday on the birthday of Lord Buddha. The Lepchas, an indigenous community, also brought out a rally to demand a development council. The Buddhists made the demands under the banner of the All Buddhist Minority Welfare Association, which consists of various Gorkha communities like the Tamangs, Gurungs and non-Nepali tribes like the Sherpas, Bhutias and Yolmos.
...
Religious minorities, which includes Buddhists, Christians, Muslims and Jains, make up about 40 per cent of the hill population. “The state government has come up with a policy to declare a particular district Minority Concentrated District (MCD) if the minorities form 25-30 per cent of the population. But the same status has not been extended to Darjeeling district despite its higher concentration of minorities,” said Bomzon. The association claimed that 12 districts in Bengal have been accorded this status. “The government has accorded this status where the concentration of Muslim population is high. They have conveniently forgotten us,” said Bomzon. “An MCD status would entail benefits for construction of houses and stipends for education to minority members, among others.” North Dinajpur, South Dinajpur, Malda, Murshidabad and Cooch Behar are among the 12 MCDs in north Bengal.

4) On the Indo-Nepal border and a reviving circus: Linky

The SSB official said people from Nepal could trade only through Pashupatinagar and Panitanki. “The customs offices are situated in these two places and if people from Nepal want to trade, they can do so from these two points, but not from Manebhanjan.” Gohian admitted that even cattle were being stopped by his personnel. “That is because most of the cattle are brought in from the other side of the border. The bribe allegation is totally false,” he said. The India-Nepal border is porous and one can step into Nepal from any place undetected.

5) More on the Gorkhaland agitation with no need to go over it beyond a certain point: Linky 1 and Linky 2

India-BD bhai bhai, season for unilateral concessions?

1. Teesta agreement:

The 60-year-old Teesta dispute between India and Bangladesh could become a thing of the past with Delhi likely to agree to a 50-50 water-sharing deal, an official source in Dhaka has said.
...
The two sides have agreed to a 50-50 water-sharing deal that has been a longstanding demand of Bangladesh, the source said, but there could a rider in the pact favouring India. Delhi may want to draw more water at certain times of the year, he hinted. Bansal is expected to sign the deal for a 15-year term and leave before Singh’s arrival, he added.
...
Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is said to be under tremendous pressure to extract a fair deal from India because the dispute has become an emotional issue in her country.

How about a fair deal to West Bengal?

According to media reports in Bangladesh, International Farakka Committee chairman Atiqur R.K. Eusufzai, a leading water activist, favoured setting aside at least 25 per cent of the water for the river and splitting the rest — 60 per cent for Bangladesh and 40 per cent for India. Delhi is unlikely to agree to such terms, but a 50 per cent share will vastly help dilute apprehensions in Dhaka.

2. Extradition treaty: Linky

Official sources in Dhaka said India was keen on inking the treaty during Hasina’s tenure and were ready with a draft, which has to be given to Bangladeshi officials for inputs and feedback. “India is keen that the treaty is signed during this regime as Indo-Bangla ties have never been better. We are at the most positive stage of our relationship and the treaty will heighten this sense of mutual confidence. Also, one has to take into account that Bangladesh is a highly polarised country and for us the time and situation is just right to go ahead with the deal,” said a senior official closely associated with the developments. The sources said the deal would most likely be inked during Hasina’s next trip to India and before Bangladesh goes to polls in 2013.

How naive of people to think that Sh. Hasina will be able to sign a deal before the Polls and will commit hara-kiri?

Delhi’s concerns are understandable. A sizeable section of the public and the opposition, led by Khaleda Zia’s BNP, have been criticising Hasina for selling out to India. There are also doubts whether the Awami League will return to power in the 2013 elections. However, it is not just India which will benefit if the treaty is signed. India is holding some 200 Bangladeshi criminals and Dhaka has given the Indian home minister a list of 100 wanted men.

Bangladesh is also keen to lay its hands on 19 absconding persons accused of involvement in the August 2004 grenade attack on Hasina. While Dhaka has already sent Interpol notices on all of them, those in India — Haris Chowdhury, Mohammad Hanif, Ratul Babu, Anisul Morsalin and his brother Muttakin — could be handed over if an extradition treaty is inked. Also on the radar are two killers of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who are believed to be hiding in India.

3. Elsewhere, slowing down coal project: Linky

Bangladesh and India's move for a $1.5 billion joint venture coal-fired power plant in Khulna has somewhat slowed down due to various hitches, and a feasibility study has scaled up cost of civil construction at the project site due to poor soil condition.

4. However, BD wants power from the Indian grid: Linky

According to officials, Bangladesh will formally place a proposal in the Bimstec technical committee meeting to import 500 MW of additional electricity from India and also another proposal to import electricity from Myanmar. “We'll try to convince India to export 250 MW power from its under-construction Palatana power plant and another 250 MW from other plants in West Bengal,” said an official at the power ministry who is a member of the Bangladesh working group for the meeting.

Officials said Bangladesh's present target is to import a total of about 1000 MW of electricity from neighbouring India. They further said another proposal for establishing inter-regional power grid connectivity among the member countries, particularly among Bangladesh, India, Nepal and Bhutan, will be placed in the meeting from Bangladesh side.

And more news on the power grid: Linky

Bimstec member states plan to finalise a memorandum of understanding today on exchange of electricity among them, said Power Secretary Abul Kalam Azad yesterday. The secretary was talking to reporters after the inauguration of a two-day Third Task Force Meeting on Trans Power Exchange of the Bimstec (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) at Ruposhi Bangla Hotel in Dhaka.

The process of exchanging power through the national grids among the Bimstec members is still at the initial stage though it was thought a lot earlier, Azad added. “We are hopeful this initiative will provide energy security in the region as it will enable the member states to share their surplus gas and electricity with each other.” Once it is finalised, the member countries will sign the MoU in the next ministerial meeting, said the power secretary.

5. On border settlement: Linky

Of the 4,156 km borderline, 320 km border with the Indian state of Mizoram had been drawn earlier. Land surveyors of both the countries have been working on the rest of the borderline, and so far finalised 1,083 maps for 3829.5 km of the borderline except 6.5 km strips along Panchagarh, Moulvibazar and Feni. The remaining 6.5 km boundary line will be drawn in a month, said Abdul Mannan, director general of Directorate of Land Record and Survey (DLRS).
...
A total of 628 maps have been drawn for 2,262 km border with West Bengal, 93 maps for 264 km border with Assam, 20 maps for 320 km border with Mizoram, 269 maps for 874 km border with Tripura, and 139 maps for 436 km border with Meghalaya.
...
The prime ministers of the two nations will decide on 111 Indian enclaves (17,160 acres of land) with a population of 37,000 and 51 Bangladeshi enclaves (7,110 acres of land) with a population of 14,000 during Manmohan Singh's Bangladesh visit on September 6-7. The two countries have disputes over land at about 25 points in West Bengal, Tripura, Meghalaya and Assam. Bangladesh adversely possesses 1,880.81 acres of India's land at seven points while India adversely possesses 1,165.49 acres of Bangladesh land at 18 points.

6. On Transit fees: Linky

A government panel on transit may suggest charging India, Nepal and Bhutan minimum transit fees between 2.5 cents and 7 cents a tonne for every kilometre of travel depending on the mode of transport. The committee, led by Tariff Commission Chairman Mujibur Rahman, is likely to submit its report to the government soon.
...
Wishing anonymity, a commerce ministry official said the protocols may not be signed during the Indian prime minister's visit. They could be inked after the fixing of transit fees. The finance minister said the charges have to be fixed after discussions with India, Nepal and Bhutan. The government formed the committee on transit in November last year after the signing of the joint communiqué. The committee submitted a report to the government in April without recommending route-wise transit charges or details of Bangladesh's benefits from transit. The government asked the committee to submit a more detailed report. Apart from India, two major development partners -- the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank -- have been pressing Bangladesh for the last two decades to give transit to the three countries.

Wishing anonymity, a foreign ministry official said deals on transit will be signed with India in line with the joint communiqué inked in January 2010. The communiqué reads, “It was agreed that Bangladesh will allow use of Mongla and Chittagong seaports for movement of goods to and from India through road and rail. Bangladesh also conveyed their intention to give Nepal and Bhutan access to Mongla and Chittagong ports.”

7. Sea boundary demarcation: Linky

The United Nations will hear Bangladesh's claim on the continental shelf in the Bay of Bengal on August 25, months after Dhaka sought international arbitration following disputes with neighbouring India and Myanmar. Foreign Minister Dipu Moni will present Bangladesh's case in the hearing scheduled at the UN headquarters in New York, official sources said in Dhaka. Bangladesh's claim on the Bay of Bengal continental shelf extends up to 400-460 nautical miles (850 km) from the coast. Dhaka says it should have total rights over the undersea natural resources within this area.

The continental shelf is an undersea extension of a continent which can stretch for many miles out to the sea. Many nations have asserted mineral and land rights to their associated continental shelves since these are rich in natural resources. Bangladesh submitted its arbitration on February 25 to the Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf (CLCS), a UN body that deals with the continental shelf.
...
Bangladesh's claim is that the dispute should be resolved on “equity principle” meaning that the countries adjacent to the Bay of Bengal would get proportional areas in the zone. India and Myanmar favours "equidistance" system to get bigger maritime areas. Under a UN charter, the principle of "equity" takes into account a country's population, economic status and needs, GDP growth, and other human issues, while the "equidistance" system marks the boundary through geometric calculations.

8. And finally, the gullibility of the Indian neta-class. Gogoi pins hopes on Dhaka visit Linky

Gogoi is of the view that Assam can gain a lot from improved connectivity — air, land and waterways — between the state and the neighbouring country as this would give a big boost to the Look East Policy in the real sense of the term. “More importantly, he is also looking for connectivity of the minds. More person-to-person interactions will help understand each others point of view, improve neighbourly relations,” one of them said.

A question that is often missed is: how stable are person-to-person interactions to sea changes in popular identification of The Other? Have nt we seen enough of this Indira Gandhi-Bandaranaike, Sheikh Mujib-Indira Gandhi-type special bonds? What have they come to today? We already have precedents on unilateral concessioning that has come back to bite us: Linky

I have written extensively on the 1974 Maritime Boundary Agreement between India and Sri Lanka and the background to the ceding of the Island of Kachchatheevu. I do not propose to dwell on those details here. However I would like to highlight one point. New Delhi’s decision that Kachchatheevu is a disputed territory was a political decision taken by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. The personal chemistry between Sirimavo Bandaranaike and Indira Gandhi came into play in a big way and the island was ceded to Sri Lanka. As stated earlier, if the principle of median line was strictly enforced Kachchatheevu should have been an integral part of India. In order to gift Kachchatheevu to Sri Lanka the precedent of the 1921 fisheries agreement was followed (where Kachchatheevu came within the fisheries jurisdiction of Ceylon). Let us await Supreme Court’s decision in this subject.

The personal equation between Indira Gandhi and Sirimavo Bandaranaike which played a decisive role in the conclusion of the 1974 Agreement has been aptly summed up by Prof. Partha Ghosh of Jawaharlal Nehru University. To quote Prof. Ghosh, “Kachchativu was the most typical case of a personal equation, playing the role of diplomacy. When the negotiations had virtually failed, and the Indian official delegation was virtually pressurizing Indira Gandhi not to give up India’s claim on the islet, Sirimavo Bandaranaike made a personal appeal to Indira Gandhi to come to her rescue, as it would otherwise spell political disaster for her. Indira Gandhi appreciated Mrs Sirimavo Bandaraniake’s predicament and manipulated the situation in such a way that it became a fait accompli even before the Indian delegation could react. Sirimavo Bandaranaike remembered this gesture as late as 1990 with immense gratitude”.

9. As a postscript, Why India's largest textile exports hub is dying? Linky
10. And as a post-postscript on what BD-Burma relations are like: Linky

Foreign Secretary of Bangladesh Mijarul Quayes will be paying a visit to Myanmar to meet his counterpart on August 24 for two days to discuss bilateral and regional issues. The last meeting at the foreign secretary level took place in Dhaka on December 28, 2009. The trip is welcomed. It is reported that the issues to be discussed, among others, may include:
* Multi-modal transport connectivity;
* Border security to prevent criminal activities and illegal immigration;
* Facilitation of trade;
* Repatriation of remaining Rohingya refugees;
* Cooperation in other areas including energy and agriculture.
...
Since the present government came to power, there has been an attempt to inject momentum and dynamism into bilateral relations. On May 16, 2009, Bangladesh Foreign Minister Dr. Dipu Moni visited Myanmar and held official talks with her counterpart U Nyan Winz. They reportedly discussed a host of issues, including repatriation of the remaining Myanmar refugees, relaxation of visa requirements for citizens of either country, facilitation of banking services, increased border trade, export of surplus power to Bangladesh, road link between the two countries up to China, direct air link, and sharing bandwidth with fiber-optic cable.

India and its near-abroad

The Economists' take on India and what it should have done, not-done yada yada, yet for all its agenda and whatnot it does have some truth to it - of course you need to ensure you blood does not boil at the tone of the article.

NO ONE loves a huge neighbour. For all that, India’s relations with the countries that ring it are abysmal. Of the eight with which it shares a land or maritime boundary, only two can be said to be happy with India: tiny Maldives, where India has the only foreign embassy and dispenses much largesse, and Bhutan, which has a policy of being happy about everything. Among its other South Asian neighbours, the world’s biggest democracy is incredible mainly because of its amazing ability to generate wariness and resentment.

Until recently it operated a shoot-to-kill policy towards migrant workers and cattle rustlers along its long border with Bangladesh. Over the years it has meddled madly in Nepal’s internal affairs. In Myanmar India snuggles up to the country’s thuggish dictators, leaving the beleaguered opposition to wonder what happened to India’s championing of democracy. Relations with Sri Lanka are conflicted. It treats China with more respect, but feuds with it about its border

The following two paragraphs seems to be in indirect ode to MMS and SG.

With the notable exception of India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, who has heroically persisted in dialogue with Pakistan in the face of provocations and domestic resistance, India’s dealings with its neighbours are mostly driven by arrogance and neglect. It has shared shockingly little of its economic dynamism and new-found prosperity with those around it. Just 5% of South Asia’s trade is within the region.

Too little and too late, the neglect is starting to be replaced by engagement (see article). This week Sonia Gandhi, dynastic leader of India’s ruling Congress Party, visited Bangladesh—a first. And on July 27th India’s foreign minister hosted his Pakistani counterpart, the first such meeting in a year. He promised a “comprehensive, serious and sustained” dialogue.

One thing I do agree is the lack of vision. Maybe before the current economic prosperity India did not have the necessary muscle or economic power to create and nurture a vision. What use is a vision if one does not have the capability to implement it, right? With India's attention to South East Asia, hopefully it has now a better vision and clarity of purpose to take its agenda forward.

Second, dynamic India can hardly soar globally while mired in its own backyard. Promoting regional prosperity is surely the best way to persuade neighbours that its own rise is more of an opportunity than a threat. Yet India lacks any kind of vision. A region-wide energy market using northern neighbours’ hydropower would transform South Asian economies. Vision, too, could go a long way to restoring ties that history has cut asunder, such as those between Karachi and Mumbai, once sister commercial cities but now as good as on different planets; and Kolkata and its huge former hinterland in Bangladesh. Without development and deeper integration, other resentments will be hard to soothe. It falls on the huge unloved neighbour to make the running.

Oh well, Karachi and Mumbai becoming sisters again? It is a dream for the select few. For the realists, it is not going to happen unless Pakistan changes and becomes friendly towards India. Not going to happen anytime soon.

India-Bangladesh relations: Issues and Irritants

A partial list

Issues:
1) Water issues with Bangladesh -- Teesta and Feni rivers along with the festering lack of confidence due to a perceived Indian unilateral action at the Farakkha Barrage. There have been many incidents in the past such as with Tipaimukh where Bangladesh has openly helped planks in India (Manipur, specifically) to ensure the safety of its river flows. As China will continue to dam more of the Brahmaputra, Bangladesh will suffer the most. Plus, the high cyanide content in the surface water will ensure a huge burden on whatever limited potable water that is available. Global warming and the consequent rise in sea levels and pushing of Bangladeshis to upstream locations will ensure an even higher stress. Morally speaking, unbeknownst to much of India, there is a brewing water crisis evolving in not-so-slow-motion in Bangladesh that could become a potential water war in the not-so-near-future. A regional water-sharing agreement along the lines of Indus Water Treaty with India, China, Bangladesh, Burma and Thailand is the need of the hour, but the upper riparian in this matter will pursue a cold water war strategy unless forced to see reason.
2) Harboring of terrorists -- Various groups such as ULFA, NDFB, NSCN(IM), KLO, NLFT, ATTF etc. have been harbored in Bangladesh in the past and continue to be as we speak. The opposite case of Shanti Bahini is a moot point because as per the agreement with the Sh. Hasina government and the previous regimes, these have now been disbanded. It is in Bangladesh's interest to catch and hand over these terrorists as has happened in the recent past. This is just their duty, not an action that has to be seen in compassionate terms as they have been willingly harbored as pawns in a chess game.
3) Illegal immigration -- Bangladesh is one of the few countries (perhaps along with some regions of India) where population growth has not stabilized. With an area or an economy that is not expanding at a commensurate rate, this puts a massive stress on the available resources. In short, this problem cannot be handled by Bangladesh and often gets diverted to India, which borders it on three sides. In India, this problem is seen in terms of the illegal immigration issue. It is not a wishful or a fantastical conspiracy theory, but Demographic change in the border districts of West Bengal and Assam is a reality. It is more of a status quo in terms of politicians of different hues in West Bengal and Assam. There is really not much that can be done to fix this mess in the short-term, especially those who are already in. The fences are being built, but the progress is slow at best especially given the changing riverine border profile and natural calamities that lay to waste 2-3 years of hard work (e.g., Cyclone Aila). Just as with the border with Pakistan, maintaining the border fences is a continual task and not a once-in-a-life time event. Further, a BSF estimate shows that most of the illegal immigration is happening in the riverine territory than in fenced areas. Riverine structure make ~1/3 of the demarcated borders, so there is really not much that can be done except a huge vigil and raising multiple battalions of BSF. India needs to do more by seeking the judicial route in this matter vis-a-vis the implementation of the various stipulations under the IMDT Act that have been suspended. The case of D-Voters can be a test case in this matter. All this requires political will, unfortunate as it does not exist in India in a broad measure. Similarly, labor shortage cannot be wished away by grandiose claims to making Indians work harder.
4) Trans-shipment issues -- If Bangladesh wants to economically tie itself to the Indian growth engine, it has to see reason and enable trans-shipment of goods from India to Indian territories in the Northeast. A regional hub that helps Bhutan, East Nepal, parts of Burma and parts of Yunnan will only ensure the economic benefits for Bangladesh. Acting unilaterally and contrary to normative discourse as happened with the Asian Highway is only a fruitless path to hell. India (and especially parts of Tripura and Meghalaya) stand to gain a lot by having a shorter route to the Bay of Bengal and it should not be surprising that these states are at the forefront of the trans-shipment issue. But then, the concerns within the Indian establishment of its periphery better connected to foreign nations than to the mainland is not to be dismissed as flightful fancies of fear.
5) Sea boundary demarcation -- India and Bangladesh have reasonably wisened up to the possibility of joint exploration of contentious water blocks for oil exploration purposes. The same cannot be said about Burma and Bangladesh. There is an imminent possibility of a war between the trigger-happy (despite a numerically minority armed forces strength) Burmans and the Bangladeshis and India will be forced to pick sides rather than advise from a cautionary role.
6) Enclaves, adverse possessions and beyond -- Enclaves are pieces of territory contiguous and inside India (and Bangladesh) that are rightfully owned by the other Government. Adverse possessions are pieces of char (riverine) territory that are illegally occupied by the other Government. In terms of enclaves, we have the complicated of issue of even an enclave within an enclave within an enclave. Unfortunate as it is, this issue is best resolved by the future generations. Emotionally traumatic as is the case with people in these territories, there is really not much of a solution that is not zero-sum.

Irritants:
1) BSF is trigger-happy -- Whatever be the accusations against BSF, these deaths of smugglers of phenisidyl, cows, people, and merchandise under the illegal economy are dwarfed significantly by encounter deaths by the RAB. Not to compare apples with oranges, the BSF is doing a thankless job in a hostile environment and no amount of vilification is going to change course.
2) Power sector unification -- Not happening not only in the medium-term, but also in the long term. Bangladesh is a power deficient economy with a big anti-India bandwagon. The case of export of natural gas is also stymied by the same bandwagon. Anyone who denies the presence of this contingent has to only note the fact that even after 40 years of independence, people such as Golam Azam, Matiur Rahman Nizami, and the various Razakars are walking free in Bangladesh even today.
3) They will continue to hate us -- It is a fancy that Bangladesh can be unified into India as it stands today. It is another fancy that we should try. Even within India, there are multiple states where hatred to the government in Delhi is harbored in different forms and all it takes for this expression to come to the forefront is an incident of opportunism. Our neighbors will continue to hate us, because they hate the idea of India and the idea of India poses an existential question to them. Success of India results in further questions and as India succeeds more and more, questions become a comparison, then a crisis, and later a calamity. The twine will not meet and it is best accepted that they will not.
4) Treatment of minorities -- Unfortunate as it is, our policy (from Panchsheel to our secular polity to our non-interference as stated by our No-First Use) means that India really does not have much say in the internal affairs of other countries. Broadly speaking, while Hindus in India can and should have an empathy to the fellow Hindus of other countries, Constitutionally speaking, unless India amends its Constitution to become a Hindu nation with all the attendant baggage (reactions from other countries, etc.), we do not stand much in raising the issues of others on a priority basis. There is going to be no sea change in terms of priorities of the babus even if political tidings change on a democratic whim. All the above is true even if Bangladesh or even Pakistan can and often do raise issues on how India treats its minorities. The best retort to this matter is "India does not encourage meddling by other countries in its internal affairs nor does it meddle in the internal affairs of other countries."
5) Various cases in Bangladesh that are important to India in terms of their evolution -- the 10 truck arms-haul case, murder of SAMS Kibria, bomb thrown at Sh. Hasina, Pilkhana carnage trials, the 71 Razakar case. In India, it is normative to wait for decades to see a judicial light and to fruition the path of retribution for the victims, and it would be unfair to criticize Bangladesh in this matter. Nevertheless, important verdicts have been delivered in India on a priority basis despite the numerous stallings and stillbirths, and it would be expected that a question as basic as whether someone acted against Bangladeshi interests or not in the War of Independence would be settled early.
6) Easing of trade barriers -- Again these are matters that can be resolved under the stipulations of WTO, but it is not illegal under these stipulations to put para-tariff barriers because of quality and safety constraints. These are not institutional biases, but these are legalistic and every country pursues them. Even friends and allies pursue these measures, so there cannot be any special provisions for Bangladesh.
7) Internal politics in Bangladesh and West Bengal -- It is the policy instrument and historical baggage of Jamaat-e-Islami to hate kafir India. There is really not much to be done. Advising caution in expressing ground realities (especially if it comes from the PMO) does not solve problems or bring new solutions to the table. Further, India is a democrazy and everyone has a right to express ground realities as they perceive. Bangladesh has to seek its inner wisdom in expressing surprise at a noisy, chaotic and openly expressive India. Similarly, West Bengal and its politics are often tied to cater to its internal dynamics. The historical baggage of the region cannot be ignored at framing policy instruments or reacting to responses that have been arrived at after considerable thought by people who run the ship there.
8) Trade imbalances -- As India continues to get better at consuming its own raw materials and goods instead of exporting them (as is the case with cotton, cement raw materials, food grains etc.), there will be less that can be sourced from India. The reliability of India as a source of import for Bangladesh is contingent on ground realities of a growing and prosperous India. Bangladesh suffers a much higher imbalance vis-a-vis China than with India. Demonizing India while at the same time pandering to China does not augur well for the behavior of a rational nation. Surely, the negative list between India and Bangladesh have to go down, but then there are internal dynamics in India where different communities tend to lose their livelihoods if India silently accedes to Bangladeshi requests. Thus, it would be advisable for Bangladesh to understand these various dynamics instead of demonizing India for the lack of a strong reason.

Defending Shri. Rakesh Sood and the MRP scandal in Nepal

Fake Wikileaks may have been used by Pakistan to spread mal-information about India. However, just like the shoe-throwing on Bush saw a few imitations, this fake Wikileak mission is also seeing some clones. Sankarshan Thakur of the "deciphering Laloo Yadav" fame had posted a report on The Telegraph, essentially dissing the Indian Ambassador to Nepal, Shri. Rakesh Sood. The Nepali media, waiting for a morsel in these hard-pressed times, ran with that lead (see Footnote 1) Linky 1 and Linky 2.

The MEA in response to these reports came out with a curt reply, which was also reported in The Telegraph. Now, not discounting the possibility that Sankarshan Thakur had access to some diplomatic sources, it is not hard to defend Shri. Sood's Ambassador-ship and India's actions in Nepal.
1) Telegraph reports that:

“He is a viceroy-style interventionist with little regard for diplomatic norms, he often behaves as if Nepal were his protectorate,” Mohan Vaidya “Kiran”, a top Maoist leader, had told The Telegraph during the raging row over the Nepal Army chief which eventually led to Prachanda’s premature resignation as Prime Minister.

Response: Yet, it is the same Mohan Baidya Kiran who launched a vituperative and hatred-filled monologue on India in the recently concluded Palungtar plenum. How come Mohan Baidya Kiran's tirade against Shri. Sood is par for the course while his equally vicious remarks on India are not reported? It is a well-known secret that a section of the Maoists rank and file see India as the number one enemy, as witnessed by one political line at Palungtar. It really does not matter whether Shri. Sood was an interventionist or otherwise, whatever he would have done would have been seen as evil. Period.
2)

Nepali domestic politics --- and the peace agreement between the Maoists and “mainstream” parties --- has remained deadlocked since Prachanda’s resignation, and many believe Sood to be a prime factor.

Response: The stalemate in Nepal has little to do with Shri. Sood or India. It is more of a show of force of the Maoists against the other democratic forces. What the Maoists could not obtain via democratic means, they would like to obtain via violent means. In fact, Prashant Jha writes on the Palungtar plenum:

In 2005, the Maoists decided at Chunbang that their immediate aim was a ‘Democratic Republic Nepal’. Their Kharipati meet in 2008 declared that the objective was to draft a constitution for a ‘People’s Federal Democratic Republic’ (PFDR). That aim persists, though many leaders at Palungtar used an alternative nomenclature – ‘People’s Federal Republican Nepal’. Chunbang led to consensus and Kharipati sharpened the polarisation. How Palungtar will play out in large depends on how far the Maoists push their political project.

Broadly, this is how the Maoists define PFDR Nepal – an executive presidency; federalism with nationality as a prominent basis; secular state; ‘democratisation’ of the Nepal Army; ‘first rights’ to local communities; ‘revolutionary’ land reform; and eventually, restricted multiparty political competition where ‘feudal and pro-imperialist’ parties will not be allowed to operate. The Maoists hope this framework would give the ‘people’ (read the party) a firm hold over the state, and break existing structures and nexus that govern policy. But intention is one thing and capacity, especially under the prevailing balance of power, another. A brief review reveals why this model provokes opposition from different sources and is not possible.

That is that, there are no ifs and buts to this story. Prachanda's resignation had more to do with his peeve that he could not enforce Shri. Rukmangad Katwal's resignation, which made him lose face. This ill-fated intervention by Prachanda in the working of the Nepal Army was opposed by everyone including the Nepali Congress and CPN(ML), let alone the former King. So what does India have to do with this story? Whether Jhalnath Khanal changed his mind on Katwal's resignation or otherwise, India has no locus standi on this. The bottomline on Katwal's sacking is that:

He has been fiercely resisting group integration of Maoist rebels into the National Army and has been at odds with Maoist government on several other issues.

Not only the Nepal Army, but almost every other party in Nepal, whether it be the Nepal Congress or the CPN(ML) or even the Terai-Madhes parties, have some issue or the other with the integration issue. In fact, the Maoists by letting the UN Mission to set up office in Nepal implicitly (as well as explicitly) agreed that this would be a major sticking point in impasse-reduction. Blaming India for the stalling of the peace process is like ignoring the elephant in the room. If Nepal was all hunky-dory, and all the parties involved in its internal debate are interested in the stakes of Nepal, and not that of China (as one section of the Maoist rank and file show occasionally), then India would have no problems in extricating itself from the goings-on inside Nepal.
3)

Many find it not strange that he is the first Indian ambassador to Nepal to have had his effigies burnt on the streets; last month, during a trip to northern Nepal, he also became the target of a shoe flung in his face. It missed, but it described the low trajectory of Sood’s image in the country.

Response: Anyone with a bare enough understanding of the stages of a Red Revolution will understand that dissing and spreading propaganda are par for the course in the maoist/leftist annals, whether it be an internal debate or an external tirade. There was an attempt to throw a shoe on Shri. P. Chidambaram, some Judges of the Supreme Court of India, Justices Arijit Pasayat and Ashok Kumar Ganguly of the Supreme Court, Justices A.V. Sawant and P.D. Upasani of the Bombay High Court, Shri. Naveen Jindal, Shri. L.K. Advani, and even Shri. Manmohan Singh. Internationally, similar attempts have been made on George Bush, Wen Jiabao, Benny Dagan, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Asif Ali Zardari, etc. If the orchestrated attempt at calumny on the part of Maoists is the low-point of Shri. Sood, can the same be said for Indian politicians? So why are the Home Minister and the Prime Minister not getting the sack for their policy decisions?
4)

A few months ago, he prevailed upon Indian corporate interests to stop advertising in “Kantipur”, Nepal’s largest media group, because its journalism had displeased him. It is also alleged he tried to turn the screws on Kantipur by putting a squeeze on newsprint supplies from India. It was only after the issue became public that restrictions on Kantipur were eased.

Response: Not much has been said about the conflict of interest in Kantipur and its skewedness of reporting and its orchestrated attempts to malign India. This is what the Hindu opinionated, in a sense of journalistic camaraderie:

While Kantipur’s dilemmas are understandable, its recent coverage does have traces of national chauvinism and appears opportunistic, linked to the advertisement embargo. While keeping big business — both domestic and Indian — to account, it should be careful and responsible enough not to tarnish companies whose contribution to manufacturing, trading, employment, and revenue is important to the Nepali economy.

Even while agreeing with the Kantipur version of the tit-for-tat, some problems remain. How come the feud between Kantipur and the Indian embassy become the central object of attention by everyone in Nepal, especially when there are more serious issues such as the stalemate on electing a Prime Minister, stalemate on the Constitution writing process, stalemate on integration of the Maoist cadre with the Nepal Army, meeting the various critical deadlines as agreed to in the 12-point agreement, etc.? How come the whole political class gets effectively snubbed by this one story while the fact that the country as such is NOT running is not cause for any serious snubbing? How come Nepal became synonymous with Kantipur?

The rhetorical reponse always to this is:

But, but India is the bigger part of the picture. You see, India created a trade blockade, changed the government at will, sheltered rebels, sustained monarchy, pushed out monarchy (some of it was his own doing), let a rebel with an army rule the country, are stopping them from coming to power...

This is exactly the cop-out, and in this regard Nepal is synonymous with Sri Lanka, blaming India for every one of their problems. "Taking charge of one's own destiny by electing an effective government" is a phrase that is seemingly absent in the Nepali lexicon. Why did the Nepalis not give an effective mandate to either party that contested the 2008-09 elections? Was it because the political class was inept that the Nepalis did not find favor with any of them overwhelmingly and hence, threw their votes in some random fashion, or was it because evil, big bad India yet again interfered with the poll process? Let me help in one logical sequence of this cop-out: the fact that the Nepali political class, cutting across party-lines, is corrupt should be a blame shared by India. The fact that the former King threw his tantrums at random and did not want a political class that could sustain itself is a blame that should be shared by India, of course. The fact that Nepal is land-locked and hence dependent on India is a blame to be shared by the evil India which let the Himalayas sandwich Nepal between itself and China. The fact that India should not demand an equal sensitivity for Indian security interests, in return for lifting of the embargo, is of course an anathema to international legalistic happenstance. If such an act happens in the United States, or with China, that is par for the course, while if it happens with India, India is evil, evil, EVIL (please add an accompaniment of a melliflous haunting tune).

When will Nepalis, both the political class as well as its people, take charge of their own destinies? It is a matter of life that everyone will try to further their own interests rather than work in a philanthropic way for others, whether they might share the same culture or religion is immaterial. India and Nepal are tied at the hip, but Nepal is a country of its own. With that knowledge, India has helped Nepal as much as it can by opening up its country to Nepalis, investing in those avenues which will lead to profit for its own benefits, etc. It is a symbiotic existence, but everyone has to take care of themselves too. The short border to Bangladesh will soon be opened up to hook into the Indian economic engine and the growth story. Yet, despite all that, it is a matter of fact that the Nepali political class as well as its media find India to be an able interlocutor of their own problems instead of resolving these problems on their own. With this mindset, companies such as Kantipur often complain when the interlocutor does not bat for them as if all the onus is on India to mediate on behalf of everyone inside Nepal. It is for the people of Nepal to unsheath such capitalistic traits and not be taken over by selective rhetoric.
5)

Sood was also backing a rather unsavoury Indian bid to grab the contract for machine-readable passport technology, for which Nepal had floated an international tender. The Indian quotation, it is learnt, was higher than several Nepal had received but Sood still wanted the job for India. He went so far as to put the Indian demand in writing to foreign minister Sujata Koirala; the letter was later leaked to the Nepali media, to some embarrassment for New Delhi.

Response: The last has not been said on this issue. After the Maoists- and Kantipur-sponsored ruckus, the Machine Readable Passport (MRP) deal was given to Oberthur, a French company. In fact,

Oberthur has offered to supply MRP at US$ 3.59 per copy (the earlier Indian bid was for US$ 4 per copy), including the personalisation system, technical support and others. As per the bidding documents, the French firm has to provide 400,000 MRP copies as its first consignment within 70 days of its agreement with MoFA. The reason for this rush is that Nepal missed two previous deadlines to embrace the smart passport owing to differences among top officials over the deal to print and supply it. Upon the government’s request, the International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) had extended the deadline to January 1, 2011 upon the government’s request. After this date, MoFA cannot distribute the hand-written passport currently in use. Three other companies – the UK’s De La Rue, Indonesia’s Perum Peruru and Singapore’s Three M Technology—were also vying for the bid.

In addition Herald reports this:

However, now with the new contractor to be decided by Nepal's foreign ministry this week, there are allegations of kickbacks. Two of the other competitors, Britain's De La Rue and Indonesia's Perum Peruri, Monday filed complaints with the foreign ministry about the French company's offer, saying it does not meet the specifications laid down in the bid documents.

ToI adds:

Under normal circumstances, complaints against bids makes it mandatory for the bid to be re-evaluated. However, in this case, Nepal's foreign ministry officials rode roughshod over the complaints and awarded the contract to Oberthur.

I digged up more on what action the MoFA took on allegations of wrong declarations. This is what I discover:

The two competitors — Indonesia-based Perum Peruri and UK based security printing firm De La Rue — had claimed that the bid winner Oberthur had offered a non-compliant printer technology, besides producing fake user certificates while presenting the bidding documents needed to supply MRP to Nepal. According to an email provided by Perum Peruri, the Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade had not undertaken any job with Park and OPC Co for personalisation of printers as claimed by Oberthur Technologies. It has proposed to use products of Park and OPC Co for personalisation of passports and has also submitted the user certificate from Korea.
...
The ministry had dispatched the documents to the concerned authorities abroad through the respective Nepali missions at Seoul and New Delhi and had also inquired of the Kathmandu-based Japanese and Korean embassies. MoFA had requested them to verify the authenticity of the documents submitted by Oberthur Technologies—the lowest bidder of the global tender for the multi-million dollar bid to provide MRP. With no response from the concerned authorities with regard to verifying the documents in question, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) today decided to go ahead with its decision to award the French firm the contract to print and supply Machine Readable Passports (MRP). “We didn’t receive any response, either positive or negative from the embassies where we had sent the documents submitted by the bid-winner Oberthur Technologies till the end of our five-day deadline,” said Mukti Nath Bhatta, Chief of Protocol of MoFA, adding, “So we decided to go ahead with our earlier decision to award the global tender to the lowest bidder—Oberthur Technologies.” The secretary-level decision of Dr Madan Kumar Bhattarai was made as per the Public Procurement Act (PPA).

Talking to journalists, Bhatta said he didn’t know what to do if the ministry received a response later, since the PPA was silent about that provision. Bhatta said, as per the PPA, the ministry has already informed two companies that had filed complaint about the ministry’s decision. He said the two companies could challenge the decision at the Public Procurement Monitoring Office (PPMO) in the next seven days if they are not satisfied with the decision.

ToI also adds:

Though the Indian company did not take part in the earlier bid process, yet its offer, in retrospect, was the most beneficial for Nepal. India had offered to train Nepali personnel to print the personalisation details so that they would have remained confidential. However, the new contract says Oberthur would have access to such details, which would pose a threat to Nepal's national security. From India's point of view, the job by the Indian company would have ensured additional security features in the Nepali passports that would have made them difficult to forge. Hundreds of Nepali passports are stolen, get lost or are faked every month and India fears they could be used by terrorists to enter India and mount operations against Indian targets.

More on the personalization issue from here:

Under the new provisions in the tender, the contracting party will not only own, control and maintain the equipment and software for personalization of the passports for five years till the contract term expires, it will also exclusively handle the digitized personal information for printing the passport, which poses serious threat to national security. The contracting party will be handed over the personal information of the passport holders by the Nepalese officials who will be doing the clerical work of receiving the applications and feeding-in the personal information. The government will have no control if this information is misused by the contractor to the detriment of the passport holders, and can even have serious consequences for the national security.

The earlier deal with the SPMCIL was only for the supply of blank passports, and the personalization to be done by the Foreign Ministry staff themselves. The Government of India would have provided the equipment, software and the source code to the Government of Nepal and trained the Foreign Ministry officials for carrying out the personalization. The Government of Nepal would have fully owned, controlled and maintained the equipment right from the commencement of the project. It would have also fully owned and controlled the personalization process, with this personal information of the Nepalese passport holders strictly remaining secure with the Government of Nepal.

So much for accusations that India was going to plant "mini"-chips in the MRPs and steal data. More on the differences:

The proposed specifications of the passport in the new tender include paper based cover and inner pages instead of cotton fabric based cover and inner pages proposed by SPMCIL. The inferior quality of the material in the new tender will severely affect the shelf-life and durability of passport as well as the possibility of tearing of visa leaves. The damaged passports will, no doubt, constantly hassle the passport holders.

But over all this, the serious accusation of graft also has precedents (see also Linky):

Sources in the printing industry revealed Francois-Charles Oberthur Fiduciaire’s $34-million contract to supply passport-making equipment was scrapped by the Kenyan government in 2004 on questions over the increased cost (overpriced contract) and absence of bidding in the awarding of the contract.
...
Francois-Charles Oberthur Fiduciare had also figured in the embarrassing printing of 80 million P100 bills that misspelled President Arroyo’s surname to “Arrovo” in November 2005. The political opposition claimed the mistake was intentional, pointing out “rovo” in Spanish means robbery.

There is also a report of similar stuff from Albania:

The Commission invited five well known companies in the area of banknotes production, such as, “De la Rue”, England, “Giessecke Devrient”, Germany, “Osterrichische Banknoten”, Austria, “Oberthur”, France and “Tumba Bruk”, Sweden to submit their bids in a certain date. The invitation also contained a technical index describing the technical requirements for the banknotes. The Commission also had the right to accept additional proposals made by the companies as it judged fit for the safety of banknotes. Four companies took part in the tender and the commission found that all of them had complied with the conditions set by it. The Procurement Commission selected the French company as the winner of the tender as it had offered the lowest bid among the four companies in the tender.

About a month after the conclusion of the tender, the head of the Procurement Commission submitted to the defendant the decision of the Commission which had selected the French company as the winner of the tender alongside an explaining report of all the actions undertaken during the procedure. The decision and the report were signed by all the members of the Commission. However, another technical report was submitted to the defendant suggesting that the bank may negotiate with the winning bidder for any additional safety elements which may deem appropriate. The second report was not signed by the Head of the Commission and the lawyer of the bank, who was a member of the commission. In fact, the law did not require such a second technical report and never had there been a second report in all previous tenders held by the Bank.

Albanian Governor assigned the defendant in a group of five persons, to sign the contract with the French company that had won the tender. During the process of drafting the contract, the French side proposed to change one safety element for a single type of the banknotes. However, the new safety element would cost the Bank an additional of USD 583,550, 1/6 of the initial bid, above the bid offered by the company in the first place. This additional safety element was discussed during the tender procedures but was not accepted by the Procurement Commission. Finally, the defendant signed the contract with the French company accepting the new safety element which had in effect changed the bid initially offered by the company during the tender. Eventually, the bid accepted by the defendant was much higher than the one offered by the bidder and accepted by the Commission during the tender procedures. The court observed that the act of the defendant whereby he had unlawfully and with no authority increased the bid of the company had unjustly favoured the French company and discriminated other companies and breached the equality of the participants in the tender an offence provided under article 258 of the Code.

I am sure that if one digs more, there could be more details of corruption. But the following point deserves more attention than just overt corruption. Herald also adds:

In addition, it now emerges that the Indian company became the victim of a deliberate smear campaign. A section of Nepal's media alleged that the Indian company was going to use "micro chips" in the passports that would be used to track down the movements of the passport holders and would pose a grave threat to Nepal's national security. In reality, as per the agreement signed between the governments of India and Nepal in March, the passport deal would have seen the Indian company provide only the blank passport booklets, set up an office in Nepal and train a Nepali staff. It would then have been the Nepali officials who would have recorded personal data in the passport booklets and India would not have been privy to the confidential information.

Planted news in the media is not new, as we in India very-well know as the menace of paid news has become overground. This is what HT and NN reported after the Oberthur deal was struck.

The Indian Embassy has clarified that Oberthur Technologies, the French company that has been awarded the printing contract of Machine Readable Passports (MRPs) by Nepal government, is not linked with the manufacturing of e-passports for India. "Attention of the Embassy has been drawn towards certain media reports claiming that Oberthur Technologies 'has been short-listed for manufacturing e-passports for India', which is factually incorrect," the Embassy said in a press release Tuesday.

This about a company that claims that:

Oberthur's Fiduciary Division is the world's third largest private banknote producer, specialized in printing and personalisation of secure documents for government applications.

should explain the number of planted news items in the Nepali media. This is not the end of it all, either. On November 28, NN and Kantipur reported that:

Oberthur had to supply 400,000 copies of the passports, including 1,000 diplomatic, 15,000 special and 25,000 travel documents by November 5 as per the contract between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and Oberthur Technologies in August. The French company is liable to fines for failing to meet the deadline. However, MoFA is in a fix over the period for which to charge the firm.

However, only a few thousand copies of MRPs have arrived at the foreign ministry as of now. It's still not certain how soon the passports will arrive. The company has said, it has already completed printing the passport books and is in the process of shipping them. It has cited the labour strikes in France and the recent terror plot in the Middle East for the lack of a cargo plane to Nepal as the cause for delay in delivering the MRPs on time. Oberthur missed the 70-day deadline to deliver the first consignment by 12 days and the agreement does not clearly mention what should be done in such a case.

Finally, MoFA announced on December 3 that they have received 40,000 MRPs (far short of the 400,000 needed) and MRPs will be issued to the public from December 24. It is to be waited and seen if this imaginary deadline will actually be met. So what happens to the penalty clause that Oberthur pay a fine for not meeting the contractual stipulation. On p. 13 of the contract signed between MoFA and Oberthur, we have: "Liquidated damages for delay in performance is: 0.05% of the Contract price per day with maximum deduction not to exceed ten (10) percent of the Contract price." There is no further talk about penalties, such is the well-written contract between MoFA and Oberthur. Already there are indications that the ambiguity in the contract clause will be used to let Oberthur pay only a small fine:

It is said that the company is being protected on the pretext of confusing situation in the agreement. Neither the controversial agreement clearly mention that what should be done in such a case nor the officials paid their heed towards the delay, which is under suspicion, said the official preferring anonymity.

So let me summarize:
a) Foreign Secretary Madan Kumar Bhattarai and Indian Ambassador to Nepal Rakesh Sood had signed an agreement on March 24 to procure four million MRPs from the Nasik-based Security Printing and Minting Corporation of India for US$ 4 per passport. This is so that Nepal could finally meet its ICAO obligations. Since India has increased its domestic production, it can now meet international demands.
b) India is accused of bulldozing through the contract with planted news, fake attempts at spreading mis-information and through wilful propaganda.
c) The tender stipulations are changed to ensure that India cannot bid again. The tender is awarded to Oberthur while the other contestants claim that Oberthur has misrepresented information in the tender application. The winning tender costs less per passport that the Indian contract, but uses sub-standard security features and paper instead of cloth cover. Oberthur will also hold the personal information of the passport-seekers thereby putting their personal securities at a grave risk.
d) Questions are asked to the Nepali embassy in Korea and France about these allegations, but they never respond. Using the ambiguity clause, the tender is confirmed and the MoFA signs a contract with Oberthur.
e) It emerges that Oberthur has been involved in kickbacks and massive corruption in Kenya, Phillipines and Albania among other countries, so questions of graft in this case are not to be ignored.
f) The first batch of 400K MRPs expected to arrive by November 6th never arrive on time. Oberthur cites terror alert in Yemen, workers strike in France, etc., for these delays.
g) As the contract only makes a cursory statement about penalties for not meeting the contractual obligations, it is not clear that MoFA will use the "Force Majeure" clause to let Oberthur go scot-free.

I believe Shri. Rakesh Sood's position in this game was stacked up. There is not much point cribbing about what he did or did not do, when the games being played by others did not meet any sense of governmental or organizational propriety. Declaring a signed contract null and void and not paying damages to SPMCI (yes, SPMCI sent two letters seeking damages of US$ 48,000) does not augur well in this direction.
6) If you forgot I am still considering the Telegraph piece with a minor diversion into the MRP deal:

Shortly thereafter, Indian embassy officials were reported threatening Madhesi members of the Constituent Assembly with unpleasant consequences if they voted for Prachanda in several failed run-offs to replace Madhav Nepal, the lameduck Prime Minister.

Response: Why is the fact that Krishna Bahadur Mahara caught in a sting getting money from the Chinese not a part of the same equation? Why is the fact that Beijing sent a representative to the annual conference of the Madhesi Jana Adhikar Forum last year not an issue at hand? Why is open Chinese meddling a la the following ok?:

More embarrassing for the Nepali government was the pressure it was subjected to when President Ram Baran Yadav planned to visit a Buddhist monastery in Boudha last year to inaugurate the centenary celebrations of a Buddhist monk. Chinese officials in Kathmandu warned the government that the visit would be interpreted in Beijing as aiding and abetting anti-Chinese activities. President Yadav canceled his visit an hour before his scheduled arrival at Boudha. Boudha is home to a large number of Tibetan refugees.

Meanwhile, Nepal acquisces to China yet again, without a whimper of protestations: Linky

The caretaker government of Nepal, under mounting pressure both at home and the international community over its failure to demobilise the guerrilla army of the opposition Maoist party, has directed its ambassador to Norway and the US, Suresh Chalise, not to attend the Nobel Peace Prize ceremony in Oslo.
...
Nepal’s capitulation comes at a time when China is also pressing Kathmandu to sign two revised bilateral treaties. Besides a revised peace and friendship treaty that would replace the pact signed in 1960, Beijing is also asking Nepal to sign a new cultural cooperation agreement that will upgrade the earlier one inked in 1964 and revised in 1999.

It seems like if China threatens Nepal, it is ok, but if India does something in its interests, whether they be acts that are deplorable or otherwise, it is an act of terrible interventionism or neo-colonialism.

It is a FACT that Nepal and India share open borders, and India has a stake in what goes on inside Nepal for its own safety and security. Hijackings (such as the IC-814) have happened in the past despite Indian warnings that such incidents could happen, counterfeit money is still funneled into India from the open borders via ISI modules, China has set up 100s of safe-houses across the Indian border to monitor the goings and comings in India, terrorist groups often take umbrage across the porous borders, etc. In fact, Niranjan Hojai of DHD(J) and Anthony Shimray (a gun-runner for NSCN(IM)) were nabbed in Kathmandu by joint actions between the NIA and Nepal Police whereas Jewel Garlosa was nabbed in Bangalore after he was tracked all the way from Kathmandu. What to say of cross-border connections to Indian maoists and as a safe-ground for petty criminals. Nepalis even play an active role in the poll process in Bihar and some allegedly are even MPs. India bloody hell has a stake in Nepal. And that stake is not even comparable with that China holds in Nepal. In fact, India did not question Nepal much when the Khampa uprising was put down in 1974 at the behest of China. So why is it that Nepal has more issues when Indian interests are at stake? And what exactly is Sankarshan Thakur trying to stir in this whole bloody mess? For the sake of journalistic integrity, I hope that he declares his sources in the South Block.

Footnote 1: There seems to be a detente of sorts between the Indian establishment and the Nepali mainstream press, as a result of which critical articles on the Indian establishment seem to be taking a round-about route of sourcing from the Indian media. This seems to be a convenient alibi to overcome the Indian establishment's supposed issues with the running of such stories.