Two education related statistics (Pakistan, India and China)

On adult literacy levels in Pakistan over the years, from the article by Anne Goujon and Asif Wazir of the International Institute of Applied Systems Analysis:
Year -- No education -- Primary Incomplete -- Primary Complete -- Lower Secondary -- Upper Secondary -- Higher Education Qualified (first Male, then Female -- all numbers in percentages)

1972 M 68 03 10 14 03 02
1972 F 92 01 03 03 01 01

1981 M 66 -- 12 16 03 03
1981 F 88 -- 05 05 01 01

1998 M 48 06 12 24 05 06
1998 F 74 04 07 10 03 03

2005 M 34 05 15 29 08 09
2005 F 64 03 11 13 04 05

Observations:
1) From the above data, the percentage of literates in Pakistan is growing (in both males and females) over the years -- which should not be very surprising. Every country makes progress on literacy levels if you give them enough time.
2) But this is not how to read the above statistics. To me, the differential in literacy between males and females is a clear indicator of the level of violence in that society (see related posts: Linky 1 and Linky 2). In Pakistan, the illiteracy differential between females and males in Pakistan is 24% in 1972, 22% in 1981, 26% in 1998 and 30% in 2005.
3) From their more detailed paper (Linky), the literacy differential between males and females is 7% in 1951, 19% in 1961, 8% in 1972, 19% in 1981, 23% in 1998, 24% in 2004 and 24% in 2009. On both extremes (illiteracy differential as well as literacy differential), Pakistan is in pakistan (aka deep do-do) and the level of violence is consequently very much explainable.
4) Breaking these figures into provincial statistics from p. 13 of Linky, we have the following differential literacy rates:

Year Punjab Sindh NWFP Baluchistan
1972 19% 19.9% 18.4% 10.5%
1981 20% 18.1% 19.3% 10.9%
1998 22.1% 19.72% 32.57% 21.5%
2004 21.3% 19.80% 38.15% 26.41%

5) Clearly, Punjab and Sindh have stabilized in terms of differential literacy rates and if my hypothesis is correct, then the violence levels in Punjab and Sindh should be pretty much consistent from 1970 and up. Either this trend was not recognized before or the hypothesis of literacy differentials correlating to violence is not completely capturing the picture or the data is being fudged somewhere.
6) On the other hand, NWFP and Baluchistan see a massive jump in the differential literacy rates in the post-Soviet/Taliban setting. While the revolution in Iran (1979) marks the turning point in terms of an upshot for worldwide terrorism trends, the violence level in the neighborhood is slow by a good 10 years. This is not explainable. While terrorism/revolutionary activities spills over very quickly into the neighborhood, why is there a lag in Pakistan? Was it that the CIA arming of mujahideen also come with caveats that prevented a quick Talibanization of the Pakistani mindset?

Salary for higher ed in India, following up from Linky. Some comments from Linky:
1) Two countries -- China and India -- have been the focus of many global education watchers in recent years as they have moved rapidly to expand capacity and expertise in their university systems. The study shows India holding its own in international faculty salary comparisons (factoring in cost of living), but not China. This reality has led Chinese universities, Altbach noted, to offer very high Western-style salaries, to a very small number of academics (typically Chinese expats recruited home). The numbers are such a small share of the total Chinese academic labor pool that they don't influence the Chinese totals, he said, but without these deviations from salary norms, China couldn't attract those researchers. India, in contrast, does not permit universities to deviate from salary norms for superstars.
2) Another area where the countries differ is in the difference between entry-level salaries (averages for assistant professors) and those at the top of their fields (full professors). Across all 28 countries studied, the average ratio of the senior salary average to the junior salary average was 2.06 to 1 (factoring in the PPP). The gaps between senior and junior pay levels were greatest in China (4.3 to 1) and smallest in Norway (1.3 to 1). Western European nations generally had low ratios.
3) Monthly Average Salaries of Public Higher Education Faculty, Using U.S. PPP Dollars

Country -- Entry Level Pay -- Average Pay -- Top Pay

Armenia $405 $538 $665
Russia 433 617 910
China 259 720 1,107
Ethiopia 864 1,207 1,580
Kazakhstan 1,037 1,553 2,304
Latvia 1,087 1,785 2,654
Mexico 1,336 1,941 2,730
Czech Republic 1,655 2,495 3,967
Turkey 2,173 2,597 3,898
Colombia 1,965 2,702 4,058
Brazil 1,858 3,179 4,550
Japan 2,897 3,473 4,604
France 1,973 3,484 4,775
Argentina 3,151 3,755 4,385
Malaysia 2,824 4,628 7,864
Nigeria 2,758 4,629 6,229
Israel 3,525 4,747 6,377
Norway 4,491 4,940 5,847
Germany 4,885 5,141 6,383
Netherlands 3,472 5,313 7,123
Australia 3,930 5,713 7,499
United Kingdom 4,077 5,943 8,369
Saudi Arabia 3,457 6,002 8,524
United States 4,950 6,054 7,358
India 3,954 6,070 7,433
South Africa 3,927 6,531 9,330
Italy 3,525 6,955 9,118
Canada 5,733 7,196 9,485

The Travel Records of Chinese Pilgrims Faxian, Xuanzang, and Yijing

SOURCES FOR CROSS-CULTURAL ENCOUNTERS BETWEEN ANCIENT CHINA AND ANCIENT INDIA By Tansen Sen

I normally do redirect you to other material just for the heck of it. So I give you an abstract from the above 10-page work by Professor Tansen Sen. It has rich maps that I am sure you will love. So click, read and ensoy.

The spread of Buddhist doctrines from India to China beginning sometime in the first century CE triggered a profusion of cross-cultural exchanges that had a profound impact on Asian and world history. The travels of Buddhist monks and pilgrims and the simultaneous circulation of religious texts and relics not only stimulated interactions between the Indian kingdoms and various regions of China, but also influenced people living in Central and Southeast Asia.  Indeed, the transmission of Buddhist doctrines from India to China was a complex process that involved multiple societies and a diverse group of people,  including missionaries, itinerant traders, artisans, and medical professionals.

Chinese pilgrims played a key role in the exchanges between ancient India and ancientChina.They introduced new texts and doctrines to the Chinese  clergy, carried Buddhist paraphernalia for the performance of rituals and ceremonies, and provided detailed accounts of their spiritual journeys to India. Records of Indian society and its virtuous rulers, accounts of the flourishing monastic institutions, and stories about the magical and miraculous prowess  of the Buddha and his disciples often accompanied the descriptions of the pilgrimage sites in their travel records. In fact, these travel records contributed to the development of a unique perception of India among members of the Chinese clergy. For some, India was a sacred, even Utopian, realm. Others saw India as a mystical land inhabited by “civilized” and sophisticated people. In the context of Chinese discourse on foreign peoples, who were often described as uncivilized and barbaric, these accounts significantly elevated the Chinese perception of Indian society.

Faxian, Xuanzang, and Yijing were among hundreds of Chinese monks who made pilgrimages to India during the first millennium CE. The detailed accounts of their journeys make them more famous than others. These travel records are important historical resources for several reasons. First, they provide meticulous accounts of the nature of  Buddhist doctrines, rituals, and monastic institutions in South, Central, and Southeast Asia. Second, they     contain vital information about the social and political conditions in South Asia and kingdoms situated on the routes between China and India. Third, they offer remarkable insights into cross-cultural perceptions and interactions. Additionally, these accounts throw light on the arduous nature of long-distance travel, commercial exchanges, and the relationship between Buddhist pilgrims and itinerant merchants.

Response to Op-ed Column on AFSPA by Ms. Kalpana Sharma

Hi Kalpana,
This is ******. I am writing in response to your article in "The Hindu" dated August 20, 2011 with the title "The Other Half - Another India, another protest" posted online at Linky 0.

Let me start by agreeing with with you when you state that:

Yet even as Hazare's anti-corruption crusade gained momentum with hundreds courting voluntary arrest, in another part of India, a protestor who has used a similar tactic, of going on an indefinite fast, continues to be ignored by the rest of the country and by the political leadership.

It is a pity that much of "mainland" India cannot count the number of Northeastern states, nor tell us much about the issues that lie beneath the various terrorist activities that are rife in these states, nor tell us much about the response of the various State governments and the Union Government of India to these different internal insurgencies, often openly backed and aided by our neighbors both near and far. I congratulate you in picking this topic for your op-ed column.

However, when you say that,

... some might consider it irrelevant to talk about a corner of the country where a lone woman continues her fight against the truly undemocratic Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) imposed on Manipur that has made life a living hell for the ordinary people of that State.

First of all, you are dealing in what can be said to be circular logic, lest you did not know. The Armed Forces Special Powers Act has been imposed in Manipur on the insistence of the State Government of Manipur. Please see Linky 1 where you will find that:

The Articles in the Constitution of India empower state governments to declare a state of emergency due to one or more of the following reasons:
• Failure of the administration and the local police to tackle local issues.
• Return of (central) security forces leads to return of miscreants/erosion of the "peace dividend".
• The scale of unrest or instability in the state is too large for local forces to handle.

Please also see Linky 2 which reports that the Government of Manipur is the entity that recommends the continuance of AFSPA for all areas except the Imphal Valley.

Second, the Government of Manipur is a Government that has been elected by the people of Manipur in the 2007 Assembly elections. While there may have been small discrepancies that are a part of the normative discourse of any participatory democracy and as seen in every place in India ("mainland" or otherwise), much of the 2007 Assembly elections in Manipur have been regarded as free and fair. The Election Commission of India had made immense measures to ensure that it was free and fair, see Linky 3 and Linky 4, for example. A report from the Manipuri media claimed the following (see Linky 5):

In line with the deep rooted sense of democracy, inherited from the past, the people of Manipur are more conscious of the electioneering system as was apparent by the large turn out of voters in past few elections as well as favourable response from the electorates to the current the 9th Manipur Legislative assembly election. Despite sporadic violent incidents and incessant rains, the voter turn out in the first and second phase polling hovered near the 90 percent mark.

In addition, 80% turnout was seen in the third phase (see Linky 6). See also Linky 7 for Manipuri newspaper E-Pao's 2007 election coverage. I can dig up similar statistics for the 2009 Parliamentary elections, but I will refrain from that as of now. My point is that the people of Manipur have overwhelmingly placed their confidence in the electoral process and as a product of this affirmation of trust that we keep seeing repeatedly, the Government of Manipur derives its power to promulgate laws and run the State. This is despite all the various ills that plague governance in India as is witnessed by the campaign of Anna Hazare and his team.

Ergo, when the State of Manipur wants the AFSPA to continue knowing the ground realities on the security situation in the State, how is that a violation of the popular will of the people (which is exactly what is meant by the term "undemocratic")? How is that the people who want the AFSPA to be revoked in Manipur not taking part in electoral exercises and instead indulging in popular/fiat-type protests? The same can be asked about Anna Hazare and his team as to why they are not standing in elections on a one-line plank of rooting out corruption in Indian society given that they believe and claim to be People's true respresentative or representing the "popular will" of the People. Lest I digress from my main point, why are people, who have an issue with anything that an elected Government does, not taking part in elections and testing how much popularity their plank with the People they claim to often represent in some sense lies? Why is this fact not called out by the Indian media across ideological proclivities?

I am sure there are various sentiments to support a "David" who is slinging against a "Goliath", but then should not these metaphorical comparisons be also subjected to the same scrutiny in every sense: a David of the Hindu Kashmiri Pandits against the Goliath of repressive terrorism of an overwhelming Islamist religious tinge that is responsible for internal dispersion of one set of Indians within India, a David of Jammu activists against a Goliath of the supreme embodiment of Justice in India -- the Hon'ble Supreme Court -- that has not allowed for redistricting the electoral constituencies in Jammu and Kashmir in accordance with the "one-man/woman, one vote" paradigm to which India Constitutionally acceded to on Jan. 26, 1950, a David of Hindu Ahomese against a Goliath of the political plank across the state and across partyline that has normatized demographic invasion of India and Indian territory by Bangladeshi Muslims somuchso that Muslim percentage in the border districts have been growing at an abnormal pace vis-a-vis the rest of India Linky 8. We have neither seen the fruition of the implementation of the IMDT Act nor its continuance in the form it was meant to take. A David of pre-dominantly Hindu Meitei residents of Manipur state against extra-State factors such as both factions of the Nationalist Socialist Council of Nagalim that supports both the Kuki as well as the Naga rioters, including ANSAM, in blockading NH-39 and NH-53, and so on and so forth.

More pertinent to the point, regarding the Jeevan Reddy commission recommendations that you highlighted, did you take a look at a report linked at Linky 9, where it is said that:

• The Army is not averse to review of AFSPA provided its concerns are addressed. The Army would require special powers to combat terrorism as all other instruments of state to restore normalcy have failed.
• The civil government still retains control as they would have to declare an area as ‘disturbed’ under the ‘disturbed area act’ before AFSPA can be applied.
• Why dilute the Act which provides legal cover to the Army to operate. If the Army is not required, the area should not be declared as ‘disturbed’.
• Since Army is called in only when the situation has deteriorated to unacceptable levels, the requirement of very strict enabling provisions is necessary.
• Army is aware of its responsibilities and its outstanding human rights record reflects the same.

Despite this report, when you claim that,

The committee recommended, amongst other things, a withdrawal of AFSPA. So Sharmila's demand is not unreasonable; a government-appointed committee has endorsed it. But the recommendation was given more than six years ago. Yet today, the security forces continue to enjoy the right to act with impunity, while the citizens of Manipur, who are also citizens of India, live without many fundamental rights guaranteed to them under our Constitution.

you are factually as well as rhetorically wrong. The fact is that the Indian Army will have no locus standi in Manipur unless the democratically ELECTED Government of Manipur "invites" the Army to maintain peace and security of its citizenry. The fact is that this is done by a Government elected by the people of Manipur only means that they know what they are doing when they invoke AFSPA. That is because the civil/State police forces have FAILED to maintain peace and security and as a last resort available to any democratically elected Government, the Army has been invited. Further, it is no walk in the park for the Army. Their personnel die or get maimed, willingly, in services for the call of ANY elected Government in India, independent of the Party in power, and often unrecognized by even the respective States where they die for because of the nature of rabble-rousing indulged by small sets of their population, in contrast to any democratic credential with which any State has to mediate often with.

The fact that just because one Irom Sharmila demands a withdrawal of AFSPA or a Justice (Retd.) Jeevan Reddy Commission says the same, does not put all the blame on the Indian Army. In the post-1947 history, the Indian Army has always acceded to the demands of an elected Government and the Indian Army has so far not done anything to the contrary on the AFSPA episode. Thus, you can do a follow-up on your op-ed and clear any ambiguities/doubts that may persist in the mind of a gullible reader that the Indian Army is to blame for this mess. Put the blame where it squarely lies, with the People of Manipur of whom Irom Sharmila is only one citizen. Factually, as well as rhetorically, that is the right course to take here.

Further, one Irom Sharmila does not Manipur make. Manipur or rather ~90% of its electing population, DID vote for some Party/individuals that contested elections. That speaks enormously in contrast to populist bandwagonning that the media often indulges in. I must also mention that you are not the first person to claim (directly or indirectly) that the Indian Army/the Government of India is all wrong in imposing AFSPA in poor-poor Manipur. I must bring to notice CPM ideologue Mr. Ashok Mitra's op-ed column in the Telegraph Linky 10. I replied to him and the Telegraph on this matter and my response can be seen at Linky 11. Sadly, neither the Telegraph published my response nor Mr. Mitra responded to me on my questions/comments. I hope that you/the Hindu group will do one better than Mr. Mitra/the Telegraph.

Looking forward to an exchange of ideas,
Sincerely,
********

PS: I must admit that I did not have any idea about your writing till I googled for your columns in crafting a response to your column. I will take a look at your co-edited book titled, "Whose News? The Media and Women's Issues and Terror Counter-Terror: Women Speak Out." since I am keen on learning about the issues in the Indian Northeast from different perspectives.

India and its near-abroad

The Economists' take on India and what it should have done, not-done yada yada, yet for all its agenda and whatnot it does have some truth to it - of course you need to ensure you blood does not boil at the tone of the article.

NO ONE loves a huge neighbour. For all that, India’s relations with the countries that ring it are abysmal. Of the eight with which it shares a land or maritime boundary, only two can be said to be happy with India: tiny Maldives, where India has the only foreign embassy and dispenses much largesse, and Bhutan, which has a policy of being happy about everything. Among its other South Asian neighbours, the world’s biggest democracy is incredible mainly because of its amazing ability to generate wariness and resentment.

Until recently it operated a shoot-to-kill policy towards migrant workers and cattle rustlers along its long border with Bangladesh. Over the years it has meddled madly in Nepal’s internal affairs. In Myanmar India snuggles up to the country’s thuggish dictators, leaving the beleaguered opposition to wonder what happened to India’s championing of democracy. Relations with Sri Lanka are conflicted. It treats China with more respect, but feuds with it about its border

The following two paragraphs seems to be in indirect ode to MMS and SG.

With the notable exception of India’s prime minister, Manmohan Singh, who has heroically persisted in dialogue with Pakistan in the face of provocations and domestic resistance, India’s dealings with its neighbours are mostly driven by arrogance and neglect. It has shared shockingly little of its economic dynamism and new-found prosperity with those around it. Just 5% of South Asia’s trade is within the region.

Too little and too late, the neglect is starting to be replaced by engagement (see article). This week Sonia Gandhi, dynastic leader of India’s ruling Congress Party, visited Bangladesh—a first. And on July 27th India’s foreign minister hosted his Pakistani counterpart, the first such meeting in a year. He promised a “comprehensive, serious and sustained” dialogue.

One thing I do agree is the lack of vision. Maybe before the current economic prosperity India did not have the necessary muscle or economic power to create and nurture a vision. What use is a vision if one does not have the capability to implement it, right? With India's attention to South East Asia, hopefully it has now a better vision and clarity of purpose to take its agenda forward.

Second, dynamic India can hardly soar globally while mired in its own backyard. Promoting regional prosperity is surely the best way to persuade neighbours that its own rise is more of an opportunity than a threat. Yet India lacks any kind of vision. A region-wide energy market using northern neighbours’ hydropower would transform South Asian economies. Vision, too, could go a long way to restoring ties that history has cut asunder, such as those between Karachi and Mumbai, once sister commercial cities but now as good as on different planets; and Kolkata and its huge former hinterland in Bangladesh. Without development and deeper integration, other resentments will be hard to soothe. It falls on the huge unloved neighbour to make the running.

Oh well, Karachi and Mumbai becoming sisters again? It is a dream for the select few. For the realists, it is not going to happen unless Pakistan changes and becomes friendly towards India. Not going to happen anytime soon.

National vs. State Parties: A Case for the "Regional Party" Tag

From Linky

With the Election Commission taking strong action against those parties not fulfilling the minimum eligibility criteria for getting recognition as “national” or “State” parties, the number of national parties in the country has come down to six from seven. The total number of State parties is 52 and registered unrecognised parties, 1112. A “State party” is entitled to exclusive allotment of its reserved symbol to its candidates in the States where it is recognised, and a candidate of a “national Party” can use the reserved symbol throughout India.

Now, the six recognised national parties are the Congress, the Bharatiya Janata Party, the Communist Party of India (CPI), the CPI(M), the Bahujan Samaj Party and the Nationalist Congress Party. The Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), which was earlier considered a national party, will henceforth be only a recognised State level party in Bihar, Jharkhand and Manipur. Its recognition in Nagaland has been withdrawn in view of its poor performance in the 2008 Assembly election there. For getting national party status, a political party should have recognition in at least four States.

Here is the complete list of all national, state and registered unrecognized parties: Linky
From the ECI website, Linky

The recognition of a political party and its continued recognition as national or state party are governed by the provisions of paragraphs 6A, 6B and 6C of the Symbols Order. For facility of reference, the said paragraphs 6A, 6B and 6C are reproduced below:

6A. Conditions for recognition as a State Party – A Political Party shall be eligible for recognition as a State Party in a state, if, and only if, any of the following conditions is fulfilled:
(i) At the last general election to the Legislative Assembly of the State, the candidates set up by the party have secured not less than six percent of the total valid votes polled in the State; and, in addition, the party has returned at least two members to the Legislative Assembly of that state at such general election; or
(ii) At the last general election to the House of the People from that State, the candidates set up by the party have secured not less than six percent of the total valid votes polled in the State; and, in addition, the party has returned at least one member to the House of the People from that State at such general election; or
(iii) At the last general election to the Legislative Assembly of the State, the party has won at least three percent of the total number of seats in the Legislative Assembly, (any fraction exceeding half being counted as one), or at least three seats
in the Assembly, whichever is more; or
(iv) At the last general election to the House of the People from the State, the party has returned at least one member to the House of the People for every 25 members or any fraction thereof allotted to that state.

6B. Conditions for recognition as a National Party – A Political party shall be eligible to be recognized as National Party, if, and only if, any of the following conditions is fulfilled:
(i) The candidates set up by the party, in any four or more States, at the last general election to the House of the People, or to the Legislative Assembly of the State concerned, have secured not less than six percent of the total valid votes polled in each of those states at that general election; and, in addition, it has returned at least four members to the House of the People at the aforesaid last general election from any State or States; or
(ii) At the last general election to the House of the People, the party has won at least two percent of the total number of seats in the House of the People, any fraction exceeding half being counted as one, and the Party’s candidates have been elected to that House from not less than three States; or
(iii) The party is recognized as State party in at least four States.

6C. Conditions for continued recognition as a National or State Party. – If a political party is recognized as a State party under paragraph 6A, or as a National Party under paragraph 6B, the question whether it shall continue to be so recognized
after any subsequent general election to the House of the People or, as the case may be, to the Legislative Assembly of the state concerned, shall be dependent upon the fulfillment by it of the conditions specified in the said paragraphs on the results of that general election.

The above rules are well laid out. The 6% mark has been recognized as an indicator of electoral legitimacy accorded by the electorate on a Party. While the Indian National Congress and Bharatiya Janata Party are far above the 6% mark in almost all states in India, the National Party recognition of some parties such as the NCP is "suspect".

The following analysis will show that a legitimate case can be made for a set of Parties that are simutaneously "smaller" than the National Parties while "bigger" than the State Parties. These are the parties that wield an ideological hold over the electorate on a regional basis. I would like to call such parties "Regional Parties" (overriding the colloquial usage of the term regional party). While the National Parties enjoy considerable advantages during the election time, the "Regional Parties" can be deemed to enjoy advantages smaller in number than the National Parties, but at the same time be better off than the State Parties.

Here is the table of % of valid votes polled in the nation as a whole from the House of People (Lok Sabha) 2009 Elections: Linky

Party name, No. of seats won, % of valid votes polled
Bahujan Samaj Party 21 6.17
Bharatiya Janata Party 116 18.80
Communist Party of India 4 1.43
Communist Party of India (Marxist) 16 5.33
Indian National Congress 206 28.55
Nationalist Congress Party 9 2.04
Rashtriya Janata Dal 4 1.27

Clearly, BSP, BJP and INC are >6% mark, while the CPI(M) comes close to that magic 6% number. Note that RJD, NCP and CPI are far short of the 6% mark. While the Election Commission of India de-recognized the RJD because of failure to meet the stipulations, the CPI and NCP continue to wield the recognition of National Parties.

A more detailed breakdown of the list of states where >6% valid votes were secured by the above parties in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections: Linky
1) BSP: Uttar Pradesh (27.42%), Chandigarh (17.88%), Haryana (15.74%), Uttarakhand (15.24%); Madhya Pradesh with 5.85% share and Punjab with 5.75% vote share get rounded out to 6%. While Chandigarh cannot be legitimately considered as providing a moral sanction on a National Party given the microscopicity of the UT of Chandigarh relative to the Indian Union, the far-more populous states of UP, Haryana, Uttarakhand, MP and Punjab accord a moral legitimacy to BSP's status as a National Party. This is also confirmed by the 6.17% national vote share by BSP in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections.
2) CPI: As of 2008, the CPI had state party status in West Bengal (essentially piggy-backing on the CPI(M)-led Left Front's performance in the 2004 elections), Jharkhand and Tamil Nadu (piggy-backing on the DMK's performance in the 2004 elections) on the basis of its representation in Parliament, while in Manipur and Kerala the party is recognised on the basis of its presence in the State Assembly. While the % vote share of CPI in the 2009 elections are not available to me in West Bengal and Jharkhand (I do not expect the numbers to be >6% since the Left combine took a beating in both West Bengal and Jharkhand), its numbers in Manipur and Kerala are 14.92% and 7.44%, respectively. Other states with decent vote share in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections include Tamil Nadu (2.85%) and Orissa (2.57%). In addition to these facts, the CPI as the founding Communist Party in India has historical roots in Andhra Pradesh and the tribal areas of Jharkhand and Chattisgarh where activism against the land-owning zamindars and as a forerunner to the mobilization of the workers' and laborers' unity has put it in a good light. Despite all these claims to being a National Party, the CPI can boast of no more than 1.43% of the national vote share, which casts serious doubts on its National Party credentials. In fact, the CPI fits to a T the status of a duopolistic regional contender with one regional focus being along the West Bengal-Tripura-Manipur axis and another in the Kerala-Tamil Nadu-Andhra Pradesh-Jharkhand axis.
3) CPI(M): Tripura (61.69%), West Bengal (33.10%), Kerala (30.48%). The only other states with >2% vote share are Andaman & Nicobar Is (4.23%) and Tamil Nadu (2.20%). Clearly, the regional footprint of CPI (M) is visible with a Kerala-Tamil Nadu front on the one hand, and a West Bengal-Tripura-Andaman & Nicobar Is. front on the other. This picture is somehow lost when the 5.33% national vote share of the CPI(M) is seen. Thus, one has to be careful as statistics can lie too, as is well-known.
4) NCP: Lakshadweep (46.87%), Goa (23.28%), Maharashtra (19.28%), Meghalaya (18.78%). Manipur with 5.96% vote share gets rounded out to 6%. The only other reasonable vote shares are seen in Daman & Diu (3.15%) and Andaman & Nicobar Is (2.76%). It is patently clear that the NCP has achieved the recognition of a National Party by exploiting the well-articulated rules. Clearly, Lakshadweep, Goa, Meghalaya, and Manipur are small states, and the only big state where the NCP has a legitimate claim is Maharashtra. This is also seen in its national vote share of 2.04%, far short of the 6% moral legitimacy mark. While the NCP may have milked the system, it does not have the moral legitimacy of a National Party in lieu of its >6% vote share only in small states. On the other hand, NCP clearly has a regional footprint by its due importance in political matters in Goa, Maharashtra, Daman & Diu, Lakshadweep (on the one hand), and Manipur, Meghalaya, Andaman & Nicobar Is. (on the other hand). NCP makes a perfect case for a "Regional Party."
5) RJD: Bihar (19.31%), Jharkhand (5.33%), Manipur (0.36%), Nagaland (did not contest). State Assembly polls of Bihar in 2005 (23.45%), Manipur in 2007 (6.67%), Nagaland in 2008 (6.56%), Jharkhand in 2009 (5.03%). While de-recognition of the RJD is within the rules, RJD as seen by its vote-share clearly has a regional role in Bihar and Jharkhand.

Moral: The cases of CPI(M) and NCP clearly expose the pitfalls of using numbers to categorize National and "Regional Parties." Somehow, a more sensible and rational choice than the one that is currently used should be arrived at. But such a choice should not be as temporal as a decision that is based on the most recent electoral trends and some "generous" leeway should be bestowed to historical roots and legacies, long-standing credibility, etc. As an officially bipartisan organization, the ECI has its hands tied in terms of revolutionizing (see Footnote 1) the Symbols Order of 1968 as its role is limited to validating and implementing the Symbols Order alone.

A case in point is that in the immediate aftermath of the 2000 General Elections, CPI(M) was de-recognized by the ECI in accordance with the statutes, but CPI(M) bounced back with its most respectable performance in the 2004 elections. Needless to say, the loss of its electoral symbol must have dealt a fairly decent blow to the CPI(M) in the 2004 elections and must have put it at some degree of a skewed electoral field, all the while when clearly regional outfits such as NCP had enjoyed the same benefits that were denied to the CPI(M).

Footnote 1: The ECI's role also includes modifying the Symbols Order as the case may be within a narrow interpretative confine (which precludes any hope of revolutionizing the Symbols Order). For example, the Election Commission of India had issued a notice to CPI in 2004 to explain why its National Party recognition should not be withdrawn. But the Commission modified its guidelines in 2005 giving the national status to a party recognised as a State Party in a minimum of four states, thus enabling CPI to keep its status as is.

Indo-American Relations: A History

As part of an interesting discussion at BRF, RamaY and I challenged each other to provide a snapshot of what we thought was America's views towards India. My task was to provide a brief summary of sources of America's foreign policy decisions when it came to India.

What I did was browsed the internet & read articles plus 'Google Books' and provided a glimpse into the relations in zimple englipees. To put it crudely, I am just regurgitating, albeit in a form that hopefully is easy to understand for Ram, Robert and Rahim. After you have read it top to bottom, you should see a pattern and be able to explain the nuances to your parents, siblings, friends, offspring, relatives and enemies. If you are not able to do so, then it mean I have much more to learn about the art of writing - which is actually a lot. Or, that you might be lacking in certain areas. Give that a thought too :-)

If you want to spend more time away from your family, work and leisure, then the references should provide you plenty of hours to while away.

Here is what I summarized. Ensoy thangamani.

Read more »